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Abstract 
 
This study discusses issues of control mechanisms in the capital expenditure of 
Indonesian local government, because capital expenditure is the second largest portion 
of local government spending after the personnel expenditure.  Indonesian local 
governments were chosen as a study sample because Indonesia has been undergoing 
major bureaucratic reform as a consequence of receiving financial assistance from 
international institutions.  This study involves five local governments from a province, 
including 64 participants from 37 local government agencies.  In addition, this study 
also uses transcripts of interviews as secondary sources, and makes an extensive 
examination of regulations concerning capital expenditure.  
 
The findings indicate that capital expenditure involves many parties with their own 
interests, whereby every party exercises its power over local government for realising a 
project.  Meanwhile, the internal conditions of local governments are still dealing with 
technical and cultural obstacles to accommodating the interests of all parties.  Moreover, 
local government officials also have vested interests in the use of capital expenditure.  
Hence, the control mechanisms intended to monitor the capital expenditure of local 
government are still vulnerable to misuse and irregularities 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1. Background of Study 
 Researchers began investigating designs of organisational structure and 
accounting control systems during the 1990s.  Researchers in organisational theory 
focus on identifying factors which affect the structure of organisations.  Meanwhile, 
accounting researchers emphasise the nature and extent of accounting-based control, in 
order to enhance effective planning and decision making (Miah and Mia, 1996).  In 
addition, the wave of „new public management‟ reforms in the1980s and 1990s 
increased the importance of the idea of responsible accounting in the public sector 
(Modell and Lee, 2001).  Furthermore, Modell and Lee (2001) suggested the 
cornerstone of responsibility accounting is the controllability principle, whereby 
managers must take responsibility for events and accounting items under their control, 
which is determined by the organisation structure, particularly in the public sector. 
 
 In the 1980s the decentralised organisational structure spread around the 
developed world.  In general, this policy can be viewed from two perspectives: top-
down or bottom-up. The top-down perspective perceives decentralisation as a strategy 
for diversifying responsibilities and crisis management in order to reduce the work 
overload and financial stress of a central government‟s administration.  Meanwhile, the 
bottom-up perspective perceives decentralisation as an expression of self-government.  
These perspectives are not mutually exclusive and can complement each other (Elander 
and Montin, 1990).  The common rationale for decentralisation is both economic and 
fiscal, enabling local governments to finance capital investments through long-term debt 
from the private market.  Hence, capital investment enhances the autonomy of local 
governments and strengthens the fiscal condition of the central government by reducing 
the grants it distributes.  The other rationale is macro-political in that it intends to 
maintain democratic stability by simultaneously gaining support for its legitimacy and 
reducing political tension because a regime supported by a small group may cause 
dissatisfaction and may be avoided by international donors (Guess, 2005). 
 
 The governments of Indonesia introduced decentralisation as part of the 
reformation agenda that was launched in 1999, however, it is regarded as a long term 
process which aims to make substantial changes and shifts in the behaviour of all 
governmental actors, i.e. central officials, local governments and citizens.  For example, 
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the process involves a balance between national and local government goals.  Hence, 
the central government needs to regulate the local governments to support national 
priorities and ensure that they behave accountably and responsibly (Lewis and Smoke, 
2008). Unfortunately, the new decentralisation policy has been characterised by the 
emergence of decentralised corruption committed by local officers.  Many heads of 
cities or districts assume the role of “a king in a small kingdom”, whereby they can 
determine their own goals without considering the interests of the other cities, districts 
or the greater interests of the province or nation (Firman, 2009).  Moreover, public 
involvement or pressure from local members of parliament are insufficient to enhance 
financial accountability and encourage the desired attitude and conduct changes (Harun, 
2007).  
 
 Despite these challenges, the GOI has devolved a large amount of money, 
particularly in capital expenditures, to stimulate economic growth in all regions.  Local 
governments allocate approximately 17% of their budget for capital expenditure (Lewis 
and Smoke, 2008).  From 2005 to 2009 government expenditure on infrastructure 
increase significantly.  In 2005, the total expenditure was approximately IDR 20tn 
(roughly equal to USD2,345,879,950
1
), and it increased to approximately IDR 60tn 
(equal to USD3,060,000,000
2
) in 2009.  The highest increase in capital expenditure for 
infrastructure occurred in 2008, from about IDR 40tn in 2007 to roughly IDR 55tn in 
2008 (Bappenas, 2011).  However, a survey on vulnerability to extortion suggests that 
the situation is influenced by the industrial sector and firm size. This suggests that, in 
Indonesia, construction and public works companies are the most vulnerable compared 
to the other sectors (Arvis and Berenbeim, 2003).   
 
 Furthermore, capital expenditure in Indonesia is extensive on the central and 
local government levels.  Appendix 1 provides details of capital expenditure on the 
municipal level from 2006 to 2010, based on data from the Central Bureau of Statistics 
(Badan Pusat Statistik / BPS), and sourced via the official website www.bps.go.id.  It 
covers two types of expenditures, i.e. direct and indirect.  Indirect expenditure is 
allocated to cover governments‟ periodic liabilities; while direct expenditure is budgeted 
based on proposed programmes or specific activities (Darise, 2009).  Total expenditure 
is the sum of indirect expenditure and direct expenditure.  Appendix 1 indicates that the 
proportion of capital expenditure compared to total expenditure ranges from 32.29% to 
                                                          
1
 Assuming exchange rate on 2005 were USD1 = IDR9,830 
2
Assuming exchange rate on 2009 were USD1 = IDR9,400 
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21.24%.  The proportion of capital expenditure is gradually decreasing every year, in 
2006 it was 32.29%, and in the following years it was 30.84%, 28.39%, 25.84, and 
21.24% respectively.  Between 2006 and 2010 it decreased by a total of 11.05%.  The 
decrease of capital expenditure is followed by an increase in indirect expenditure, which 
means that the municipal government is still emphasising routine spending rather than 
capital expenditure because managing indirect/routine expenditure is much easier and 
more predictable than capital expenditure.  The municipal level tends to focus on 
indirect expenditure in order to meet its budget target instead of direct or capital 
expenditure. 
 
 Appendix 2 presents the ratios of capital expenditure to total expenditure on the 
provincial level from 2005 to 2010.  The table indicates that the ratio is relatively stable 
compared to the ratio on the municipal level.  The ratio for provincial outgoings is in the 
range of 21.33% to 28.04%.  The indirect expenditure at the provincial level is also 
stable; indicating that the focus of the provincial level is on routine spending and capital 
expenditure.  In addition, examining the ratio of capital expenditure to total expenditure 
for the central government indicates that the ratio is lower than the ratio for municipal 
governments or provincial governments.  The ratio for the central government is 
between 10.50% and 15.52%, as shown in appendix 3.  These conditions indicate that 
many capital expenditure projects have been devolved to the lower level, both 
provincial and municipal, in line with the decentralisation policy.    
 
 Overall, the ratio of capital expenditure to total expenditure indicates that the 
ratio for the local government (municipal and provincial governments) is higher than 
the ratio for the central government.  Hence, capital expenditure on the local level needs 
to be monitored and controlled properly, because ineffective or incompetent control 
affects the outcomes and achievements in every area of public policy (Thompson and 
Jones, 1986).  Therefore, this study focuses on the local government rather than the 
central government.  Subsequently, this study explores the perceptions of local 
government officials, especially relating to the establishment of capital expenditure 
control in the local government.  The reformation of the capital expenditure control 
system, especially at the local government level, began at the behest of Indonesia‟s 
government in 1998 through the involvement of several international institutions. These 
institutions provided the GOI with funds and stipulate the values to be adopted by all 
levels of the Indonesian government following the Asian crisis in 1997.  
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1.2. Local Government Administration 
 As the institution overseeing the local government, the central government 
needs to ensure the accountability of the usage of the local governments‟ resources by 
requiring local governments to comply with and employ the established control systems  
(Lewis and Smoke, 2008).  This is particularly necessary in the decentralisation era, in 
which vast amounts of money are devolved to local governments in order to undertake 
various projects; hence, an efficient allocation of funds requires cooperation between 
the central government and local governments, in order to achieve national objectives 
(Aquina and Bekke, 1993).  In this context, control is often interpreted as an 
administrative process designed to regulate the activities of organisations through 
formal and informal mechanisms such as authority structures, rules, policies, standard 
operating procedures, budgets, reward and incentive systems, shared values, and 
information sharing among organisation members (Kenis, 2006; Harrison and 
McKinnon, 2007). However, these control systems are perceived as inadequate due to 
their poorly designed mechanisms, weak control and limited oversight by parliament 
and civil society (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2007; Mimba et al., 2007). 
 
 Historically, finance and accounting systems at the Indonesian local 
government level have been developed along with improvements in governmental 
structure.  Single entry bookkeeping with a cash basis was employed from 1945 until 
1998.  Although in some stages it was refined through regulations and laws, the 
alterations did not change the substance of the system.  For example, The regulations 
(Undang-undang No. 5/1974), laws (Peraturan Pemerintah No. 5 and 6/1976), and 
Manual Administrasi Keuangan Daerah – MAKUDA (Manual of Financial 
Administration of Regions) of 1981 asserted the implementation of the cash basis and 
single entry system (Priyono, 2012).  Based on these systems, the government could not 
produce a balance sheet that explained the position of the assets and liabilities of each 
local government; hence, the local government could not value their own assets and 
liabilities.  
 
 Therefore, when the “New Order” regime collapsed, the people demanded 
greater accountability and transparency from the government.  The government issues 
regulations regarding accountability to establish a committee to develop and set 
government accounting standards, which would incorporate an accrual basis and double 
entry system.  Although the accrual basis has yet to be fully implemented, the 
government has been employing cash towards accrual as a bridging system into full 
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accrual which is supposed to be implemented by every local government by 2015.  
Hereafter, all public expenditure by local governments must comply with the 
requirements of the relevant legal acts and must be recorded, based on the “Standard 
Akuntansi Pemerintahan” (Government Accounting Standards) that are imposed by the 
central government, in order to enable errors and fraud in public finance management to 
be identified (Mackevičius and Pranckevičiūtė, 2007).   
 
 Regarding transparency, the central government had attempted to strengthen 
the position of Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan/BPK as Indonesia‟s supreme auditor, in 
addition to the Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan Pembangunan/BPKP as the internal 
auditor of the central government, because their roles were not clear in the previous era.  
The BPK and BPKP require the publication of audit reports, or at least that the reports 
are made publically available upon requests.  Through these policies, the government 
has built infrastructures enhancing accountability and transparency.  However, 
administering such a massive nation is not an easy task and Indonesia still suffers from 
poor governance when compared to other countries in Asia (Scott, 1999; Shankar and 
Shah, 2001; McGee, 2008; Kamal and Rahim, 2008).  The development of Indonesia‟s 
local government and its financial and accounting systems is presented in detail in 
appendix 4, which is summarised in Table 1.1, and depicts the changes applied to 
several elements of the old regime by the new one.  
 
Table 1.1 Shifting of several aspects in the old regime and the new regime.   
CHANGES OLD REGIME NEW REGIME 
 
Organisational structure 
 
Centralised. Decentralised. 
Financial management 
Central government managed 
most of the development 
funds. 
Central government devolves 
development funding to the 
local government for 
management. 
 
Personnel 
Central government managed 
all government officials. 
The central government 
transferred most of the 
government officials to the 
local government. 
 
Formal control mechanisms 
The central government 
lacked formal control and the 
role of government auditors 
was undermined. 
The central government has 
adopted many best practices, 
implemented software 
applications, and emplaced 
government auditors. 
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Informal control mechanisms 
The central government 
controlled every aspect of 
society; particularly the 
dissemination of information. 
 
The central government 
liberated dissemination of 
information, and even 
endorses it.  
 
As shown by Table 1.1, this study covers several aspects, including organisational 
structure, financial management, personnel aspects, and formal and informal control 
mechanisms, which are specifically related to capital expenditure decisions. 
 
1.3. Aims and Objectives  
 This study is being undertaken in an attempt to acquire a deeper understanding 
of the interrelationships and interactions of all actors related to capital expenditure at the 
local government level of Indonesia following the introduction of new values adopted 
from international institution by the central government.  Hence, in the first stage, this 
research identifies the actors and how the actors affect capital expenditure decisions.  
Subsequently, it explores the interrelationships and interactions among the actors, and 
how the local government officials perceive the roles of those actors in relation to 
strengthening capital expenditure control.  Finally, this study explores how those parties 
directly and indirectly affect capital expenditure control.  This study will identify weak 
points in the control mechanism by investigating the aforementioned factors.  Hence, 
the findings can be used to strengthen the control mechanism in the future.    
 
 In order to explore the dynamics of local government, the researcher employed 
a case study in a province with a long history of governance as a kingdom, which has 
abundant references regarding governance practices in this realm.  Knowledge of the 
contents of these volumes is required to comprehend the local values of this particular 
government that might affect the implementation of the newly introduced values.  
Hence, the case study approach is compatible with this objective. As this study focuses 
on the nature of decision-making processes in a particular local government; the 
findings are unlikely to be generalizable to the other regions which may raise questions 
regarding its validity. Therefore, in order to enhance the validity of the information 
collected by the interviews, the data is confirmed by other data from secondary sources, 
both in the form of interview transcripts and government documents such as laws and 
regulations. 
 
1.4. Contributions of Study 
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 This study investigates Indonesian local government differently from previous 
studies.  First, none of the previous studies investigated the impact of the vast changes 
to the financial and accounting systems on local government institutions.  This study 
focuses on the processes of establishing social structure in the organisation of 
Indonesia‟s local government, which has barely been investigated (Djamhuri, 2009) and 
is often neglected because the human resource factor is regarded as statistically 
insignificant (Mustafa et al., 2011).    
 
 Second, previous studies examining capital expenditure of the Indonesian local 
government focused on quantitative research methods rather than the qualitative 
approach.  The context of this study is capital expenditure in local government, and 
several studies related to capital expenditure have quantitatively examined how the 
capital expenditure budget is affected by local revenues (Pendapatan Asli Daerah), 
specifically allocated funds (Dana Alokasi Khusus), generally allocated funds (Dana 
Alokasi Umum), and revenue sharing (Dana Bagi Hasil), such as (Jaya and Dwirandra, 
2014; Wandira, 2013; Nuarisa, 2013; Arwati and Hadiati, 2013).   
 
 Third, none of the previous studies investigates control mechanisms from many 
aspects with emphasising specifically on capital expenditure, either in Indonesia local 
government or local government of any other countries.  Most of the studies on 
financial control of local government focus on public expenditure in general, such as 
studies on Comunitat Valenciana – Spain (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007); Portuguese 
municipalities (Afonso and Fernandes, 2008); Belgian local government (Borger and 
Kerstens, 1996) as the sample of their study.  While, several example studies with 
Indonesian local government as the sample are Abdullah & Asmara (2006), Mimba et 
al. (2007), Djamhuri (2009) and Harun & Kamase (2012).  Therefore, this study is 
expected to contribute to the study on capital expenditure control of local government.  
In particular, to give an understanding of the rationales of discrepancies between capital 
expenditure controls that strategically has been established by the central government 
and the implementation of controls on the local government level. 
 
 For current practice, this study is expected to give insights into the social 
structure in a local government organisation, which should be useful for the central 
government when introducing new laws or regulations.  Hence, the central government 
can select the appropriate approach to minimise the emergence of resistance from local 
governments.  For instance, in 2008, the central government passed regulation 
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No.60/2008 concerning Sistem Pengendalian Intern Pemerintah (Governmental Internal 
Control Systems).  At present, this regulation is still in the dissemination stage and has 
not been fully implemented. Therefore, the central government needs to formulate a 
specific approach to introducing it, by considering the current values of its local 
governments, in order to achieve an effective standard and level of control. 
  
 This study utilises a Foucauldian lens to analyse the interrelationships and 
interactions among the actors related to capital expenditure.  The analysis identifies the 
types of interrelationships and interactions; in particular, how the actors exercise their 
power over each other.  Many factors affecting the process and mechanisms employed 
by those actors can be identified in this study.  Interviewing primary sources provides 
much information about the issue of interest, which is supported by secondary sources. 
Theoretically, this method offers a dynamic framework of local government functioning 
regarding capital expenditure that distinguishes this study from previous studies on 
Indonesian local government. 
  
1.5. Organisation of the Thesis 
 This study is organised into eight chapters.  The first chapter is the 
introduction. It discusses the study‟s scope and background, the reasons for it, and 
indicates its theoretical and practical aims, objectives and contributions. 
 
 Chapter two describes the nature of Indonesian local government, and the 
reformation that the GOI is undergoing. It also discusses the role of international 
institutions‟ efforts to infuse new values into the GOI.  The aim of this chapter is to 
provide understanding of the values that have been imposed by the central government 
upon the local governments.  In addition, this chapter underlines the existing studies on 
the financial management of local governments, particularly capital expenditure, and 
identifies research gaps from previous studies that are filled by this study.   
 
 Then, chapter three discusses control mechanisms and Foucault‟s perspective is 
employed in this study, which is followed by the development of a theoretical 
framework.  Furthermore, this chapter gives an overview of research methods; 
discussing the advantages and limitations of the employed method.  It also discusses the 
selection of primary sources in the particular local government, methods of data 
collection, and the use of transcripts as a source of secondary data.   
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 Chapter four and five discuss the empirical findings from the viewpoint local 
government officials towards the external and internal parties of the local government 
respectively.  The chapter four focuses on the interrelations of external parties of the 
local government and identifies actors of the external parties who affect the local 
government.  This discussion revisits several related regulations concerning particular 
external parties.  Then, it is followed by discussing the perception of the local 
government officials towards the parties in terms of their commitment to strengthening 
control of capital expenditure. 
 
 Chapter five emphasises the dynamics in the sampled local government 
concerning the implementation of the new values that are represented by new 
regulations related to the newly prescribed decentralised control system.  The aim of 
this chapter is to comprehend current practices and new values in terms of 
interrelationships and interactions between the many actors in relation to capital 
expenditure control.  This study relies on interview transcripts from the primary 
sources. 
 
 Chapter six discusses the main empirical findings from the external and 
internal parties and is followed by a critical analysis and reflection of the findings in 
relation to their practical and theoretical value in Chapter seven.  The final chapter 
covers the conclusion; a summing-up of the findings of this study, followed by a 
presentation of the study‟s limitations and suggestions for future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Bureaucratic Reform in Indonesia Local Government as an Attempt to 
Enhance Transparency and Accountability 
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2.1. Introduction 
 The previous chapter set out the background, scope, and aims of this study, 
which focuses on issues in capital expenditure control used by the Indonesian local 
government.  This chapter is now intended to give an overview of the nature of 
Indonesian local government in which the control mechanisms of capital expenditure 
are employed, along with reforms that have been undertaken by the GOI in order to 
enhance the transparency and accountability of local government.  This chapter also 
describes the involvement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which intensified 
after the Government of Indonesia (GoI) signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) on 31 October 
1997.  Initially, the LoI was a survival programme outlined by the IMF, to be 
implemented when the GoI suffered severely from the Asian financial crisis; and later it 
was followed up by several further LoIs as a continuation of the programme.  The LoI 
has many facets, such as exchange rates, banking reforms, judiciary reforms, and 
governance reforms.     
  
 The governance reforms embrace reformation of government, empowerment of 
the private sector, and reformation of civil society.  Reformation of the government 
sector focuses on reinstating the position of the supreme audit agency (BPK / Badan 
Pemeriksa Keuangan), modernising the management of public expenditure and 
procurement, managing and auditing off-budget accounts, establishing the Anti-
Corruption Committee (KPK / Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi), increasing civil service 
salaries and achieving decentralisation.  The decentralisation agenda includes fiscal 
transfer, civil servant transfer, implementation of accounting standards, and control over 
financing and expenditure.  The reformation agenda relating to the private sector 
encompasses encouraging a more competitive environment, supporting small and 
medium enterprises, and endorsing involvement of the private sector in infrastructure 
projects.  Finally, the reformation agenda concerning civil society supports the 
involvement of members of local society in monitoring local government programmes.   
 
 
 
2.2. Nature of Indonesian Local Government 
 Indonesia is the largest archipelagic state in the world.  It is administered by 
530 local governments consisting of 497 municipalities and 33 provinces (Depdagri, 
2010) spread across17,508 islands (Indonesia, 2012).  In addition, on 25 October 2012 
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the Indonesian parliament approved the 34
th
 province, meaning that Indonesia now has 
34 provinces, which are diverse in many aspects, such as in ethnicity, language, and 
cultural background. 
 
 Structurally, the GOI can be divided into four levels.  Level 1 is the provinces, 
each of which is headed by a governor, who also has a role as representative of central 
government.  Consequently, the governor is answerable to the president.  The governor 
is assisted by a vice governor, and must coordinate every decision with the provincial 
parliament regarding local ordinance issues.  The second level is the municipalities, i.e. 
cities and districts, which consist of 98 cities and 399 districts.  In relation to the second 
level, the governors have the role of supervising and coordinating the governance of the 
cities and districts in their province.  However, the heads of cities and districts are not 
responsible to the governor, but directly to central government via the Ministry of 
Home Affairs.  The heads of cities and districts are assisted by a vice-head, and must 
coordinate with city or district parliaments to approve all local ordinances.  The third 
level is made up of 6694 sub-districts from all over Indonesia.  The head of each sub-
district is chosen by the head of a city or district to handle certain autonomous 
programmes in smaller areas.  Therefore, they are responsible to those city or district 
heads.  The head of a sub-district is selected from civil servants who are considered to 
have the capabilities needed for governance.  The lowest level is level 4, which 
comprises 8216 villages.  The head of each village is appointed by the head of a city or 
district, based on recommendations from the head of the sub-district in which the 
village is located.  Hence, the head of a village is responsible to the head of a city or 
district. 
 
 The head of a local government is assisted by a deputy; both officers are 
elected directly by the people in a particular area or constituency.  The head and deputy 
head of a local government are assisted by a regional secretary as a right-hand „man‟, 
who is selected as a senior civil servant.  The regional secretary is responsible for day to 
day activities, particularly in formulating policies and coordinating with local 
government agencies, technical units, and sub-districts.  Thus, the regional secretary is 
responsible directly to the head of local government.  The local government agencies 
are vested with autonomy and have tasks to implement and oversee; each agency is led 
by the head of a service unit that is answerable directly to the head of local government 
through the regional secretary.  Meanwhile, the technical units are formed specifically 
as support in formulating and implementing the policies of local government.  The 
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heads of technical units are also answerable to the head of local government via the 
regional secretary. 
 
 Following the policy of decentralisation, central government initiated financial 
decentralisation, which authorised local governments to manage funds, both from 
central government and from local revenues.  For accountability purposes, local 
governments are required to prepare expenditure budgets in detail, which must be in line 
with national goals.  The budgets are classified based on spending categories, types, and 
functions, and must then be approved by the local parliament.  Expenditure cannot 
exceed the budget ceiling and cannot be re-allocated to other spending categories unless 
the revision is approved by the local parliament (Lewis and Smoke, 2008).  At the 
implementation stage, the realisation of the budget may vary; it might lead to under-
spending due to the government officials‟ failure to understand their roles as providers 
of public infrastructure services.  The local government officials continue to perceive 
that major investments must be carried out by central government.  Hence, the focus of 
the local officers is more on lobbying central government officers in order to make such 
investments, rather than on planning and managing the investments (Lewis and 
Oosterman, 2009).  Consequently, conditions such as unexpended resources, inefficient 
spending, and inadequate quality of projects are evident in most local governments 
(Lewis and Smoke, 2008). 
 
2.3. Reformation in Indonesian Local Government 
2.3.1. Factors Influencing the Reformation 
  Historically, Indonesian politics has experienced turmoil: specifically, in 1998 
the military regime that had been ruling for 32 years was obliged to step down (Lewis, 
2005).  The financial crisis affected Indonesia severely both economically and 
politically, all of which served to weaken the central government (Green and Campos, 
2001), resulting in a change of government similar to the transformation experienced by 
South Korea and Thailand (Heryanto and Mandal, 2003).  With the central government 
weakened, a separatist sentiment emerged. In order to cope with this situation, in May 
1999 the Indonesian Parliament passed Laws 22/1999 and 25/1999 concerning regional 
autonomy and fiscal decentralisation.  The main political reason for implementing this 
decentralisation policy was to shift the burden and responsibilities of governance from 
central government to local governments that had ensued after the economic crisis of 
1998 (Firman, 2009).  It was also expected to bring improvements and efficiency to 
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government services, because the local governments are closer and more accessible to 
the people they serve, meaning that they should be more responsive to people‟s needs 
and be able to mobilise and coordinate local resources more effectively (Coaffee and 
Johnston, 2005; Turner et al., 2009; Young and Padovani, 2009; Lewis, 2005).  All of 
those programmes were outlined by many international institutions that came to give 
assistance to the GOI to accelerate its recovery from the crisis, such as the IMF (the 
International Monetary Fund) programmes contained in the Letter of Intent from 
October 31, 1997 up until December 10, 2003. 
 
  Following the IMF programmes outlined in the LoI, central government 
undertook government reform gradually, and determined which institutions need to be 
reformed.  Its first priority was public organisations responsible for state revenues; the 
second priority was the audit institutions; the third was law enforcement institutions and 
the judiciary.  After that, other ministries or agencies would follow that were regarded 
as „less important‟.  For example, the Ministry of Finance became the first priority, 
followed by the BPK, the supreme audit board, as the second priority.  During the 
reform processes, these institutions had successfully implemented the concept of a 
„balance scorecard‟ in order to monitor overall strategy, execution of that strategy, and 
performance of the institutions.    
 
  Regarding structural reforms in the BPK, these not only involved the IMF, but 
also the USAID, which engaged with the BPK in order to improve existing and develop 
new techniques of investigating, tracking, tracing and recovering assets.  Moreover, 
examinations were to be carried out for the certification of anti-money-laundering 
specialists.  The IMF formally encouraged empowering the BPK in a letter of intent of 
March 18th, 2003.  In this LOI, the IMF suggested improving the accountability and 
transparency of the government‟s financial management.  In order to achieve these 
improvements, it was suggested to prioritise finalisation of laws that were in line with 
international best practices.  The proposed laws would complement the previous Law 
5/1973, to reinstate the position of the BPK, based on constitutional authority.  As a 
result, the parliament enacted Law 17/2003 regulating state finance, followed by Law 
15/2004 regarding the audit of state finance.  Then, the GoI issued Law 15/2006 
specifically emphasising the importance and position of the BPK.   
 
  As a follow-up of Law 15/2004, the BPK required the establishment of 
generally accepted government accounting standards, standards which, on 17
th
 January 
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2005, the head of the BPK proposed to the president in order to formulate government 
accounting standards (Simanjuntak, 2005).  The accounting standards did not solely 
adopt the IPSAS (International Public Sector Accounting Standard), but were also based 
on best practices and are informed by the government standards of other nations (Islam, 
2012).  The „government accounting standard‟ is being implemented gradually, and is 
aimed at making a transition from cash-based accounting towards the application of a 
full-accrual method; but currently it is still applying the cash towards accrual method 
(CTA).  However, the implementation of the proposed government accounting standard 
has had to deal with several issues, both at central government and at local government 
level, including weaknesses in internal control and the management of financial 
resources (Islam, 2012), the lack of availability of skilled civil servants to implement 
the standard (Harun, 2007), and the sub-optimal usefulness of the accounting 
information for decision making (Mir and Sutiyono, 2013).   
 
  With the establishment of a government accounting standard, all of the 
financial reports have become more rigid, in line with the private sector model 
(Indonesia, 2003; Harun and Kamase, 2012).  Each local government must provide an 
income statement, balance sheet, cash flow and notes in its financial statement, which is 
then used as the mechanism that central government uses to oversee the financial 
performance of local government; this in turn creates and sustains power relations 
between central and local government.  These mechanisms require local government 
officials to comply with all of the requirements mandated in the governmental 
accounting standard.  Consequently, local government need to upgrade the competency 
of their officials (Harun and Kamase, 2012), especially financial officials, in order to 
meet these requirements and get unqualified opinion from the BPK as a supreme audit 
(Indonesia, 2007).   
 
  Apart from establishing the government accounting standard as a basis for 
reporting, another agenda of the IMF was the reform of budgeting processes, because, in 
the previous era, the Indonesian administration had been running without a budget. „The 
philosophy at that time was, “Give me the money, and we do the job.” When we 
entered, it was important to ask, “Why should I give you the money-what job is it?”‟ 
(Salim, 2009), and even ministries or government agencies had off-budget accounts to 
cover any unexpected expenditures (Green and Campos, 2001).  The IMF required 
financial transparency, and hence off-budget accounts were identified, audited, and 
brought under a consolidated budget.  This task is assigned to the State Audit Board 
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(BPKP / Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan Pembangunan), which is responsible for 
internal audits of government institutions.  In addition, central government implements 
budget discipline to rationalise public expenditure, and obliges the bureaucrats to start 
to prioritise and explain the use of public funds.  Following this, the central government 
budget is presented to parliament for approval.  However, the budget consultation 
process still focuses on lobbying, instead of on conceptual arguments, since parliament 
is still perceived as underperforming (Tornquist, 2006) 
 
  Therefore, in order to cope with any irregularities, the IMF suggested 
establishing the Anti-Corruption Commission, which was realised by the end of 2003 
but only effectively came into operation in 2004.  This new body was named the KPK 
(Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi / Commission of Corruption Eradication) (Schutte, 
2012).  The institution has responsibility for preventing, investigating, and prosecuting 
corruption cases.  In order to facilitate the carrying-out of these duties, a special court 
for dealing with corruption cases was established, i.e. Tipikor (Tindak Pidana Korupsi / 
Corruption) court (Jacobs and Wagner, 2007).   The court has maintained a 100% 
conviction rate of corruption cases, and the KPK has prosecuted many prominent 
politicians, ministers, and governors, as well as officials of the Indonesian central bank.  
Consequently, some police, prosecutors, and parliament members that were under the 
scrutiny of the KPK orchestrated a fight back and managed to weaken the KPK and the 
Tipikor court (Butt, 2011). 
 
  The World Bank also played a role in the reformation by working with the 
Kemenpan (Ministry of Apparatuses Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform) along 
with other ministries to bring in people from the private sector, independent experts, and 
consultancy firms.   They held a forum for sharing and learning with many experts from 
various countries, such as Malaysia, Korea, Singapore, Italy, Germany, Australia and 
Sweden, in order to accelerate organisational restructuring to make it more efficient and 
more effective.   To this end, employing technology was considered to be a priority at 
that time in Indonesia‟s reforms.  There were several reasons for this: the first was to 
minimise personal interactions that could possibly create a temptation to behave 
corruptly, which would thus enhance good governance.  The second reason was the 
need to build information systems to support human resource administrations, since the 
current information system was fragmented and negatively affected both the quality and 
accuracy of data.  This meant that the data could not be relied on; for example, there 
was a lack of data pertinent to the competence and background of staff.  Even more 
16 
 
disturbingly, some names were still on the old database, although that person had by 
then retired or passed away.   
 
 In 2000, the Indonesian government held a meeting with the CGI (Consultative 
Group on Indonesia) that was supported by the World Bank and the CIDA (Canadian 
International Development Agency) in order to endorse the implementation of the 
decentralisation process by determined planning and staging.  The meeting decided 
upon the stages of implementation, breaking them down into initiation, instalment, 
consolidation, and stabilisation; they also decided on relevant targets.  The initiation 
stage was undertaken in 2000; 2001 and 2002 were designated for the instalment period; 
2003 and 2004 were for the consolidation period; and finally 2007 was expected to be 
the stabilisation period.  However, the implementation plan did not go as well as 
expected, due to a lack of effective communication between the central government and 
local governments.  Hence, central government amended Law 22 of 1999 into Law 32 
of 2004 that still reflected enthusiasm of decentralisation.  Moreover, the law of 1999 
was perceived as being motivated more by political than fiscal reasons (Pepinsky et al., 
2009). 
 
  Another international institution involved in the reformation was GTZ 
(German Agency for Technical Cooperation), especially in running of „good 
governance‟ programmes.  Donor institutions such as GTZ did not impose their 
programmes, but raised awareness of and gave insight into the reformation of all levels 
of government.  This process also involved bilateral donors such as Australia and  New 
Zealand, which assisted in designing government organisations that would eliminate 
corruption or financial irregularities practices (Hamilton-Hart, 2001).  As a result, the 
structure of the ministries and agencies in Indonesian public administration has been 
transformed; it is now more regimented and rigid in order to enhance the performance 
of the bureaucracy so as to deliver an effective and efficient public service (Datu and 
Nawawi, 2014).  Therefore, selection and placement of the right person in the right 
place is essential. 
 
2.3.2.  Pros and Cons of the Engagement of International Institutions 
  Since the first time the GoI engaged with the IMF, from 31
st
 October 1997 to 
10
th
 December 2003, about 20 Letters of Intent (LoI) have been signed by the GoI 
concerning many aspects of government reforms in Indonesia.  The IMF did not only 
offer technical assistance for the implementation of the reforms but also provided funds 
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that were equivalent to SDR 7.3 billion or 490 percent of the quota (IMF, 1997).  The 
GoI at that moment was suffering from a macro-financial problem because the exchange 
rate had plummeted from USD1 = IDR2,432 in mid-July 1997 to USD1 = IDR11,050 
by the end of January 1998 (Habibie, 2006). Consequently, overseas loans  rose to 
USD140 billion (about 60% of GDP), of which USD33 billion of the loan was short 
term (IMF, 1997).  Hence, this condition aggravated the financial burden the GoI was 
under.  Moreover, internally, 16 banks were shutdown and the GoI had to bail out those 
major banks that could be salvaged, increasing the financial pressure on the GoI, driving 
it to the IMF to get the funding to meet the nation‟s obligations. 
 
  The IMF then set up a three year stand-by funding arrangement (IMF, 1997) 
which came from many sources such as the IMF, the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, Japan, Singapore, the US, and four other Asian countries (Head, 
1998).  According to Soesastro (2009): 
They were very reluctant at the beginning to do so, the Fund, the International 
Monetary Fund, saying that this is not the area of our competence. We know 
nothing about structural reforms, reform of the manufacturing sector, trade and so 
on, it is only the financial sector that we wanted to include in the package, 
including fiscal and so on, but not structural policies. It was the World Bank that 
said you have to. The Indonesian ministers also said we have to put it in. In fact, 
even outsiders like us said it is important. 
 
The GoI was provided with emergency procedures that would be reviewed quarterly in 
the first-year programmes.  Under these conditions, the GoI was obliged to follow the 
IMF lead regarding macroeconomic policies and financial sector restructuring.  The GoI 
was required to adhere to any decisions that it was decided must be taken by the IMF to 
resolve the multi-dimensional problems facing them.  This situation gave excessive 
power to the IMF, which acted as a governing actor and dictated any policies that 
should be taken by the GoI.  After this, the IMF started to implement systems through 
many policies, referring to the best practices that were perceived as the best way to 
resolve Indonesia‟s problems. 
 
 The IMF set indicative measures, along with target dates, to be met, and 
determined what action or actions had to be taken.  If the GoI could not meet the target, 
or did not comply with the LoI, the IMF would discontinue the funding.  For example, 
before the GoI signed the LoI on 24th June 1998, the IMF discontinued the funding to 
assist Indonesia‟s recovery from the financial crisis.  After the GoI stressed its full 
commitment, as expressed by the president in his speech on 21
st
 May, 1998, the IMF 
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once more began to channel their funding.  By the end of July, the consortium known as 
the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia) increased loans to Indonesia, and 
the “Paris club” (an association of countries providing loans to Indonesia)  decided to 
postpone repayment instalments of Indonesia‟s debt, which indicated the growing  
confidence of lenders in Indonesia (Habibie, 2006). 
 
 With the signing of the LoI, the GoI was placed under the control of the IMF, 
and had no bargaining power regarding the recommended programmes.  This situation 
can be perceived as a new model of colonialism, i.e. a form of economic colonialism in 
developing countries.  This view was expressed by the former Coordinator Minister of 
Finance and Industries (Kwik Kian Gie), who perceived affiliation between the World 
Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the IMF as external forces determining the 
economic and financial policies of Indonesia.  These international institutions were the 
biggest donors supporting the financial recovery in Indonesia when the country was hit 
by the Asian financial crisis (Head, 1998).  They suggested many policies outlined in 
the LoI which were perceived as being inflicted on the GoI.  One such policy was a 
relaxation of the import duties on rice and sugar, because domestic production for these 
commodities was abundant.  The policy was detrimental to farmers because Indonesia is 
known as a producer of both rice and sugar.  Hence, the domestic price of rice and sugar 
rapidly declined (Gie, 2011).  Moreover, Gie (2011) explains that before 1945, the 
Dutch exploited Indonesia through the country‟s valuable crops and human resources.  
However, after 1967 these international institutions had exploited mineral resources 
through the latest methods and technologies.   From this perspective, we can see that 
Indonesia had surrendered its sovereignty to various international institutions and had 
started to be governed by those international institutions.   
  
 Moreover, the IMF assumed that the best practices that had been suggested 
were suitable for Indonesian society because they could be implemented in various 
conditions and by different cultures as a one-size-fits-all, global panacea.  This was 
exemplified by the discussion between a former coordinating minister for economic 
affairs and Dr. Hubert Neiss, Director of IMF Asia, about whether or not to raise the 
price of fuel during the rising political temperature in Indonesia.  A decision which was 
based only on a superficial observation of the country without considering any of the 
socio-culture dimensions of Indonesian society: 
I said to Neiss, as an economist, I fully understood the reason to increase the oil 
price, but Indonesian political temperature is high already. If you push this, 
19 
 
something will happen. Dr.Neiss with his cockiness, he doesn‟t understand 
Indonesian politics. He is a good economist. He said, „You are exaggerating. 
Every morning I use my shorts, my jogging outfit. I jog behind the Grand Hyatt in 
the poor area of Kebon Kacang and what I see is Indonesian smiling.‟ (Ramli, 
2009) 
 
The consequences were disastrous, as the decision triggered uprisings in many regions 
and aggravated economic and social conditions as well. 
They (the IMF) increased the BBM (Bahan Bakar Minyak, oil fuel) gas selling 
price 71%, something, and the day after that decision there are major 
demonstrations and the burning of Makassar on May the 2nd. On May the 3rd, 
Medan was burned, major demonstration and it goes into Surabaya on the 4th, the 
5th. Solo was burned. Hundreds of people are being hurt in Jogja (Yogyakarta) 
and Solo and then it ended May 12th, of 1998 in Jakarta when buildings all over 
the city were burned. … Thousands of people were killed and I consider this is a 
nightmare, IMF-provoked riots, like what they have done a lot in Latin America 
and Indonesian rupiah dropped IDR15,000. Forty million people laid off, the 
whole economic consequences of using economic policy for political change, it‟s 
huge. The human, the moral cost of it is huge. (Ramli, 2009)  
 
The GoI did not have the power to reject the arrangement, and so implemented the 
programmes as indicated in the LoI, along with technical assistance from the IMF.  This 
showed that, although the suggestion was feasible economically, it was not feasible 
socio-culturally.   
 
 Another example of an IMF recommendation that caused controversy and 
opposition was liberalising the economic system in Indonesia, which had previously 
been situated in the middle between socialism and liberalism.  In the prior system, 
important natural resources and companies were still managed, controlled and 
monopolised by the government in order to maintain the welfare of society.  However, 
in accordance with the LoI‟s recommendations, the GoI agreed to privatise several 
strategic state-owned companies and banks; these were later bought by international 
companies because most of the Indonesian companies were still struggling to survive 
the financial crisis.  This is indicative of the fact that the IMF neglected the local socio-
cultural make-up, which can be seen as a communal rather than an individualistic 
society. 
 
 However, perceptions of the IMF programmes were not shared by all ministers.  
On one side, a group of ministers and advisors supported the implementation of the 
programmes, and perceived that such actions would be able to resolve the multi-
dimensional crisis. As expressed by one of the secondary sources: 
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the more important reforms instituted under the IMF packages were institutional 
reforms, governance basically, good governance. (Soesastro, 2009) 
 
Furthermore, the former Minister of Finance admitted that, even though it was not a 
good way to undertake reform, having reforms enforced by other, external institutions 
was like a blessing in disguise: 
We could be very, very disappointed because crisis induced reform is not well 
thought out reform, it is urgent reform, it is advanced by the situation, it is 
enforced by other institutions like the IMF (International Monetary Fund) program 
and so on. (Indrawati, 2009) 
 
The later source gave full support for the implementation of the IMF programmes 
outlined in the LoI and focused on achieving the targets.   
 
 Opposing them, a former Coordinating Minister for Finance and Industries 
resisted the involvement of the IMF; he suspected the involvement of what he called the 
„Berkeley Mafia‟ as cronies of the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development 
Bank, ensuring their control over Indonesia‟s economic and financial policies (Gie, 
2011).  Officially, the GoI was under the control of the IMF until 2003, when the IMF 
produced its final review, under the extended arrangement, on the 10
th
 of December, 
2003. 
 
 Resistance to the involvement of the IMF in Indonesia‟s affairs was not only 
expressed by the next president after Soeharto, as described by a secondary source as 
follows: 
Abdurrahman Wahid‟s ministers were all against it. The coordinating minister for 
the economy in fact sabotaged.  Because he came from a political party, PDIP 
(Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan), that is totally against the involvement 
of the IMF.  He is the coordinating minister who is in charge of this. When they 
negotiate a package with the IMF-in fact, he didn't want to participate and said, „It 
is totally yours.‟ So the IMF was very frustrated, and they came to see members of 
the National Economic Council and said, „We can't work like this. It has to be your 
package, not ours.‟ (Soesastro, 2009) 
 
Nevertheless, resistance occurred from the first time that the GoI engaged with the IMF, 
when President Soeharto was still in power.  He was perceived as very combative, and 
did not comply with suggestions outlined in the LoI.  His position was supported by the 
Minister of Science and Technology, who later became vice president and then became 
president, replacing Soeharto when he stepped down.  The minister was in charge of all 
strategic industries (Soesastro, 2009) such as land, sea, and air transportation, machines, 
and military weapons (Habibie, 2006).  The resistance possibly arose because the IMF 
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suggested closing down the strategic industries without any rational reasons. This was 
despite one of the industries being able to produce aeroplanes suitable for the 
geographical conditions present in Indonesia: planes which had been certified suitable 
to fly.  Moreover, the industries had been able to produce military weapons, vessels for 
sea transportation, and military ships (Habibie, 2006).   
 
 This policy can be regarded as an intervention by the IMF to protect the 
interests of the donor countries, because if Indonesia could not produce all of these 
products, then the GoI would be dependent on the other countries and buy all their 
products from them.  Therefore, in order to eliminate the intervention of the IMF, the 
GoI decided to end the IMF programmes, and repaid the entire loan in 2004.  
Subsequently, the new programmes were introduced and initiated by the GoI itself, 
superseding the IMF programmes (Soesastro, 2009). 
 
2.3.3.  Agenda of Local Government Reform  
2.3.3.1. Decentralisation 
 The main agenda of the LoI of the IMF was devolution of power from central 
government to local government, and the IMF and the World Bank coordinated with 
parliament to ratify this agenda.  Legislation was arranged carefully to establish a legal 
basis before proceeding with decentralisation reform and administrative 
decentralisation, as well as the expenditures and revenues that might be incurred or 
accrue from the policy respectively.  For example expenditure required to set up 
facilities for the decentralisation processes or revenue acquired by central government 
through the implementation of the DBH (revenue sharing).  The UNDP (United Nations 
Development Programme) was also involved in promoting decentralisation by 
embracing its principles, actions and budgetary considerations. For the implementation 
of the programme, the GoI provided a budget of about IDR1.02 trillion, equal to around 
USD1 billion at that time, plus IDR94 billion, which was roughly USD94 million from 
donor countries, channelled through the UNDP.   
 
 These conditions stoked up enthusiasm for the creation of new districts or new 
provinces, but without any consideration being given to the region‟s developmental 
potential.  Instead, the main idea was to get as  much money as possible from central 
government (Devas, 1997) and give locals the opportunity to become a member of the 
elite executive or legislative bodies.  Once obtained, the funds from central government 
were then used for administrative spending, such as on government officials‟ salary and 
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government offices, rather than investment or infrastructure to generate new 
opportunities.  This conduct  reflected the poor governance and lack of accountability at 
local government level (Sjahrir et al., 2014).  In addition, the increase in the number of 
local governments also enlarged the bureaucracy and increased the number of 
bureaucrats, which required the recruitment of local people. 
 
 Creating new districts or cities increased the number of local governments 
from approximately 420 in 1998 to a current total of 514.  Since decentralisation is 
directed at the municipal rather than the provincial level, this raises a problem regarding 
the extent of central government‟s reach over the municipalities.  Therefore, central 
government delegates its coordination function to its representatives at the provincial 
level.  However, there is no formal, subordinate relationship between the municipalities 
and the provinces; hence, the municipal administration might well ignore the 
intervention of a governor, who has no legal power over either the districts or cities in 
their region / province because the municipalities are structurally responsible to central 
government rather than to provincial governments.  Ideally, if the decentralisation 
process is managed properly, it creates a conducive environment for democratic 
development by effectively diffusing administrative power (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001).  
  
 Another issue in the creation of a new district arose from local sentiment, and 
especially the idea that the putra daerah (the region‟s indigenous people) should be 
leaders of regions (as governors, regents, or mayors).  The problem with this idea is that 
the quality of human resources of the newly autonomous regions was and is still low 
(Devas, 1997) – problematic because the roles of leaders in governance reform are 
crucial, especially in providing a model for strengthening economic development in a 
particular area.  Moreover, local leaders must be able to control, manage and lead, 
which means they must have a firm grasp of regulations, procedures, local ordinances, 
codes of ethics and codes of conduct in order to ensure tight control, as any violations of 
any of such legal matters could well mark the beginning of a problem.   
 
 This issue becomes especially prominent for regions located in the outer 
islands because of the unequal economic and human resource development between 
Java (where the capital city is located) and the outer islands.  The mindset of the 
previous regime was that if the outer islands became well-developed, then the threat of 
separatism from those islands would be greater than from those which were less-
developed.  Hence, currently Java has become the centre of the economy, and the 
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quality of human resources in the outer islands is relatively low in comparison to Java 
and its surrounding islands.  It has even been suggested that 30% of regencies cannot 
meet the standard of autonomy legislation that has been set by central government, and 
that the other 70% only meet the minimum level, which negatively affects their 
transparency and accountability at the local level (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001).  Moreover, 
geographical conditions are regarded as a trigger affecting regional development, which 
must be taken into consideration as well (Pepinsky et al., 2009). 
 
 In the previous era, decentralisation had become a concern of central 
government, leading to it issuing Law 5/1974, but this regulation could not meet the 
expectations of the regions as there was no derivation from the regulation to support the 
implementation of the law.  When a moment for decentralisation emerged in 1998, 
central government facilitated the demand by devolving more resources and power in 
order to eliminate separatism movements, which had been flaring up in several regions 
(Rabasa and Chalk, 2001).  This decentralisation was, and is still, intended to strengthen 
Indonesia in general by giving more autonomy to local government, as well as 
embracing local culture, supporting economic distribution and facilitating political 
expression by devolving power to local regions.   
 
 The basic idea is that if decentralisation manages to enhance economic 
performance at the local level, then it should improve the national economy as a whole 
(Pepinsky et al., 2009).  However, decentralisation is regarded as too far-reaching by 
one of secondary sources (Nurbaya, 2010), as the power is devolved to districts and 
cities rather than just to the provinces.  Initially, the President considered that if power 
were devolved only to the provinces, provinces would then still have the power to 
demand independence from central government; but if devolution were extended 
beyond them, to the lower levels of districts and cities, any intention to separate from 
central government could be eliminated, as the municipal regions are too small. 
 
 In May 1999, the government issued Law No. 22 regarding regional 
development, which it intended to be implemented within two years after it was issued.  
In order to accelerate the implementation, the government divided the MoHA into two 
ministries, i.e. the MoHA and the Ministry of Regional Autonomy.  From this point 
onwards, the regions would take their entire problems to, and consult with, these 
ministries, and therefore the engagement of the regions with these ministries was 
intense when compared with the other ministries.  However, coordination between the 
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two ministries did not go well, especially in matters related to law-making and 
regulation processes, following changes in administration, which then had a significant 
impact on other aspects of governance.  These regulations were thus perceived as being 
unable to fully accommodate the reformation processes.  Each ministry pursued its own 
agenda, and, as a consequence, implementation of Law 22 was slow, due to the absence 
of technical guidance and a lack of knowledge of the details comprising the regulations.  
Therefore, there was criticism that the decentralisation policy lacked adequate structural 
planning to support the implementation of the policy (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001).  
Finally, in August 2001, the Ministry of Regional Autonomy was reintegrated into the 
MoHA. 
 
 In these decentralisation processes, the MoHA also dealt with the transfer of 
assets and government officials from central government to local governments.  In 
addition, a new law, No. 32, marked out clearly which areas were to be managed by 
central government and which areas would be managed by local government.  This law 
determines six areas controlled by central government: i.e. national monetary and fiscal 
affairs; foreign affairs; religion; national security; defence; and the judiciary.  Referring 
to this regulation, central government determines the assets, personnel, and 
administrative tasks to be devolved to local government.  Thus, following Law 32, not 
all issues are decided in Jakarta.  This makes decision-making much easier, because of 
the geographical constraints in Indonesia (Klinken, 2013). 
 
2.3.3.2. Fiscal Transfer 
 While the transfer of assets and government officials from central government 
to local government were handled by the MoHA, the Ministry of Finance implementing 
the fiscal transfer.  In the first step, the ministry changed the fiscal year, which 
previously ran from April to March, to January to December.  The new fiscal year 
arrangement began on 1
st
 January 2001, which marked the start of the instigation of 
Indonesia‟s regional autonomy.  The Ministry of Finance also initiated laws regarding 
fiscal balance, which require central government to collect all revenues and then 
distribute the funds to all regions in an attempt to ensure equitable distribution among 
regions. The grant from central government that encompasses DAU, DAK, and DBH 
thus significantly affects local government development (Kappeler et al., 2013).   
 
 In the previous era, highly centralised governance resulted in a fiscal imbalance 
between central and local government, as central government collected 90% of the 
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revenues, and only 10% was collected by local authorities.  Decentralisation has played 
its role in reducing the government‟s and nation‟s fiscal imbalance, but on the other 
hand, it can also be seen to have increased the gap between poor and rich regions 
(Rabasa and Chalk, 2001).  In order to reduce the gap, central government allocates 
funds through many channels for specific purposes.  The main allocations are via the 
DAU, DAK, DBH, Dana Penyesuaian, and Dana Otonomi Khusus.  However, it is 
suggested that, on average, only 30% of the total budget benefits the public domain, 
since about 70% of the funds are allocated to bureaucrats, political parties, and 
parliament.  Proportions of fund allocation from central government from 2012 to 2014 
are presented in appendix 5. 
 
 Initially, the percentage of distribution that was received by the revenue-
producing regions was determined by negotiation with central government, and it was 
determined that those regions must be well informed with regard to the calculation of 
the percentage. It should be pointed out that this system was highly affected by political 
conditions and considerations, and, in order to deal with these phenomena, laws 
concerning local revenues and fiscal balances were revised several times, i.e. in 1999, 
2004, and 2010.  Subsequently, the Ministry of Finance also dealt with finance transfers 
from central to local government, developing a new format for the implementation of 
such transfers. 
 
 The first allocation is the DAU (Dana Alokasi Umum / generally allocated 
fund), coming from the national budget and intended for equitable distribution of 
income among the regions.  This fund is used to finance regional needs as a component 
of the implementation of the decentralisation programme (Indonesia, 2004).  Central 
government does not merely employ population numbers as a criterion for allocating 
funds, unlike the previous era, which focused its development drive on Java, which 
received the largest allocation as the most populated island in Indonesia; instead, the 
government emphasises under developed regions, especially the outer Java islands.  
Basically, central government has developed a matrix with four quadrants which 
consists of low-growth – low-income; low-growth – high-income; high-growth – low-
income; and high-growth – high-income.  Rich regions included in the low-growth – 
high-income quadrant need to be pushed to undertake policy reforms in order to shift 
them to the high-growth – high-income quadrant.  Equally, if there are some regions in 
the low-income – low-growth quadrant, this means that central government needs to pay 
more attention and allocate more money to the regions.    
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 The second source of local government funding is the DAK (Dana Alokasi 
Khusus / specifically allocated fund),which is allocated from the national budget to 
particular local governments to finance either specific central government programmes 
relating to a particular local government, or specific local government programmes 
which conform to national priorities (Indonesia, 2004).  This fund is intended for 
specific needs that cannot be predicted in general terms and gets its funds from the 
DAU / generally allocated fund.  Specifically, it is allocated mostly for infrastructure 
development with a long economic life, and the individual local government must also 
participate in these processes, i.e. the 10% of the total DAK that has been given by 
central government.  For example, if the central government grant for DAK is worth 
USD100,000, then the local government must provide USD10,000 in addition to the 
central government‟s grant  (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, 2011).   
 
 The other source is DBH (Dana Bagi Hasil / shared revenue fund), which deals 
with the revenues from central government apportioned to regions based on the 
potential of those regions.  This fund is acquired from sharing the revenues derived 
from taxes and the exploitation of natural resources.  The sharing mechanisms are based 
on the „origin principle‟ and realisation of revenues.  Previously, rich regions 
contributed revenues from forestry, minerals, gas and oil, but they received the least 
money because most of the funds were managed by central government.  Therefore, 
central government tries to balance this situation, and as a result local regions currently 
receive revenue proportionally.  However, this arrangement also creates environmental 
issues in local regions. For example, a correlation between decentralisation and 
deforestation has been indicated, because there is no guideline regarding the ratio of 
green to non-green areas.  Hence, the rate of deforestation is identical with that of 
decentralisation, because the majority of local government administrators are elected 
with support from local business; hence, in return, those businesses are given timber 
concessions.   
 
2.3.3.3. Civil Servant Transfer 
 Regarding personnel transfer, the MoHA collaborated with Kemenpan 
(Kementerian Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara / the Ministry of Empowerment of 
State Apparatus, later known as the Ministry of Empowerment of State Apparatus and 
Bureaucratic Reform) to transfer government officials away from central government in 
order to strengthen the institutional capacity of local governments (Bennet, 2010).  In 
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the previous era, all government officials were managed by central government, and at 
that time central government controlled more than 2.1 million civil servants.  The 
decentralisation policy aimed to transfer many of these civil servants out by the end of 
2001.  The transfer was expected to reduce the numbers on the central government 
payroll by 1.6 million.  But this process of personnel-transfer provoked unrest among 
the government officials because they were central government officials but would be 
transferred under the management of local government, a novel arrangement which was 
unknown in terms of the sustainability of local government.  However, the transition 
process was accomplished relatively smoothly, although at the beginning local 
governments still employed the old organisational structure.   
 
2.4.   Impacts of Reformation in Multidimensional Aspects 
2.4.1. Impact on Government Officials 
  Bureaucratic, civil service and political reforms were undertaken at the same 
time, but civil service reform was perceived to lag behind the other two.  Some 
important positions were still held by people who lacked competence in a particular 
field.  Such individuals were in position based on their seniority instead of performance 
levels; a carry-over from the previous era, when loyalty was more important than 
efficiency.  Therefore, improvements in the competency and capability of the civil 
servants rely upon the policies and rules from the Kemenpan that the line ministries 
must comply with.  However, the Kemenpan has been struggling to improve its own 
internal human resources, due to its important role as Indonesia‟s think tank for 
advancing methodologies or mechanisms for civil servants that will be referred to by the 
other ministries, specifically for laws related to civil servants.  For example, if the 
Ministry of Finance would like to implement performance management, it must consult 
with and get approval for such an initiative from the Kemenpan as the central authority 
for competence and the BKN (Badan Kepegawaian Nasional / National Civil Service 
Agency). 
 
  It has been predicted that, of the staff inherited from the previous era, 30%-
40% are unproductive, but they receive the same amount of salary.  This condition 
demotivates the productive staff, as they feel they are being treated unfairly, relative to 
their unproductive colleagues.  Therefore, an assessment centre and mechanisms to 
measure the competency of staff has been created, along with a training system to 
ensure that personnel are trained up to understand and deal with the new systems and 
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procedures.  Personnel are expected to deliver a high standard of performance, but they 
are rewarded with fair and reasonable salaries proportionate to their workload and 
responsibilities (Setiyono and Mc.Leod, 2010).   Therefore, ministries have also set up 
new incentive schemes based on the performance of their staff.  Hence, if a staff 
member delivers a good performance, then he/she will get a higher incentive bonus and 
remuneration.  Although they are now paid with a higher salary, some civil servants can 
still be found who underperform in their workplace.  Rewarding staff by increasing their 
salary and benefits is perceived as not positively affecting these staff members‟ 
behaviour, as the officials might well be receiving bribes of greater value from outside.   
Doing something about this type of civil servant, particularly in a highly corrupt 
government system, is still regarded as an extremely difficult task (Hamilton-Hart, 
2001; Setiyono and Mc.Leod, 2010). 
 
 In order to deal with this issue, governance reform has begun to implement the 
balancing of rewards and punishments.  The punishments encompass either 
psychological or material aspects.  Psychological punishment can be a demotion of staff 
from their current position; this kind of punishment is regarded as harming the 
individual‟s pride, and hence the punishment is perceived to be more effective when 
applied to a staff holding a higher position than to a lower-level staff.  Meanwhile, for a 
corrupt civil servant, a material punishment needs to be implemented, with a 
requirement for them to return the stolen funds.  In addition, the staff will be convicted 
as a criminal and will be given administrative sanctions as well.   
 
 Nevertheless, honest, ethical behaviour all depends on the power and capacity 
of the leader to displace officials who do not comply with the reform programmes.  In 
order to make such a system effective, open commitment of the leaders to governance 
reform needs to be initiated by the president and all ministers, parliament members and 
local government leaders, and all judicial branches.  The commitment must be 
embodied by giving positive examples, such as not practising cronyism, and by 
respecting laws, bureaucracy and meritocracy, because in Indonesian culture good, clear 
examples can make the concept of reform easier to understand.  Moreover, consistency 
is also needed in structuring, closely monitoring, evaluating and restructuring the 
governance system, all of which demonstrate the leader‟s concern with reform.   
 
  Therefore, strong leadership is needed in government organisations, and 
sometimes an „overkill‟ punishment is necessary in order to send a powerful message to 
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all members of a ministry or department.  For example, take the case of the Bulog 
(Badan Urusan Logistik / The nation's state logistics agency).   In the previous era, it 
was common to bribe the top-level officials of the Bulog to secure a placement of a 
government official in a rich area, which had huge amounts of money in circulation.  
However, when the new leader came up, he rotated 200 officials from the „rich‟ areas to 
the „poor‟ and outer areas in order to send his message that he did not want any bribery 
within the system.  However, the capacity of leaders or ministers to exert control in 
public organisations is extremely sensitive to and highly affected by political change.  
After the general election, every 5 years, most ministers will be replaced by new 
ministers; it is quite possible that the new minister will promote people from his or her 
affiliated political party without any clear indicator as to the degree of the appointee‟s 
talent.  As a consequence, this practice might well demoralise other, talented civil 
servants within that ministry or agency. 
 
2.4.2. Impact on Organisational Culture 
 Many leaders of government institutions lack an understanding of what the 
reform is because the reform is perceived as offering increasing remuneration and solely 
focusing on regulations and policies; it is thus regarded as being an inherently 
incomplete reform.  The reformation suggested by Ministry of Finance official needs to 
start by overhauling business processes for improving public services that are expected 
to regain the public‟s trust.  For example, reformation of the Ministry of Finance began 
with reviewing the standard operating procedures and then simplifying the business 
processes by automating some areas by combining IT with certain procedures.  These 
steps were followed by reviewing job descriptions, analysing jobs and workload, 
building an assessment centre that would affect any additional bonuses, setting up a 
human resource information system, and then enhancing the quality of human resources 
by recruiting new staff from the pool of high-quality new graduates.  
 
  The governance reforms at this moment are relatively complex, as they not 
only focus on hard-control related to procedures, laws and regulations, but also to soft-
control emphasising socio-cultural aspects currently encountered in government: for 
example, ineffective infrastructure development and government spending are induced 
and facilitated by counterproductive bureaucracies either in central and/or local 
government.  Therefore, in order to change the cultures of internal organisations, the 
leader must have the courage to challenge officials in structural positions who hold 
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established positions and who are regarded as ruling little kingdoms in a particular 
ministry or department.  However, this approach is not supported by existing regulation, 
and it is not easy to discharge a government official unless he is caught red-handed 
committing a serious crime, or is in grave violation of civil service regulations.   
 
 In addition, concerning the organisational culture of government organisations, 
it is necessary to establish an egalitarianism climate in which an individual can speak up 
if something wrong occurs, and where any ensuing judgements are not be based on 
ethnic or religious affinities.  This bureaucratic mentality is still dominant among 
government officials, inherited from the previous era where the working environment 
tended to impede the critical and creative thinking of officials (Harun and Kamase, 
2012).  Moreover, socio-cultural structures in Indonesian government institutions are 
very strong, an esprit de corps, meaning that it is considered inappropriate to shame a 
member of the group, and hence attitudes are very permissive towards underperforming 
staff or even those violating the rules (Irawanto et al., 2012).  Hence, it is now a 
preferable option to recruit new personnel, rather than attempt to re-educate the old 
staff; young, talented workers can be shaped easily, and are perceived to be able to 
change socio-cultural attitudes and values in public organisations, enabling them to 
become more open-minded.  They have the courage to argue with their superiors, which 
rarely occurred in the previous era.  
 
  Another issue relating to governance reform is interaction among departments 
or ministries, as expressed in a secondary source from a senior economist:    
There was rivalry between departments. You see, the departments used to have 
money, and they are the kings in their own sectors. Therefore, it needs inter-
sectoral (across departmental) coordination and cooperation. The government 
officials do not really belong to the government; you belong to one department, a 
department which demands your loyalty: the department symbols, the department 
songs, the department association. I mentioned with so many departments, (it is) 
ego-sectoral. How can you build one civil service? That was a big battle. … The 
whole system of government was very much ego-sectoral. (Salim, 2009) 
 
Hence, it is not easy to draw personnel from other departments, as the current system 
encourages departmental loyalty rather than a wider inter-departmental perspective.  In 
order to deal with this issue, the ministries or agencies are compelled to formulate an 
integrated system.  At the national level, there is the National Reform Team, which 
consists of the Kemenpan (the Ministry of Apparatuses Empowerment and Bureaucratic 
Reform), the Ministry of Finance, and the KPK (Commission of Corruption 
Eradication), which make up a coordinating forum to discuss policies and regulations 
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across institutions in a more structured way; this forum can also revisit policies that 
have been implemented.   
 
However, this kind of forum is susceptible to political dynamics, because the 
current political system encourages domination by national elites (Faguet, 2013).  When 
many political parties are involved and hold power in many departments, then conflicts 
of interest will be prominent, rather than when the organisation is managed by a 
professional appointed by the President.  This condition is due to the composition of 
ministries in the Indonesian government, as approximately 61% of ministers are from 
political parties (Echwan, 2009).  The historical roots of each political party affect the 
behaviour of each political actor differently  (Peters, 1999; Blau, 1970; Barley and 
Tolbert, 1997) because each party has own values that affect the activities and 
relationships within the organisation (Barley and Tolbert, 1997).  When a political actor 
has a position in a ministry, the values of his/her party affect them significantly.  As 
Eisenstadt (1964) indicates, parties will tend to fight for their own interests within the 
existing systems, and use the systems as vehicles for their political benefit (Dix, 1992).  
In line with this, Eisenstadt (1964) suggests the need for the creation and 
institutionalisation of norms of social behaviour, along with sanctions, all of which will 
regulate the behaviour of an organisation‟s members who come from different cultures 
or political ideologies (Eisenstadt, 1964).   
 
 Lack of coordination does not only occur between ministries, but also between 
ministries and local governments, leading to public funds being spent without 
considering the benefit for the local government (Mello, 2000).  As formal 
organisations, ministries and local governments must have a system to coordinate and 
control activities (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Local 
government is required to conform to the regulations and policies that have been 
established by central government (Meulen, 1998).  However, in many cases, local 
governments reluctantly adopt the prescribed systems, which might not fit with their 
needs because every local government has its own different characteristics (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977).  As a result, interrelationships among ministries, local government and 
local government agencies may seem to be attached, but in some aspects they remain 
circumscribed, separate and slow to respond (Weick, 1976). 
 
2.4.3. Impact on Engagement of Private Sector 
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 Apart from governance reform, the private sector has also been put on the IMF 
agenda to be empowered.  The basic idea is that in the market mechanism/model, when 
a buyer buys for himself and the sellers sell their own product or service, then there is 
no opportunity for corruption.  However, when government officials, who hold 
authority over resources, get involved in these business activities, opportunities for 
corruption do emerge, because corruption can occur when one party has control over 
resources, but does not own them.  Since corruption is inefficient and raises costs, this 
will put a company at a competitive disadvantage in the market paradigm (Hipsher, 
2013). 
 
 Therefore, interaction between government officials and the private sector is 
encouraged to be more transparent, as the private sector is suspected of engaging in 
mark-up or bribing government officials in order to secure government projects through 
procurement mechanism.  The idea of transparent interaction has been imposed by the 
KPK (Commission of Corruption Eradication), as currently the KPK does not only 
prosecute politicians and public sector officials who receive bribes, but also companies 
and individuals in the private sector which offer bribes.  Everyone who takes part in the 
activity will be charged.  The KPK‟s actions are intended to make people worry about 
bribing government officials to enhance their business interests. Therefore, the 
dissemination of information, guidelines and legal interpretations is required in order to 
eliminate any legal uncertainties concerning the acceptable behaviour of government 
officers and others (Magiera, 2011).  In addition, government officials need to 
understand the nature of the business world, which needs businesses to run faster and 
get money quicker.  Hence, officials must be able to provide good services by running 
all their processes more efficiently, without any rent-seeking activities, which are 
regarded as specific characteristics of infrastructure projects (Davidson, 2010). 
 
 In the reformation era, the involvement of the private sector in public-sector 
projects is widespread, whereas in the previous era it only involved a small number of 
private sector individuals who were close to the political elite.  Engagement of the 
private sector in public-sector business is still needed, as the infrastructure is still 
considered undersupplied and serviced.  Involvement of the private sector in 
infrastructure projects can be accommodated through PPP (Public-Private Partnership) 
schemes (Tirtosuharto, 2012; Chen et al., 2013).  In the LoI of October 31
st
, 1997, the 
IMF suggested creating a competitive environment via a privatisation policy and the 
involvement of the private sector in infrastructure schemes, such as building roads, 
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bridges, irrigation, power supply works etc.  In order to ensure competitiveness, the 
government set guidelines for procurement and contracting procedures, which were 
formally issued at the end of December 1997.  Moreover, the guidelines indicated the 
important role of government in stimulating the growth of private enterprises, especially 
small to medium enterprises (SMEs), which are perceived as the catalysts of economic 
growth in developing countries (Tirtosuharto, 2012).  The commitment of central 
government to the realisation of the competitive environment is supported by the 
Ministry of Finance, which plays an important role in regulating fund disbursement and 
the accountability of that disbursement.  The MoF is also supported by the BPKP, as the 
government‟s internal auditor, the BPK, as the supreme audit that has authority to give 
an audit opinion, the KPK, as the anti-corruption commission, and the Tipikor court, as 
a special court in cases of corruption or bribery that occur during the procurement 
processes.  Such broad support will serve to maintain the competitive environment that 
has been suggested by the IMF.  If any government officials are found to be involved in 
corruption or receive bribes, the Ministry of Empowering of State Apparatuses will take 
responsibility for punishment, based on civil servant regulations. 
 
 Involvement of the private sector is not only a matter when undertaking a 
project as vendors or suppliers; some ministers are recruited from the professions or 
from the private sector.  Being a bureaucrat was a prestigious position to have during 
the previous regime, and was always protected by the President.  However, nowadays 
many professionals from outside the government have been placed in the top-tier 
management of ministries, as such individuals are expected to bring new ideas, new 
paradigms and a fresh attitude to public-sector organisations, in terms of how civil 
servants should do their work professionally, provide services responsibly, and be 
market-orientated and with a focus on the customer.  Thus, the government institution is 
expected to be able to support both the business community and the public as 
consumers, because top managers in the private sector are regarded as having the 
expertise to support and facilitate improvement in the public sector (Potrykus, 2010).   
 
 The injection of „new blood‟ into the system is perceived as being the only way 
to change the dominant, somewhat self-interested and irresponsible, culture in public 
administration, which does not focus on providing effective and efficient public 
services.  Moreover, this view is also in line with suggestions from the World Bank in 
terms of efforts to accelerate the reformation of Indonesia‟s public service.  Although it 
cannot fully eliminate bribery or rent-seeking practices in public-sector organisations, 
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nowadays the civil servant‟s mindset has been considerably changed; and, as a 
consequence of these changes, the bureaucrats are also treated as equivalent to 
professionals in the private sector by increasing their benefits and remuneration. 
 
2.4.4. Impact on Strengthening Civil Society 
 In the LoI, the IMF also set an agenda to empower civil society in Indonesia, 
because it is perceived as one of the most important dimensions of development, along 
with the government and the private business sector.  Civil society was suppressed by 
the prior regime, as all movements such as labour unions, student unions etc. had been 
controlled by the state.  Hence, civil societies need to be empowered after the fall of the 
previous authoritarian regime.  Although there is no consensus about the term civil 
society, it can be defined as following: 
Civil society is understood as the home of enlightenment values like 
individualism, personal liberty (and property), and rationalism (if not secularism), 
and more politically, of human rights.  Civil society organisations are then 
guardians of this treasure, and advocates for such values in the state and economy. 
(Harney and Olivia, 2003) 
 
 One of the attempts of government to educate society is through the 
involvement of the press, such as to communicate policy via mass media.  This effort 
builds public trust in the government on one side, as the public is provided with many 
perspectives and is acquainted with the rationales behind the policy, which in turn 
enables the public to observe the implementation of the policy.  When the policy works 
well, the public will then hopefully give it a positive response and their support.  The 
role of the press, in the era 1998-2000, was vital for the support of democratic 
movements, which led to the downfall of the autocratic regime and encouraged the 
adoption and development of the democratic process.  Therefore, the role of the press 
was crucial to disseminate the desired messages.  However, currently, the press is still 
focusing on the upper and upper-middle classes located in the metropolitan area 
(Hollander et al., 2009). 
 
 In Indonesian culture, the public must be re-assured by evidence.  If they are 
offered many concepts, they will not believe them unless they are presented with clear 
evidence that they work.  Moreover, the public also needs role models, then they will 
follow their lead; otherwise, they will reject what is being offered or presented.  
Therefore, empowering Indonesian civil society should begin mostly with intellectuals, 
who come from universities, or social organisations, such as the two religious-based 
35 
 
organisations NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah, which tend to be more 
independent and have support from „grass roots‟ people – in other words, from the 
public domain, and not necessarily managed by the government (Tornquist, 2006).  
These religious organisations are the largest mass-based Islamic movements, having 
more than 70 million affiliates all over Indonesia, and are regarded as major civil-
society players (Fuad, 2002).  Each organisation has a different mass base: the majority 
of Muhammadiyah‟s members come from the urban middle class, while the NU has its 
base in rural and traditional communities; however, both of them have the same 
concerns (Barton, 2014).  These organisations actively engage in anti-corruption 
training and workshops, and outreach through mass media (Setiyono and Mc.Leod, 
2010). 
 
 Another way to develop civil society in Indonesia is by developing CSOs 
(Civil Society Organisations).  The CSOs engage with government to meet their specific 
agendas fulfilling numerous roles such as watchdog, facilitators of government, or 
advocates (Antlov et al., 2010; Setiyono and Mc.Leod, 2010).  Some CSOs have 
developed formal structures and have the remit to educate members of the public on 
combating corruption; these include ICW (Indonesia Corruption Watch), MTI 
(Masyarakat Transparansi Indonesia, Indonesian Society for Transparency) and IPW 
(Indonesia Procurement Watch), which flourish because they have been triggered by the 
democratic transition (Setiyono and Mc.Leod, 2010).   
 
 However, the development of CSOs has not run smoothly for a number of 
reasons.  First, civil society organisations have been used as political vehicles, either 
religion-based or ethnic-based.  The second reason is the distrust between the CSOs and 
politicians that has built up in parliament.  The CSOs suspect politicians of being a 
group of corrupt people with no interest in empowering society.  At the same time, the 
politicians see that CSOs receive  financial support from abroad, and believe that they 
are designed to discredit Indonesian political systems, because in the first decade of the 
reformation era some CSOs received considerable funds from donor agencies to 
transform themselves into formal organisations in order to undertake their programmes 
on governance and anti-corruption activities (Setiyono and Mc.Leod, 2010).   Third, 
most of the CSOs still deal with internal factors.  For example, they implement 
confrontational strategies because of the CSOs‟ leaders have limited political skills, 
limited organisational capacity and inability to articulate the interests of indigenous 
societies to policy makers. Politicians also address CSOs‟ sustainability issues, i.e. the 
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social and cultural gap between the CSOs and general society (Antlov et al., 2010).  
Fourth, the holders of power are mainly concentrated in a combination of private sector 
and state interests: 40% relate to public executives, 16% is in the hands of the police 
and military, 17% in parliament and political parties, and 12% is related to business or 
CSOs.  Moreover, weak representation and the dominance of influential actors and the 
middle class in parliament further weaken the role of the public in general (Tornquist, 
2006). 
  
 Another form of participation of local society in local government is expressed 
in political sector, where central government facilitates direct elections both of the head 
of local governments and local parliament members in every region (Tornquist, 2006; 
Bennet, 2010).  However, the awareness that local society has of the political and 
economic aspects of government is still low.  Hence, without educating people to raise 
their awareness (Schutte, 2012), local society will only become a legitimating tool, 
because public participation is more ceremonial than genuine, and only serves to fulfil 
the regulation requirements (Purba, 2010; Sopanah, 2012).  Local society can easily be 
manipulated by political elites to achieve their political ambitions. 
 
2.5. Issues over Public Expenditure Control and Capital Expenditure Control 
in the Post-Reformation Era 
 Based on these conditions described in the previous sections, many studies 
have been undertaken to investigate the process and effects of decentralisation as listed 
in appendix 6, such as (Ridha and Basuki, 2011; Mustafa et al., 2011; Amirya et al., 
2011; Nugraha, 2010; Djamhuri, 2009; Rahmanurrasjid, 2008; Harun, 2007; Abdullah 
and Asmara, 2006; Cameron et al., 2005; Sumarto et al., 2004; Alatas et al., 2002).  
Several of these studies focus on financial control in Indonesian local government from 
many perspectives, such as opportunistic behaviour from the agency theory perspective 
(Abdullah and Asmara, 2006), as well as some studies on the importance of internal 
control in local governments (Nugraha, 2010; Mustafa et al., 2011).  In addition, 
research based on institutional theory with various focuses have been carried out, such 
as emphasising budgeting and accounting systems (Djamhuri, 2009; Amirya et al., 
2011) and underscoring the impact of external pressures, uncertainty, and management 
commitment to transparency in the financial reporting of local government (Ridha and 
Basuki, 2011).   
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 Abdullah and Asmara (2006) investigate how the legislative body use 
government regulations as a foundation to behave opportunistically for its own benefit; 
their study which covers 53 local governments (cities and districts) as samples.  
Findings of this study indicate that legislative members behave opportunistically 
towards budgeting processes, which are affected by Pendapatan Asli Daerah (local 
government income) and the Anggaran Pendapatan Daerah (local government budget) 
as mediums for corruption.  Meanwhile, studies on the internal control of local 
government have been performed on Indonesian local governments as well, such as 
Nugraha (2010) on the Provincial Government of West Java and Mustafa et al. (2011) 
on Kendari City.  All of these studies indicate the importance of an effective internal 
control system to ensure the reliability of financial information.  In addition, Mustafa et 
al. (2011) find that technology is required to enhance the reliability of financial 
information, and that human resources are insignificant factors, because of the 
insufficient knowledge of the staff in accounting.   
 
 Other research is conducted by Amirya et al. (2011), referring to the study by 
Djamhuri (2009).  Amirya‟s study selected Brawijaya University as the research 
sample, while Djamhuri employed a local government as his sample.  Both of them 
apply institutional theory as a lens through which to investigate budgeting and 
accounting practices in local government or in state-owned enterprises.  Djamhuri 
(2009) investigates performance-based budgeting and accrual accounting in a local 
government.  His findings indicate that introducing a new budgeting and accounting 
system will cause decoupling due to the insufficient quantity and quality of staff in 
accounting, and the rigidity of bureaucratic culture.  Meanwhile, Amirya‟s findings 
indicate that the adoption of budget and accounting systems is required to compile all 
regulations for state university, such as Brawijaya University.  Another research based 
on institutional theory is performed by Ridha and Basuki (2011), investigating some 
factors affecting transparency in financial reporting. They emphasise isomorphism 
methods, i.e. coercive, mimetic, and normative, on the transparency of financial 
reporting; their findings indicate that implementation of financial transparency is 
affected by external pressures which are imposed through laws and regulation from 
central government and by management commitment.   
  
 Referring to the findings of those studies (Abdullah and Asmara, 2006, 
Djamhuri, 2009, Nugraha, 2010, Amirya, 2011, Ridha and Basuki, 2011, and Mustafa et 
al., 2011), control mechanisms are required, but there are still some internal and 
38 
 
external local government issues.  The quality of local government finance staff is still 
regarded as an internal obstacle, according to Djamhuri (2009).  Meanwhile, the 
external obstacles include the opportunistic behaviour of local parliament members 
(Abdullah and Asmara, 2006), who use the rigidity of bureaucracy (Djamhury, 2009) 
that requires compliance with many regulations (Amirya et al., 2011, Ridha and Basuki, 
2011) to facilitate attempts at rent-seeking.   
 
 Furthermore, regarding the study of capital expenditure in local government, 
much research has been undertaken with samples from many regions, such as in Java 
and Bali regions (Harianto and Adi, 2007); in Central Java province (Nuarisa, 2013); in 
West Java Province (Arwati and Hadiati, 2013); in Bali province (Jaya and Dwirandra, 
2014); and in Central Sulawesi province (Oktora and Pontoh, 2013).  Most of these 
studies investigate factors affecting the allocation of capital expenditure by local 
governments.  The findings of these studies vary: for example, Abdullah and Halim 
(2006) suggest that the allocation of capital expenditure in 32 local governments in 
Sumatera Island is affected by income from central government, i.e. DBH, DAU and 
DAK (Abdullah and Halim, 2006).  This conclusion is confirmed by Harianto and Adi 
(2007), who study the financial structure of local governments located in the Java and 
Bali regions.  Their findings indicate that DAU positively affects the allocation of 
capital expenditure, which stimulates the increase of PAD; a conclusion which is in line 
with the studies by Nuarisa (2013) and Jaya and Dwirandra (2014).  However, this 
finding contradicts the study by Arwati and Hadiati (2013), who find that DAU does not 
affect capital expenditure decisions; while another study indicates that DAK does not 
affect the allocation of capital expenditure (Darmayasa and Suandi, 2014). 
 
 Concerning the role of PAD in determining the allocation of capital 
expenditure, Abdullah and Halim (2006) find that local government still rely on income 
from central government instead of local income (PAD).  This finding is consistent with 
the studies of Wandira (2013), Oktora and Pontoh (2013) and Darmayasa and Suandi 
(2014), whose studies all indicate that PAD does not affect the allocation of capital 
expenditure.  In addition, regarding the economic growth of local government, Harianto 
and Adi (2007) find that income per capita negatively affects allocation of capital 
expenditure because local governments tend to reduce the proportion of capital 
expenditure when they have met the target of local income per capita (Jaya and 
Dwirandra, 2014).  This finding is not confirmed by Arwati and Hadiati (2013), 
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however, who conclude that economic growth does not affect allocation of capital 
expenditure. 
 
 Apart from research concerning factors affecting capital expenditure decisions, 
there are several studies focusing on control mechanisms in local government 
embracing internal and external factors.  One has been undertaken in the Talaud Island 
district, suggesting that local government has formed its financial statement based on 
government accounting standards, but that local government does not provide 
stakeholder access to that statement (Poae and Saerang, 2013).  Consequently, the 
transparency and accountability of financial management of local government are 
perceived as weak.  Another study is undertaken by Mogi and Morasa (2013) in the 
District of Sangihe Island, based on 2011 data, which has had a „disclaimer opinion‟ 
from the BPK, as Indonesia‟s supreme audit, for the fiscal year of 2011.  Their findings 
indicate that the local government acquire lands as fixed assets, but these are not 
supported by any legal evidence of ownership in the form of land certificates, which in 
2010 identified 107 land parcels valued at over IDR16 billion or equal to USD1.1 
million (assuming USD1 = IDR14,000).  Moreover, this study also finds many assets 
from central government that have not been recorded and recognised as assets of local 
government (Mogi and Morasa, 2013).  Syafitri‟s (2012) study also emphasises internal 
factors in a local government, the city of Palembang, South Sumatra, where, it is 
suggested, the city manages its financial recording based on government accounting 
standards, but still does not take into account depreciation of assets and accumulation of 
depreciation.  Consequently, there are many discrepancies that occurred between real 
conditions and the value of fixed assets – particularly fixed assets that have almost 
reached the end of their economic life, because fixed assets are still recorded and 
recognised based on their acquisition cost (Syafitri, 2012). 
 
 Meanwhile, several studies regarding external factors of control mechanisms 
have been undertaken by Nuru et al. (2013) in the city of Sorong focusing on local 
parliament members; the researchers conclude that local parliament members still lack 
knowledge of budgeting mechanisms.  Another finding indicates that any involvement 
of local society is merely symbolic, and occurs only to comply with government 
regulations (Nuru et al., 2013).  Another study on external factors by Wonda et al. 
(2013) in Puncak Jaya district investigates factors affecting local parliament to perform 
control mechanisms on the local budget.  Their first finding is that the placement of a 
local parliament member into a particular commission, which is responsible for control 
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of the local budget, is based on the recommendation of a particular political party, 
instead of the background of the member.  Second, parliament members from coalition 
parties will have dominant roles regarding the formulation and ratification of local 
budgets, rather than opposition parties.  Third, about 87.5% of local parliament 
members do not have comprehensive knowledge about the regulations of financial 
control mechanisms (Wonda et al., 2013). 
 
 Referring to these findings from the cited studies in capital expenditure, several 
issues can be highlighted: first, recording and recognition of acquired fixed assets; 
second, legal evidence of ownership; and third, accessibility to local government 
financial statements.  In addition, control from other parties, such as local parliament, is 
still weak because of the dominance of political parties over local parliament members 
and the lack of knowledge of local parliament members, particularly regarding issues 
relating to financial control mechanisms.  Input from local society is also weak because 
it is merely symbolic in nature and occurs only in order to meet the requirements 
stipulated by regulations.  In summary, from a general perspective regarding the 
financial management of local government and the specific perspective on capital 
expenditure, there are several issues on control mechanisms that encompass both 
internal and external parties that can be investigated further in order to get an 
understanding of the whole picture of control mechanisms in Indonesian local 
government.  
 
 
 
2.6. Summary 
 This chapter is intended to give an overview of the financial, governance and 
civil service reform in Indonesia, which mainly relies on secondary sources.  Although 
the engagement with the IMF raised pros and cons between ministers, the IMF has 
brought new values to the GoI, which has since affected the way that the GoI runs the 
government.  However, the values that have been introduced do not fit entirely with 
Indonesian culture.  Several points can be underlined derived from this chapter related 
to factors affecting those reforms that subsequently will affect lower levels of 
government.  The first refers to the involvement of three ministries in regulating local 
governments.  The Ministry of Home Affairs is responsible for nation building and the 
regulation of decentralised governance, political systems, regional development and 
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community empowerment; the Ministry of Empowerment of State Apparatus and 
Bureaucratic reform regulates civil servants along with the services they are expected to 
provide; and the Ministry of Finance deals with fiscal balances and financial transfers to 
local government.  All government institutions are interrelated and influence each other.  
However, there is still a lack of coordination and communication.  For example, a lack 
of coordination at ministerial level in producing ministerial regulations might contradict 
or have the same substance as regulations issued by another ministry, which in turn may 
affect local government agencies and compound problems regarding the implementation 
of the regulations at local government level.  In addition, local governments are not only 
regulated by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
and the Ministry of Apparatuses Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform, but must also 
adhere to regulations from related ministries.  Ministerial coordination and regulation 
are perceived as being related to departmental or ministerial ego, in which every 
ministry might issue ministerial regulations to look after their own interests.   
 
 The second is the involvement of citizens in monitoring programmes; this is an 
initiative which can be established through civil-society organisations based on 
commonality of society and non-government organisations, either local or 
internationally affiliated NGOs.  The third, which is interaction between government 
and CSOs, can be facilitated by political parties, each of which will have their own 
agendas.  Fourth, the private sector has been facilitated through the establishment of a 
competitive environment and support from government for facilitating the engagement 
of private sector businesses in infrastructure projects.  Finally, the GOI endorses the 
involvement of professionals from the private sector into ministerial-level positions. 
 
 Several issues related to the internal aspects of local government can also be 
identified within this chapter.  The first is the lack of ability of government officials, as 
a result of which conditions become severe when central government heightens the 
standard of transparency by requiring various reports to be available, and for public 
spending requirements to be fulfilled.  On the other side, as those responsible become 
more important, central government provides higher remuneration and benefits for the 
government officials, although there are still pros and cons regarding the policy.  The 
second is the low involvement of society in the social control of government and 
parliament.  The third is the wide span of central government‟s control and the 
empowering of provincial-level government to cope with the lack of coordination 
between central and municipal government.  The fourth factor is political influence on 
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government, and ensuring the capacity and independence of heads of government 
institutions to resist the interference of political influence.  The last factor is dealing 
with local culture.  For example, the role of head of a government institution is very 
important, especially as a role model in his/her organisation, thus, he/she must be able 
to be a leader in the organisation.  Particularly in Indonesian culture, the leader is given 
a higher status and is perceived as a master or lord.  This culture is still sustained by the 
organisation‟s members.  Therefore, the leader tends to be authoritarian.  To sum up, 
these findings consistent with the study of Faquet (2013), indicating that issues on 
decentralisation are related to the lack of political will, low bureaucratic ability and 
insufficient resources.   
 
 After the context of this study has been described in this chapter, the following 
chapter discusses the theoretical basis and research method applied in this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Control Mechanism within Foucauldian Perspective 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 The previous chapter described the context of this study, focused on the 
introduction of new values to the Indonesian government by international institutions 
that had both positive and negative implications.  Introducing new values from another, 
different culture affects the dynamics of the organisation, it is suggested (Bourne and 
Jenkins, 2013).  Likewise, as international institutions introduced new values, this 
affected the dynamics of the Indonesian public sector, especially on establishing control 
mechanisms in capital expenditure, both in central and local government.   
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 This chapter now elaborates on how those values influence the implementation 
of control mechanisms in an organisation.  In this stance, control is perceived as a focal 
point in management processes apart from planning and organising activities.  It is a 
required mechanism for conducting actions effectively and accountably, which are 
provided by control and control techniques.  These control mechanisms are related to 
individual human interrelation, which requires the individual to adhere to an 
arrangement.  The control mechanisms have evolved from emphasising power in the 
early stage to subsequently emphasising behaviour, and then involving 
multidimensional aspects (Belkaoui, 1986).  Miller and O‟Leary suggest shifting 
perspectives: from seeing the individual as a machine to treating an individual as a 
decision-maker.  This points to the importance of the personal dimension in control 
mechanisms, because the individual has opportunity to make choices, include in relation 
to the acceptance of norms, instructions, and standards.  Hence, every management tool 
should consider the complexity individuals along with their needs and objectives (Miller 
and O'Leary, 1987). 
 In addition, this chapter provides viewpoints for conducting and analysing a 
case study whose findings are set out in the following chapters.  Accordingly, this 
chapter is structured as follows: the first section is an introduction; this is followed by a 
description of the control systems in an organisation.  This second section covers 
control systems, various approaches to control, and the cultural aspects of control.  
Then, the third section describes control as a form of responsible accounting, where an 
individual is required to take responsibility for the resources under his/her control.  The 
fourth section discusses the roles of power and knowledge in control systems.  The 
subsequent section covers the application of discipline and surveillance in control 
systems.  Then, referring to the analysis provided the preceding sections, the discussion 
shifts to the research methodology and design, which become the basis for determining 
the approach of this study, i.e. the justification for applying a particular research method 
and case-study approach in this research and determining the data-collection method.  
Finally, the content of this chapter is summarised in the section summary. 
 
3.2.  Control Systems of an Organisation 
  Control systems are divided by Merchant and Stede (2012) into two basic 
functions, i.e. strategic control and management control.  Strategic control is considered 
to be “something that makes an organisation unique; a winner or a survivor” (Thomas 
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1993, p.3 as cited in Coad, 2005, p.168).  Strategic control can be further categorised 
into two functions: the first ensures that an organisation‟s strategy, i.e. what it 
determines to be its long-term goals and objectives, is on the right track, indicated by 
specific short-term goals (milestones) (Langfield-Smith, 2006; Berry et al., 2005a); the 
second ensures the relevance of that strategy by considering changes within the business 
environment through systematic and continuous surveillance of internal and external 
factors (Coad, 2005; Simons, 1995; Langfield-Smith, 2006).  The strategic control 
function was developed predominantly in the 1960s to the mid-1980s, referring to the 
work of Robert N. Anthony (1965), who proposed how important it is for an 
organisation to apply strategic planning, management control and operational control 
(Belkaoui, 1986).  Similarly, management control was defined by Anthony in 1988 as 
the process by which managers influence other members of the organisation to 
implement the organisation‟s strategies through formal, information-based routines and 
procedures (Cowton and Dopson, 2002).  The function implies that the management 
control system acts as an intermediary between strategic control and operational/task 
control that is employed in a stable environment and in mechanistic organisations 
(Langfield-Smith, 2006; Coad, 2005; Berry et al., 2005a).  Operational control is closely 
related to day-to-day activities in an organisation, and must carry out its tasks in an 
efficient and effective way (Berry et al., 2005a).   
  
 The formal routines and procedures of management control systems 
encompass plans, budgets and market-share monitoring systems; information-based 
systems provide up-to-date information for all organisation members regarding 
emerging developments (Simons, 1995).  Concerning information flow, control systems 
also cover both vertical and horizontal information.  Control systems also cover 
reporting structures, such as performance reporting and incentive systems (Langfield-
Smith, 2006).  The information should encourage and facilitate all levels of the 
organisation in searching, learning, and innovating in response to environmental 
changes (Simons, 1995).   
 
 One of the important aspects of the formal set of procedures and policies is the 
internal control system, which is intended to reduce fraud by safeguarding assets and 
ensuring the reliability of financial statements by producing accurate accounting 
systems (Edmonds et al., 2011; Simons, 2000; Leitch, 2008).  In the early development 
of internal control systems, attention was purely focused on bookkeeping, i.e. on 
checking and detecting whether bookkeepers were making any errors or committing 
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fraud.  However, following recent developments, the coverage supplied by internal 
control has been extended to embracing business risk management (Leitch, 2008), as set 
out by the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations (COSO) in the five characteristics or 
components of internal control systems: (i) the controlled environment, i.e. the 
foundation of all other components of internal control; (ii) risk assessment, meaning the 
identification and analysis of risks that might emerge from efforts to achieve the entity‟s 
objectives; (iii) control activities, involving processes, policies, and procedures to 
ensure the accomplishment of management directives; (iv) information and 
communication, consisting of systems and reports to support management and help 
employees to undertake their responsibilities; and (v) monitoring, i.e. activities intended 
to supervise the internal control performance of those within an organisation (Woods, 
2008; Graham, 2008).   
 
 In addition to the concept of formal control, Langfield-Smith (2006) indicates 
that management control systems also involve informal controls, encompassing 
performance measurement systems, employee and managerial incentive systems, 
physical controls over assets, personnel controls, and cultural and social controls.  
Hence, organisations must set up feasible mechanisms to induce all organisation 
members to pay attention to accepted behavioural aspects.  Without such control 
mechanisms, members of an organisation or business might initiate uncoordinated 
activities that can lead to financial failure, reputation damage, and/or, even worse, 
organisational failure (Berry et al., 2005b; Merchant and Stede, 2012).  Consistent with 
this perspective, Turnbull Guidance
3
 (2005 par. 19) suggests that it is important to 
consider behavioural aspects to ensure that an organisation‟s control systems protect 
assets and manage risks (Kajuter et al., 2008). 
 
3.3. Various Approaches of Control Mechanisms 
 Control involves interrelationships between an organisation‟s members, both 
vertically, in superior-subordinate relations, and horizontally, with colleagues.  Control 
starts at the beginning of the business process, and neglecting one element of the 
business process will affect the strength and degree of control (Follett, 1932).  
Furthermore, Ouchi (1979) describes a control mechanism as the surveillance and 
                                                          
3
 Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code (the Turnbull Guidance) was 
first issued in 1999.  In 2004, the Financial Reporting Council established the Turnbull Review 
Group to consider the impact of the guidance and the related disclosures and to determine 
whether the guidance needed to be updated. 
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directing of subordinates by their superiors, together with the introduction and 
implementation of rules concerning processes or standards of quality and quantity 
(Ouchi, 1979).  Sometimes, a control mechanism places more emphasis on monitoring, 
evaluating, coercion, and oppression; this is an orientation which prompts 
unenthusiastic responses from employees because such a model is perceived as an insult 
to their sense of autonomy and self-control (Macintosh and Quattrone, 2010; Ouchi, 
1979).   
 
 Organisations can choose many differing control mechanisms, as suggested by 
Ouchi and Merchant, which can involve action (behavioural) control, personnel and 
cultural (or clan and social) control, and result (or output) control (Drury, 2001).  
However, having more controls does not guarantee a better quality or standard of 
control (Merchant and Stede, 2012).  Action control ensures that the actions of every 
organisation member are beneficial to their organisation; personnel control motivates all 
organisation members to perform tasks on their own; and cultural control shapes 
organisational norms and encourages employees to monitor and influence each other‟s 
behaviour (Merchant and Stede, 2012).  Meanwhile, result (output) control is seen as a 
system that requires monitoring to compare the output of processes to determine targets 
and then make adjustments or take corrective actions if the output deviates from the 
target (Pidd, 2007; Drury, 2001).   
 
 Choosing particular control mechanisms must be based on the context, values, 
and beliefs of an organisation, because each condition requires different types of control 
(Follett, 1932; Scheytt and Soin, 2005; Edmonds et al., 2011).  Different parts of an 
organisation may behave differently even though theoretically they are guided by the 
same control system (Berry et al., 2005b).  Therefore, those designing a management 
control system must consider the expectations that an organisation has of their 
employees in order to conceive the strategies and objectives of that organisation, which 
will subsequently reduce the occurrence of behavioural problems, helping to prevent 
any unpleasant surprises (Merchant and Stede, 2012).  This notion is consistent with 
Follet‟s idea of two points of control design, i.e. the focus on fact-control instead of 
man-control, and on the correlation between many controls rather than the adoption of 
one superimposed control (Follett, 1932). 
 
 Furthermore, designing a control system must encourage an organisation and 
its members to adapt and respond to environmental changes in order to enable strategic 
47 
 
responses (Langfield-Smith, 2006).  Hence, the environment is considered as very 
important, because it has integrity and involves many kinds of qualitative ethical issues, 
governance and management styles, accounting and business competencies, and 
personnel policies and human resources (McPhail, 2005; Graham, 2008).  Likewise, the 
environment must be assessed carefully because it is intangible and subject to 
interpretation and rationalisation (Graham, 2008).  Therefore, there is no such thing as a 
perfect control model or system; even good management control still allows for some 
probabilities of failure (Merchant and Stede, 2012). 
 
 Another approach to the mechanism of control involves informal processes 
that affect the behavioural aspects of employees‟ performance, because a rigid, top-
down, command-and-control technique is not an appropriate fit in a competitive 
environment that requires creativity and initiative from its employees.  Application of 
organisation control tends to provoke various responses, including resistance (Cowton 
and Dopson, 2002).  Therefore, the control model needs to strike a balance between top-
down direction and bottom-up creativity, between surveillance and feedback systems, 
and between command control and social and cultural controls  (Simons, 1995; 
Merchant and Stede, 2012).  Regarding social control, Hopwood (1974) suggests that 
this reflects social perspectives or norms and patterns of social interaction (Berry et al., 
2005a).  Meanwhile, cultural control offers mutual monitoring of those who wittingly or 
unwittingly violate group norms and values; it is the most effective control model when 
a group has social or emotional bonds (Merchant and Stede, 2012).  Cultural controls 
embrace the values, social norms and beliefs that are shared by an organisation‟s 
members and influence their behaviour; it is a model that requires all members to 
understand their roles, and the capabilities needed to undertake those roles.  Therefore, 
personnel or cultural controls are suggested as optimal because they have fewer side 
effects, are relatively unobtrusive, and incur lower costs as well. However, personal or 
cultural control models are usually combined with other forms of controls.  Hence, if 
the personal or cultural control models do not fit with the conditions of an organisation, 
it is necessary to assess the reliability of the chosen control system and the possibility of 
employing and applying other forms of control (Merchant and Stede, 2012; Drury, 
2001).     
 
3.4. Cultural Approach to Control Mechanisms 
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 An organisation binds individuals who have the ability to identify 
opportunities and convert them into an output of value, along with available resources 
based on specified objectives (Simons, 1995).  Dynamic interaction between individuals 
affects social and organisational situations, during which they learn about the 
consequences of their actions. They also share concepts of structural stability – depth, 
breadth, and patterning of integration – which are less tangible and less visible; this 
pattern is known as organisational culture.  This culture also consists of shared 
traditions and sets of structures, beliefs, values, ideologies, routines, rules and norms, all 
of which inform members on how to behave in an organisation.  This behaviour is 
shaped by words and by example, including leadership behaviour, codes of conduct, 
employee rotation, group rewards, and physical and social arrangements (Schein, 2004; 
Scheytt and Soin, 2005; Merchant and Stede, 2012).   
 
 Organisational culture is also perceived to be a representation of the common 
perceptions of an organisation‟s members implied in the relational and internal 
processes of the organisation.  Chatman and Jehn (1994) describe organisational culture 
as being based on seven primary characteristics that exist in every organisation, i.e. 
innovation and risk-taking, attention to detail, outcome orientation, people orientation, 
team orientation, aggressiveness, and stability.  Therefore, an organisation is considered 
to be a complex cultural entity (Scheytt and Soin, 2005); any attempts to change it are 
regarded as a threat because culture implies some level of structural stability in the 
group (Schein, 2004; Ouchi and Wilkins, 1985).   
 
 Managers‟ nationality and the business environment influence an 
organisation‟s values, because managerial work essentially focuses on the social and 
political rather than the fundamentally analytical (Silverthorne, 2005; Watson, 2012).  
Therefore, as a form of managerial responsibility, a manager has to ensure that 
organisational activities conform to the organisation‟s strategies through administrative 
and cultural mechanisms (Simons, 1995).  Culture is not perceived as a key factor of 
success, but it is essential for all of the organisation‟s members to gain a perspective on 
organisational processes and understand the nature of organisational life (Scheytt and 
Soin, 2005).  Hence, a strong cultural component of an organisation affects the level of 
organisational control.  This level of control decreases when an organisation‟s beliefs 
and norms become highly institutionalised.  However, a culture becoming „too strong‟ 
has a negative effect because it is difficult to adapt when the environment changes 
rapidly (Merchant and Stede, 2012), causing an inevitable interaction between 
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organisations and their environments (Peter, 2000; Meyer, 2008).  Hence, any changes 
in the business environment require organisations to adjust their formal structure, 
organisational structure, and goals, programmes, or missions (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). 
  
 The effectiveness of a culture is determined by its interaction with its 
environment, which influences all aspects of the organisation, either official or 
unofficial.  Dimensions of this mingling can be seen in certain issues such as primary 
tasks and internal operations, rituals, climate, artefacts, jargon, stories, jokes and 
humour, legends, myths, sagas, rewards or punishments, and behaviour (Schein, 2004; 
Merchant and Stede, 2012; Watson, 2012; Scheytt and Soin, 2005).  However, each 
organisation has different ways of responding to its environment, because the culture 
and societies of the organisation vary either locally and/or nationally.  Therefore, 
research in international settings shows that the application of a particular management 
technique in one culture does not always produce the same result in another culture 
(Silverthorne, 2005).   
 
3.5. Control as a Form of Responsibility Accounting 
 Management control systems (MCS) are closely related to financial data, 
which have put accountants in an important position for ensuring the effective operation 
of organisations by applying two components: first, establishing effective control 
through directing the activities of subordinates; second, evaluating the outcome of 
activities and deciding on corrective actions if required (McNally, 1980).  The latter are 
affected by managers‟ past experiences, organisational history, and commitment to 
delegating control (Choudhury, 1986).  Furthermore, McNally (1980) argues that 
accounting still emphasises the second component and neglects the first component, 
although both have the same importance from an accounting perspective.  There are two 
reasons for the importance of the first component: (i) designing and operating the MCS 
requires an understanding of the distribution of control in an organisation; and (ii) the 
authority to control is outlined in an organisation‟s formal structure, rather than relies 
on the influence of an organisational member in an organisation.  The formal 
organisation system and standard operating procedures are beneficial for accounting in 
order to identify the centre of responsibility, resource utilisation, and decision-making 
(McNally, 1980).   
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 The MCS is designed and implemented by accountants based on the principles 
of responsible accounting, characterised by the controllability principle (McNally, 1980; 
Choudhury, 1986; Antle and Demski, 1988), i.e. “personnel within the system of budget 
should be charged or credited only for items within their control” (McNally, 1980, 
p.165), or, in other words, can be expressed as “control begets responsibility” (Antle 
and Demski, 1988, p.714).  Hence, responsible accounting only focuses on costs 
incurred under a manager‟s control; any „external‟ influences should be eliminated 
(Choudhury, 1986).  Furthermore, Choudhury (1986) suggests three types of 
controllability filters: event separation filters; manager separation filters; and period 
separation filters.  Event separation filters suggest that a manager‟s performance should 
not be affected by any events outside of his/her control.  A manager separation filter 
demonstrates the importance of separating a manager‟s performance from effects 
resulting from the actions of other managers: for example, a manager‟s operating 
decisions might be related to investment decisions made by his/her superior, which are 
beyond the manager‟s control.  Finally, the period separation filter indicates the 
exclusion of any effects on current decisions derived from the past (Choudhury, 1986).  
 
 Referring to the principle of controllability, it is necessary to distinguish 
between controllable and non-controllable costs based on authority that has been 
prescribed in a formal organisational structure.  Understanding the two components of 
the cost is needed for several reasons: (i) if someone responsible for costs under his/her 
control, it generates a positive attitude and cost awareness; (ii) the inclusion of non-
controllable variables in performance assessment produces an unfavourable response; 
(iii) sometimes, a manager is required to be accountable for variances in non-
controllable costs or items by a superior; (iv) the combination of budget constraints and 
non-controllable items tends to intensify tensions, and later affects decision-making 
behaviours that tend to avoid innovation and adopt low-risk strategies (McNally, 1980).   
 
 In order to overcome these conditions, McNally (1980) suggests three possible 
structural changes.  First, he suggests identifying varying degrees of control over items 
or costs, which will then generate three, four or five levels of control instead of only 
two categories, controllable and non-controllable.  This idea is based on the concept that 
degrees of control can be perceived as a continuum.  Second, he suggests emphasising 
control over areas of activity or decisions, because a manager might participate in 
different activities involving different levels of control, particularly in collaboration 
with other departments.  Finally, he suggests broadening the interpretation of control by 
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suggesting that formal authority should consider informal organisational influence.  
Informal organisational influence affects responsible accounting in several ways; for 
example, a resource may be located within a department, but control over the resource is 
outside the manager‟s control, and so should be excluded from the accounting report 
responsible (McNally, 1980). 
 
 Management control still assumes that managerial legitimacy is being taken 
for granted, meaning the organisation as a unitary entity, and neglects issues of power 
and conflict.  Anthony even argues that in the absence of power, authority is still 
present, because strategies have been determined and implemented through 
assignments.  Hence, development studies on management control are focused on the 
development of a critical perspective on management control, particularly power issues.  
This brings in Foucault: although Foucault‟s works are not directly related to 
management or accounting, they have influenced studies on these fields (Cowton and 
Dopson, 2002). 
 
3.6. Roles of Power and Knowledge in Control Mechanisms 
 Macintosh (1994) suggests five paradigms of accounting theory, i.e. structural 
functionalist, interpretivist, radical structuralist, radical humanist, and postmodernist; 
these are described in turn.  The first paradigm, structural functionalist, also known as 
rational contingency, relies on empirical works which apply a natural sciences approach 
to analysing how organisational control works.  This paradigm begins with a 
hypothesis, quantitative data and statistical analysis; hence, it is perceived to be more 
neutral and objective than the others.  The second paradigm is interpretivist or 
subjective interactionist; this emphasises the interaction between members of an 
organisation, and holds that there is no single objective approach to organisational 
reality.  However, this paradigm perceives that an approach to organisational reality is 
determined by a personal interpretation of certain situations.  The third paradigm is 
radical structuralist, offering a similar view to structural functionalism, i.e. assuming 
that an organisation as a social system has a concrete ontological existence.  However, it 
emphasises the existence of parties who hold the power to rule and exploit the other 
members of the organisation.  The next paradigm is radical humanism, which assumes 
that there is a subjective social world with a people-oriented view.  This paradigm has 
enlightenment and emancipation aims.  The enlightenment aim is about encouraging the 
self-induced awareness of organisational members, while the emancipation aim is 
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intended to increase the power and responsibility of the self-constructed social structure.  
The last paradigm is postmodernism, which arose in opposition to dominant paradigms 
in accounting theory, such as structural and radical functionalism.  This paradigm 
encourages marginalised parties to create their own discourses in resistance to 
hegemonic power (Macintosh, 1994).  In a different context, Foucault expresses it as 
“an instrument for those who fight, those who resist, and refuse what is” (Harris, 2001).  
Postmodernism regards discourse as a method to observe, monitor, shape, and control 
behaviour, compelling individuals to act as expected.  Hence, individuals‟ behaviour 
will become predictable, and large bodies of people can thereby be managed (Cowton 
and Dopson, 2002).  Developing discourses, also known as regimes of truth, are 
attempts to treat humans as objects of study, examination, diagnosis, and correction.  A 
regime of truth might contain various discourses and knowledge that are perceived by 
particular society as true.  Each regime of truth derives its own criteria that are used by 
its members to distinguish between true or false values.  The regime of truth cannot be 
separated from power relations in order to determine strategies of social interactions 
because of the power relation build-up structure of social interaction (Macintosh, 2002). 
 
 Power will be prominent when challenged by other parties because power is 
applied to others‟ actions or “an action upon action on possible or actual future or 
present actions” (Foucault, 1994, p.340).  Furthermore, Foucault perceives power as 
omnipresent, an endless and open strategic game (Gordon, 1991).  Foucault (1994) also 
indicates that power tends to be more repressive, although in some sense it is also 
considered productive.  Likewise, power that is viewed solely from the perspective of 
political science contributes a narrow perspective, as it only focuses on power in the 
public domain and ignores invisible sets of practices (McKinlay and Starkey, 1998).   
 
  Power is perceived as a way to direct individuals or groups to embrace many 
approaches, ensuring their subjection to political or economic ideas in order to 
“structure the possible field of action of others” (Foucault, 1994).  The „subject‟ gives 
up his own identity consciously, and is put under the control of someone else because of 
economic and social processes as a form of subjectivity.  Hence, the mechanisms of 
subjection can be identified based on their relationship with mechanisms of exploitation 
and domination (Gunn, 2006).  This is perceived as a manifestation of power, which 
people need to exercise over others, as power is designed in relation with „partners‟.  
This power relationship consists of two elements: first, the other, who is recognised and 
maintained as a subject; second, through conduct, which means to lead the other based 
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on mechanisms of coercion and the exercise of power (Foucault, 1994).  This 
domination can be described as a stable and hierarchical relationship resulting from 
technologies of government that give subordinates extremely limited space to 
manoeuvre (Lemke, 2002).   
 
  Meanwhile, from Gramsci‟s perspective, power is conceptualised as 
„hegemony‟ that tends to be exercised through the channels of intellectual and moral 
capacity rather than by coercion, and is perceived to be more complex than the 
propaganda and manipulation method.  Hegemony embraces the realities of the politics, 
economics, and social structure of the masses, and involves negotiation between the 
dominant and dominated because the interests of the masses tend to change from time to 
time (Gunn, 2006).  Gramsci, in Lemke (2007, p.51), suggests that the state cannot be 
perceived as being a result of a compromise between classes, gender or other groups, 
but as a strategic articulation (Lemke, 2007).  As indicated by Lukes, in Gunn (2006), 
there are three different views of power; these are categorised as the one-dimensional 
view, involving visible conflict, the two-dimensional view, involving visible and latent 
conflict between parties with conflict of interest, and a three-dimensional view, which 
extends the previous concepts to embrace the social structures and cultural patterns of 
groups and the practices of institutions.  From these perspectives, power affects groups 
more than individuals (Gunn, 2006).  
 
  Since those perceptions are acquired based on historical development, and 
affect the interactions between the nature and objectives of control systems and systems 
of communication and power, the role of perception cannot be over generalised, because 
it is influenced by social, political and economic history that can be started by 
expanding it to include political cultures that consider the process of labour and 
structures of belief, as well as the history of society.   Understanding social history is 
useful for understanding the expression of power, and how power relations between 
dominance and resistance occur (Gunn, 2006).  Foucault indicates that knowledge is 
produced by „discourse‟, which can be comprehended by exploring the institution 
producing the knowledge.  Furthermore, Foucault suggests the notion of discipline, 
which has an important role in generating knowledge and power (Cowton and Dopson, 
2002). 
 
3.7. Discipline and Surveillance in Control Systems 
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 In some areas, where power is established by a permanent structure it is 
perceived to circulate, and is not localised on a specific person.  Therefore, an analysis 
should be undertaken on its effects, instead of its sources (Gunn, 2006).  Power over 
and repression of individuals cannot be perceived solely in negative ways, but they also 
engender positive forces.  For example, placing workers in a particular position is an 
embodiment of a power relation.  Power in this understanding is not related to person or 
place, but to a relationship constituting an institution instead (Boland, 1987).  
 A historical approach can be employed to explore the exercise, practices, 
strategies, and technologies of power.  In this sense, a state of power should be viewed 
as a set of practices rather than merely as an institution (Gunn, 2006).  Hence, an 
administration should not be seen merely as the internalisation of rules and routines, but 
as the interrelation between order and discipline that consists of a set of practices 
embracing common-sense, experiences, and aspects of personal identity (McKinlay and 
Starkey, 1998).  Activities that ensure the way subjected individuals or groups behave 
can be achieved through communication, and via the application of power such as 
through surveillance, reward, and punishment.  These are enforced through a hierarchy, 
and their application might vary according to the different conditions in each 
organisation and how people perceive „discipline‟ (Gunn, 2006).  This notion implies 
that each region has different versions of truth dependent on its traditions and values.  
Hence, individuals are judged in accordance with these standards.  This argument 
suggests that a version of truth came into existence and affected standards, virtues, and 
norms of society, a truth which is regarded as the intrinsic nature of reality (Macintosh, 
2002). 
 Disciplinary power is efficient when it is imposed through administrative 
rules, and when it later raises resistance and legitimises disciplinary power (McKinlay 
and Starkey, 1998).  Disciplinary power can be extended infinitely because it deals with 
the cognitive/emotional subject.  In a knowledge/power relation, all of social science 
can be regarded as a discipline in two senses, i.e. as an intellectual discipline and as a 
discipline of repressive order (Boland, 1987).  Based on the concept of 
knowledge/power, accounting is perceived as a set of practices and as a discourse to 
criticise, scrutinise, compare, and modify an organisation‟s member(s), which makes 
those members become knowledgeable, comparable to one another, and governable 
(McKinlay and Starkey, 1998). Norms form a field of discourse structured by 
normalising judgement and it is essential to make individual visible through a normative 
55 
 
judgement.  Hence, individuals are constructed by a field of normative judgement 
(Boland, 1987).  Power/knowledge is an effort to find the true nature of what is 
expected to be a „normal‟ human being and use the knowledge to correct individuals in 
order to be in line with the „normal‟ standard (Macintosh, 2002).  Articulation of 
personal psychology is required for implementation of this concept.  Therefore, the 
sophistication of accounting practices is required, as exemplified by the application of 
standard costing which is not only required for cost control, but also can be used to 
control the behaviour of organisational members (McKinlay and Starkey, 1998).  
Furthermore, McKinlay and Starkey (1998) perceive that this practice is a thorough 
surveillance instrument for managers. 
 Foucault, in his work Discipline and Punish, argues that prison, army, school, 
and workshop have the same structure, i.e. ways of knowing individuals (Boland, 1987).  
Foucault signifies that knowledge could become power to be used as a tool to discipline 
individuals who deviate from what knowledge perceives to be „normal‟ (Macintosh, 
2002).  Disciplinary power embraces various ways of engaging with social life through 
the implementation of regulations and tools to manage the population and individuals‟ 
lives, whose identity is not perceived as comprising a homogenous sphere in wider 
society (Miller and O‟Leary, 1987).  For example, the mechanism of punishment in 
Europe in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries used torture to acquire power, but later it was 
replaced by an impersonal surveillance system that relied on the psychology of the 
individual.  The surveillance mechanism is exemplified by Jeremy Bentham‟s 
Panopticon, which is described as a prison in the shape of a circular building with a 
single observer at the centre able to see all the prisoners, although the prisoners cannot 
see the observer.  Consequently, the principle of surveillance is internalised, and power 
functions automatically, without being exercised by external parties.  In this sense, the 
Panopticon can be seen as an image of management control in general and accounting 
control in particular.  Hence, accounting and management control both attempt to 
increase visibility in their particular fields.  Through the application of responsible 
accounting, a manager is put in very special „space‟ that can be monitored by the 
observer, as depicted in the Panopticon (Cowton and Dopson, 2002).  Hence, 
accounting is not regarded as a neutral and objective tool, but as a picture of power 
relations that is brought into organisational and social life (Macintosh, 2002).  For 
example, standard costing, accountability and responsibility are attached to each 
individual, which is intended to prevent inefficiencies at the individual level.  Hence, 
the contribution of each individual can be identified, which requires constant 
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monitoring and observation.  Through this method, the body and mind of individuals 
will be directed within the standard of economic performance (Miller and O‟Leary, 
1987). 
  In knowledge-intensive organisations that are identified as „organic‟ rather 
than „mechanistic‟, and in which creativity requires an absence of disciplinary power, 
cultural or normative control is developed as an alternative to bureaucratic control, 
which is perceived as a new technology of power.  Normative control can be applied 
when particular practices and discourses are embraced by organisational members in 
daily life through an unspoken code, such as dress code, acceptable behaviour, etc.  In 
this control mechanism there is a trade-off between self-subordination and personnel 
development (McKinlay and Starkey, 1998).  Hence, there is a shift from formal 
techniques towards informal techniques, a shift which is regarded not as segregation, 
but as an element of governmental technologies (Lemke, 2007).  Currently, surveillance 
by managers tends to be subtler than direct observation, employing such methods as 
written documents or records and information systems.  The use of computers is useful 
to enhance surveillance over the operation of branches, particularly from a financial 
rather than a physical perspective.  Surveillance will produce asymmetries of power 
which enable one group to rule over others (Cowton and Dopson, 2002).        
 
 Boland (1987) argues that Foucault‟s perspectives embracing the concept of 
disciplinary power, the relation between knowledge and power, the notion of visibility, 
and the process of normative judgement are closely related and hard to discuss 
separately.  Exploring these ideas requires a specific institution along with a specific 
institutional problem, as Foucault notes (Boland, 1987).  Macintosh (2002) argues that 
discipline and control can be realised by implementing three general principles, 
referring to Foucault‟s Discipline & Punish.  The three general principles are the 
principle of enclosure, the principle of the efficient body, and the principle of the 
disciplined mind or comportment.  The principle of enclosure can be employed by 
placing individuals in self-contained places of confinement.  Putting an individual in 
this kind of place allows for the imposition of a monotonous disciplinary state.  The 
self-contained place can be in the form of a horizontal or vertical partition that works 
hand in hand.  The horizontal arrangement depicts a serial or functional chain, while the 
vertical arrangement can be defined as the hierarchical ranking of the partitions.  In 
other words, the partitions also identify two states of function, i.e. the real and ideal 
state, in which the real state depicts the arrangement of a material object and the ideal 
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state describes the functions, serial relationships, and ranking of the partitions 
(Macintosh, 2002, p.84). 
 The second principle is regarded as a development of the previous principle, 
i.e. the efficient body principle, suggesting the efficient usage of time in any particular 
partition.  The efficient body can be imposed in three ways: timetable, manoeuvre, and 
dressage.  (i) The timetable approach is an attempt to ensure that time is used 
efficiently, and that any distractions are eliminated accordingly:“Time penetrated the 
worker‟s body, rendering it docile, obedient, and efficient” (Macintosh, 2002, p.84).  
(ii) The second approach is the manoeuvre: that is, techniques employed to intensify the 
usage of time by giving detailed directions and the exact timing of an accomplishment 
in order to link the individual body with a tool or machine (Macintosh, 2002).  (iii) The 
third approach is dressage, which is perceived as a mechanism to “place the body in the 
world of signal” in order to initiate immediate responses and ensure obedience to do the 
particular action (Macintosh, 2002, p.85). 
 The final principle is the correct comportment or disciplined mind, which can 
be achieved through hierarchical surveillance, normalising sanctions, and examination.  
(i) The first mechanism is hierarchical surveillance, involving observation and the 
gathering of information, with the main functions of intensifying the constant 
surveillance of individuals‟ skill, punctuality, and commitment to their job.  (ii) The 
second mechanism of a disciplined mind comprises the normalising sanctions that are 
applied by giving rewards and punishments.  The sanction is intended to motivate 
individuals to achieve the higher level of competence instead of inducing individuals to 
adhere to the established norms of correct behaviour.  Use of this sanction is to be 
avoided if possible, it suggested, referring to the assumption that a deviant individual 
can be motivated more by the desire to acquire promised rewards than by the fear of 
being punished by sanctions.  “The positive use of sanctions was much preferred” 
(Macintosh, 1994, p.226).  Employing sanction mechanisms at work both automatically 
and silently will induce individuals to correct themselves, adhere to the norm, and be 
motivated to improve –“Quiet sanctioning produced normalisation” (Macintosh, 2002, 
pp.87-88).  (iii) The third mechanism is examination, which suggests that the result of 
examination can be used as a justification for sanctions, and the combination of these 
two mechanisms are regarded as an integral part of the principle of a disciplined mind.  
Examination can be used as a mechanism to reveal the special attributes, characteristics, 
and capabilities of individuals, which becomes knowledge held by one party.  This 
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acquired knowledge can then become a power held over other parties.  Hence, “the 
individual existed as a thing to be corrected, normalised, and treated in accordance with 
the discursive practices of that particular discipline” (Macintosh, 2002, p.89).  From 
this view, the individual is self-normalised based on the discursive regime of truth 
rather than on “any final true existence” (Macintosh, 2002, p.115).  The discourses of 
power, knowledge, surveillance, and discipline in the control system in particular are 
depicted in Figure 3.1. 
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3.8. Research Method and Design 
 The quantitative and qualitative approaches in social research are regarded as 
complementing each other, although in some aspects these approaches are very different 
(Creswell, 2003).  The differences are particularly evident in the ways in which these 
studies collect and analyse data in order to understand patterns.  Another difference 
between the two research approaches is in the nature of the data employed.  Qualitative 
research relies more on the interpretation of soft data, which can be observed in 
impressions, words, symbols, and photographs.  Hence, the qualitative researcher must 
consider the „case and context‟ of the data (Neuman, 2007), which enables such a 
researcher to investigate social phenomena holistically (Creswell, 2003).  Meanwhile, 
quantitative research employs „hard‟ data in the form of numbers;  an approach that 
focuses on „measuring variables and testing hypotheses‟ (Neuman, 2007).   
 
Referring to these characteristics, this study employs a qualitative approach, 
because the research relies heavily on soft data, which are affected by cultural and 
historical contexts, in order to comprehend practice control mechanisms operating in 
Indonesian local government.  Moreover, the qualitative approach is deemed to fit well 
with this study, which is expected to provide detailed descriptions concerning an 
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analysis of human experience (Marvasti, 2004), with a particular focus on managing the 
control of capital expenditure in relation to other parties.  Hence, this study explores 
how power relations in local government organisation, which are influenced by cultural 
and historical backgrounds, affect the strength and efficacy of the control mechanisms 
of capital expenditure in Indonesian local governments. 
 
 The qualitative approach in this study also requires an analytical method for 
analysing the acquired data, specifically discourse analysis. Discourse analysis 
considers the interrelationship between language and power because language can be 
perceived in terms of social practices (Wodak, 2001).  The aim of this method is to 
investigate social conditions and processes that are expressed, signalled or legitimised 
by language (Wodak, 2001).  In addition, discourse analysis is also regarded as an effort 
to conceptualise discourse as a social phenomenon, and then to find explanations for it, 
determine how it happened and investigate the structure of the phenomenon.  Therefore, 
Teun van Dijk (as cited in Wodak 2001, p.20) defines it as “a framework systematising 
„phenomena of social reality‟ and a „communicative event‟”.  As indicated by 
Fairclough: “every social practice has a semiotic element”(Meyer, 2001; Fairclough, 
2001).  Therefore, this method covers three social concepts: the concept of power, the 
concept of history, and the concept of ideology (Wodak, 2001).  
 
 In this study, the discourse analysis is employed to capture social phenomena 
that are applied by influential parties to local government and to identify social 
phenomena in the internal of particular local government.  Referring to the identified 
social phenomena, then it will be analysed based on how do the phenomena emerge in 
particular relationship based on historical and cultural view; how does ideology affect 
the relationship; and how can the phenomena be used as a „power‟ by one party to 
another party.  Furthermore, this study also identifies how strong the phenomena affect 
practices in particular local government; and how do the local government deal with it.  
Hence, this study embraces many discourses related capital expenditure control system 
along with the influence of formal control to the social phenomena at local government 
level. 
 
3.9. Case Study  
 A case study is a methodological approach to gathering information about a 
particular social setting, event, person, or group in order to comprehend how the 
particular condition/situation works (Berg, 2001).  Sometimes, the term „case study‟ is 
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interchangeable with qualitative research and even treated as a synonym, because much 
qualitative research is in the form of a case study (Bryman, 1989).  Furthermore, 
Bryman (1989, p.143) suggests that the nature of a case study embraces several aspects.  
First, the definition of „case‟ is broad: it can be an organisation, department, person, or 
event.  Second, the case-study approach does not necessarily involve one case on one 
site, but it can be related to two or more sites, meaning that it can enhance the 
generalisation output of the research.  However, the aim of the case-study approach is to 
develop patterns and linkages on a theoretical basis, instead of inferring findings from a 
population.  Third, this study focuses on context, an approach that should make a reader 
feel engaged in the particular organisation being studied, as well as provides insights 
that can help to interpret events.  This approach is very useful for examining the impact 
of a policy, because it can depict the implementation of that policy in day-to-day 
activities.   
 
 Particularly in the UK, the case-study approach is applied by referring to the 
work of social theorists such as Habermas, Foucault, and Gidden (Scapens, 1990).  
Furthermore, Scapens (1990) suggests that in the accounting management area the case-
study model could provide insights into the nature of management of accounting 
practices in relation to techniques, procedures, and systems. These management 
accounting components can be studied by distinguishing the formal systems that are 
supposed to be implemented from the ways the systems are actually used.  Case studies 
can be applied in various ways.  First, a descriptive case study can depict an 
implementation of accounting systems, techniques and procedures.  Second, an 
illustrative case study will demonstrate innovative practices developed by companies.  
Third, an experimental case study is intended to examine the implementation of a new 
system and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of that system.  Fourth, the 
exploratory case study tries to find reasons for particular accounting practices, and 
attempts to generate ideas that will be examined by empirical testing to produce 
generalisations of those practices.  Finally, there is the explanatory case study, which is 
designed to explain particular reasons for the implementation of certain accounting 
practices.  Theoretically, the case-study method is used in order to provide a framework 
to comprehend and explain specific practices, instead of producing generalisations 
(Scapens, 1990, p.265).  This case study fits with the fourth aim, and is intended to 
explore mechanisms of control of capital expenditure that can be used as a starting point 
for future studies in this area.  
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 A case study in management accounting refers to social theory because 
accounting practices are socially constructed (Scapens, 1990).  Hence, the researcher 
tries to find out the structure of social behaviour that constructs and informs practices.  
In order to study management accounting as social practice, it is suggested the 
researcher should probe the relationships between social action and the dimensions of 
social structure in an organisation by considering the historical, economic, 
organisational, and wider social context as well.  Understanding the complex inter-
relationships of many components in a system is required in an attempt to construct 
explanatory social theories (Scapens, 1990, pp.268-269).  Referring to all of these 
characteristics, this study is best-suited to employing the case-study approach, because 
the research focuses on organisational sociology in Indonesian local government.  
Hence, local government organisation cannot be separated from the many elements of 
the public, from central government, and also from political aspects.  Therefore, inter-
relationships among parties affecting local government, particularly in capital 
expenditure decisions, will be explored by considering their organisational and cultural 
contexts, which is expected to provide an understanding of how those organisational 
and sociological aspects affect capital expenditure control.   
  
3.10. Qualitative Research 
 As mentioned in the previous sections, this study employs the case-study 
approach to acquiring data, and discourse analysis to analysing data.  With regard to the 
case-study model, there are several stages to undertaking this type of study, as 
suggested by Scapen (1990).  However, the stages do not simply follow a linear order, 
because a case study is regarded as a complex interactive process; hence, a different 
order and different interactions between the stages are likely to occur (Scapens, 1990).  
The stages start with the preparation stage.  After the researcher finds a case, it is 
suggested to review the available theories that are relevant to the case from the 
researcher‟s point of view.  The applied theory should be stated explicitly and 
comprehensively.  The second stage is collecting evidence.  The preferred theory gives 
an indication of the types of evidence that need to be collected.  The evidence can be 
collected formally in several ways, such as interviews, documents, direct observation, or 
participant observation. However, the researcher must also be aware of the possibility of 
gathering informal evidence, such as comments, or information in the form of the tone 
of an answer, facial expressions, and gestures or body language.  Such informal 
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evidence can be useful for developing predetermined questions in order to explore 
several issues, and for providing an indication concerning the validity of the formal 
evidence. 
 
 The third step in the case study‟s progress is assessing the evidence.  In a 
quantitative study, reliability and validity of evidence are essential; reliability is 
regarded as the independence of the evidence from the researcher, which means that the 
evidence must not have any relationship with the researcher.  Meanwhile, validity 
corresponds to the perception that the acquired data are „true‟, or have an objective and 
accurate reality.  However, the reliability and validity approaches described above do 
not fit with a case study, where evidence comes not only from formal sources but also 
from informal sources, such as „external‟ factors, which help in the interpretation of 
formal evidence.  Hence, validity in a case study can be assessed by particular 
conditions, known as „contextual validity‟.  Contextual validity can be examined in 
several ways.  First, the validity of evidence can be assessed by other kinds of evidence 
concerning a particular issue, an approach that is also known as triangulation.  Second, 
the validity of evidence acquired from a particular source can be assessed by other 
evidence collected from the same source.  If any inconsistency emerges from the source, 
the researcher can determine the validity of the evidence.  Third, validity can also be 
assessed by other members of the research team, in order to eliminate bias that might 
arise from the personal characteristics or experiences of a researcher.  Fourth, feedback 
from subjects of study is also useful to confirm the researcher‟s interpretations of the 
data.  This study employs the first approach, which assesses particular issues from other 
sources, i.e. transcripts of interviews of secondary sources, and documents in the form 
of laws and regulations related to the issues. 
 
 The fourth stage is identifying and explaining patterns.  After all the evidence 
has been collected, the researcher needs to identify themes and patterns emerging from 
that evidence.  In order to understand connections between the themes, preparing a 
model is suggested.  Subsequently, the patterns indicated in the model, which may be 
related to prior studies and/or an underlying theory, can be used to describe and explain 
the case.  Meanwhile, any inconsistencies or missing connections within the pattern can 
be used as bases for further study.  The fifth stage is theory development.  In case the 
pattern is inconsistent with the existing theory, it is necessary to collect evidence in an 
attempt to explain this difference.  In such a situation, a theory can be developed to 
approach and explain the new findings.  However, the researcher is also required to set 
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the boundaries of his/her study, because essentially the pattern of the case-study model 
can be extended indefinitely.  The final stage is report writing, which is intended to 
make the case and explain the context in a way that can be comprehended by other 
parties.  In addition, the report is also useful to describe theoretical implications that 
might affect other studies (Scapens, 1990). 
 
 Discourse analysis is employed in this study, because it studies discourse as 
text and discussion in social practices, and hence focuses on what people do.  There are 
several important points about this model that need to be noted.  Since discourse 
analysis looks at products of human action, the conception of that action affects the 
main features of discourse, i.e. action orientation, situation, and construction.  The first 
feature is action orientation, where discourse is perceived to be the primary medium of 
human action and interaction, which can be characterised either in a general or specific 
setting.  The second feature is the situation, which perceives discourse to be situated in 
one of three contexts: sequential, institutional, and rhetorical.  In general, the rhetorical 
context is defined as a version of event or action used to counter alternatives, and 
therefore requires an understanding of the sequence of a particular event or action 
(Potter, 2004).  Finally, the third feature is construction, i.e. where discourse is both 
constructed and constructive.  Discourse is constructed because it is developed from 
various sources, and constructive because it can be used to build and stabilise particular 
versions of events or actions (Potter, 2003).  Furthermore, referring to those features, 
Potter (2003) suggests how to do an interview involving discourse analysis.  The first 
suggestion is the focus, which concentrates the interviewer on predetermined themes 
and direct questions to provoke participants to elaborate on discursive issues.  The 
second suggestion is standardisation, which ensures all participants have the same 
perception about the themes (Potter, 2003).  Referring to Potter‟s (2003) suggestion, this 
study pushes the primary sources to elaborate more on particular discourses. 
 
3.11. Method of Data Collection 
 Indonesia is the largest archipelago country in the world, comprising530 local 
governments consisting of 497 municipalities, and 33 provinces (Depdagri, 2010) that 
are spread throughout 17,508 islands (Indonesia, 2012).  In October 2012, the 
Indonesian Parliament approved the 34th province.  It is impossible for this study to 
cover all areas, because the nation of Indonesia is too huge.  Therefore, this study adopts 
a case-study model for one province: the special region of Yogyakarta.  This province 
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consists of a city and four districts: Yogyakarta city, and the four districts of Sleman, 
Bantul, Gunungkidul, and KulonProgo.  This province was chosen because it is located 
in the centre of Java Island.  Hence, it can be said to represent the typical conditions of 
other regions in Java Island, apart from Jakarta, Indonesia‟s capital city, which is also 
located in Java Island.  Moreover, the special region of Yogyakarta has a long history of 
governance and culture that differentiates it from the other regions in Java.  Thus, it can 
be employed to explore the influence of cultural and historical aspects on current 
practices. 
 
 Local government agencies were selected based on total capital expenditure, 
compared to other agencies.  In each region, 10 agencies were selected, plus the 
inspectorate as an internal auditor in each region, one of the main responsibilities being 
to ensure the implementation of internal controls in each agency.  Finally, 66 local 
government agencies were selected to be the targets of the research interviews.  
However, only 38 local government agencies were willing to be interviewed to provide 
samples for this study.  The study obtained 38 interview recordings, but of these, one 
interview‟s results were excluded because the recording could not be clearly heard and 
the answers did not focus on the questions.  As a result, only 37 transcripts are 
employed as data for this study.  The interview participants were 67 local government 
officials in various positions, from a head of a local government agency to planning 
and/or financing officials as listed in appendix 7.  The main targets of the interviews 
were local government officials engaged in planning, financing, and accounting 
activities. Head and/or middle management officers were selected because officers at 
this level have knowledge of and understand the reasoning behind the policies and 
practices in each organisational unit. In terms of implementation of local government 
programmes, they must refer and adhere to many regulations both from central and local 
government before implementing those programmes.  Concerning confidentiality, the 
interviewees are not mentioned by name but in the form of a code of their position 
instead, and their name will not be revealed to the public.  Even, some comments that 
are regarded to be sensitive will be kept anonymous. 
 
 The primary data were collected via semi-structured interviews consisting of 
seven main questions, as set out in appendix 8, but the questions were then developed 
following the participants‟ answers.  All of these interview questions were open-ended, 
embracing several aspects of capital expenditure, including sources of capital 
expenditure funding, considerations for accepting a capital expenditure proposal, 
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obstacles that might arise from interactions with other parties in accordance with the 
current procedures, and efforts made by government officials to deal with those issues.  
This interview method was employed in order to explore in-depth aspects of capital 
expenditure, and was further developed based on the conditions pertaining in each 
agency.  The interviews were recorded and transcribed into the Indonesian language.  
Additional translation into English was undertaken when quotations and examples of 
statements were required. 
 
 Secondary data are also used in the study, acquired from the website: 
www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties. This website contains interviews with 
Indonesian notables from many backgrounds, such as economists, politicians, ministers, 
and government officers, which took place between 2009-2012 (see appendix 9).  The 
data from this website comprise recordings and transcripts of the recordings.  This 
material was employed after permission was obtained from the administrator of the 
website.  This study uses 12 transcriptions for data analysis, which are important 
descriptions of the perceptions of the central government officers or persons who have a 
direct connection to the central government decision-makers relating to decentralisation 
and the new management controls which came along with the decentralisation policy.  
The archived descriptions give context and background to this study. 
 
 Finally, including both primary and secondary data there are 49 samples/cases 
that have been subjected to discourse analysis.  At the first stage, based on 
transcriptions of the interviews, the researcher has identified themes that emerged from 
each transcript.  In order to enable the identification of themes, the researcher employed 
the NVIVO software.  This study not only considers dominant themes but also non-
dominant themes.  Therefore, other aspects that cannot be categorised into a particular 
code are sorted into the „other‟ category.  As a result, the total number of transcripts 
codes is 210.  Subsequently, the codes were re-assessed and re-grouped based on some 
commonalities in order to develop categories or themes.  After the re-assessment, the 
codes were classified into 22 themes.  Then, all the themes were placed into a 
framework showing how many parties who have an interest in capital expenditure 
interrelate. 
 
3.12. Summary 
 The main purpose of this chapter is to explain the analytical basis of the case 
study.  It employs Foucauldian perspectives, particularly of power, knowledge, 
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surveillance, and discipline, on establishing control.  Control is perceived as a power to 
direct organisational members to adhere to all regulations that have been established.  
Although the application of power potentially provokes resistance from the subjugated 
individual, domination through power needs to be maintained in many ways, such as 
through knowledge, surveillance, and disciplinary power.  An organisation can be seen 
as a coalition of individuals that are highly susceptible to conflict.  In this circumstance, 
control systems are required to identify the commitment and expectations of individuals 
as members of the „coalition‟, a process which requires individuals to be observed, 
measured, and supervised.  From this perspective, accounting is regarded as a social and 
organisational practice (Miller and O‟Leary, 1987).     
 In addition, this chapter is intended to show how the best research approach 
was chosen to fit with the proposed conceptual framework for this study.  This study 
employs qualitative research because it is intended to explore current practices of 
control mechanisms in Indonesian local government, especially in capital expenditure.  
The case-study model is employed in this study in order to enable in-depth exploration 
regarding the particular case, by investigating the perspectives offered by a sample of 
local-government officials.  The primary data of this study were gathered through semi-
structured interviews, which enabled the researcher to develop questions that could 
elicit more information regarding particular issues.  The interviews were conducted in 
the offices of each local government agency so that informal information could be 
added to the formal information collected at the same time.  The informal information is 
expected to give insight into the working environment of the sampled local government 
agencies. 
 
 Since the subject of this study is public institutions, which tend to be very 
sensitive on the issue of government laws and regulations, it focuses on those laws and 
regulations that have been implemented by Indonesian local government.  This is 
intended to support the acquired primary data.  The secondary data from the archival 
interviews with notable figures in Indonesia‟s government, who were involved in 
decision-making about the nation‟s bureaucratic reforms, and thus could give insights 
into such a major change process, supplement the primary data.   
 
 The next chapter elaborates on the findings of this study, with emphasis on the 
implementation of control in capital expenditure, particularly in relation to „external 
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actors‟, their decision-making, and their interactions, and how these interrelationships 
might strengthen/weaken the control of capital expenditure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
External Parties Affecting Capital Expenditure 
 
4.1. Introduction 
  The previous chapters have discussed the context of this study and the research 
methods employed in this study.  Chapter 2 discusses the context of this study, which 
begins with the agendas of international institutions and the impact of those agendas, 
particularly on Indonesian local governments. Chapter 3 addresses the conceptual 
framework of this study, along with the methods employed in conducting this research, 
by referring to the context of this study. Now, Chapter 4 will depict the empirical 
findings, which have been obtained by employing the research methods described in 
Chapter 3. This chapter identifies parties affecting local government, particularly 
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external parties associated with local governments who influence capital expenditure in 
some way, both directly and indirectly.  There are many organisations or institutions 
involved in capital expenditure decision-making, which include both formal and 
informal bodies, such as BPK, BPKP, LKPP, NGO, local society, etc.  It has been 
suggested by international institutions in the Letter of Intent (LoI) that the involvement 
of these organisations/institutions needs to be established or empowered in order to 
enhance the transparency and accountability of public expenditure. 
 
  The main aim of this chapter is to elaborate on the issue of the financial control 
mechanism that has been determined by the central government of Indonesia.  In the 
first place, an extensive study on the legal basis for the interrelationships between many 
parties and local government is carried out.  From the study, it can be identified three 
parties affecting control mechanisms on capital expenditure; these are regulators, 
oversight bodies and stakeholders.  Subsequently, this chapter identifies the influential 
external parties in real practice from the point of view local government officials; how 
are they interrelated, how do they affect capital expenditure decisions, and how their 
involvement in capital expenditure decision-making might strengthen or weaken capital 
expenditure control.  Also, this chapter investigates how those agencies deal with the 
engagement of the external parties.   
 
  This chapter is structured as follows: the first section addresses the initial 
control of public expenditure, which is undertaken through budget setting and the 
empowering of auditor agencies, along with establishing government accounting 
standards as a guideline for conducting audit assignments.  The second section describes 
fixed assets and methods of acquiring those assets, along with acquisition costs that 
must be considered in order not to exceed the budget. The third section looks at the 
involvement of external parties in the capital expenditure decision that include 
budgeting or the implementation of the budgeting stages. The fourth section depicts 
influence of the external parties on control mechanisms of capital expenditure in local 
government agencies.  The final section is a summary of the chapter. 
 
4.2. Budgeting as the First Stage of the Control Mechanism of Public 
Expenditure 
  The financial system of Indonesia‟s local government begins with the 
composing of a budget for each local government agency. Then, the budgets of all 
agencies are compiled at the local government level to become the local government‟s 
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budget. The influence of political processes in budgeting decisions is immense, 
particularly when the executives compose a budget and submit it to the legislative body 
to get approval. Later, after the budget is approved, the executive holds full 
responsibility for the implementation of the financial aspects to the legislature and 
society, based on current regulations (PSAP, App.2, par.9).  Basically, the government‟s 
budget is a formal document based on the agreement between executive and legislative 
bodies regarding government spending and revenue generation.  The budget is regarded 
as a tool of coordination between spending activities and the availability of funding in a 
certain period.   
 
 Moreover, the budget plays an important role in several ways: the budget is 
regarded as a public policy statement; it is a fiscal target; it is the basis of control along 
with legal consequences; it is a basis of performance assessment; and details of the 
implementation of the budget will be contained in accountability statements from the 
government.  Hence, the interrelationship between accounting and financial statements 
relating to the budget is very close, because the budget is the starting point of 
implementation programmes that are later expressed in the financial statements (PSAP, 
App.2, Par.13). The term government in this regulation refers to the central government 
and to local government, which have separate accountability and authority towards 
particular  assets, jurisdictions, tasks and missions (PSAP, App.2, Par. 19-20). 
 
 Within Indonesian local government, public expenditure is highly regulated in 
order to protect the utilisation of public funds.  Therefore, the Indonesian government 
has issued several regulations intended to strengthen control of public expenditure. For 
example, a government regulation (PP 24/2005) regarding government accounting 
standards was issued, in which the government accounting standards committee referred 
to several professional bodies.  These professional bodies consisted of the International 
Federation of Accountants, International Accounting Standards Committee, 
International Monetary Fund, Indonesian Institute of Accountants, Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, Governmental Accounting Standards Board, and other 
professional organisations from other countries, all of which regulate financial 
statements, government accounting and auditing (PSAP, App. 1, par.13.). The issuance 
of the government accounting standards can be regarded as a milestone of bureaucratic 
reform when compared to the absence of accounting standards in the previous era.  
Accounting standards are required as guidelines with which to prepare financial 
statements in accordance with the principles of transparency and accountability, 
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particularly for public expenditures informing the implementation of local government 
budgets. In addition, the government accounting standards committee also considered 
the internal environment of the Indonesian government.  In particular, the committee 
addressed the characteristics of government structures alongside the services provided, 
embracing the form of government and segregation of power, an autonomous 
governmental system and financial transfers between governmental levels, the influence 
of political processes, and the interrelationship between taxes and government services 
(PSAP, App.2, par.7).   
 
4.3.  Mechanism of Capital Expenditure  
  Based on government accounting standards, assets, in general, are defined as 
economic resources possessed by a government as a result of past transactions which 
have economic benefits that can be measured by financial instruments.  Meanwhile, 
fixed assets are defined as tangible assets that have an economic life of more than 12 
months.  Economic life is specified as the period of time for which assets are to be 
employed by the government or the public; or the total production expected to be 
acquired from government activities or public services.  The value of the fixed asset is 
measured by cost, which is determined as cash or a cash equivalent paid to acquire an 
asset until the asset can be utilised.  Considering the utilisation of the asset also involves 
taking into account the depreciation, carrying amount and residual value of the asset.  If 
the asset is to be exchanged with another asset, it will be considered to be the fair value 
of that asset (PSAP 07, par.5).  
 
  Acquiring costs for equipment consist of the total expenditure incurred, starting 
with the cost of the equipment, transportation, installation, and other direct costs until 
the equipment can be utilised.  Meanwhile, acquiring costs related to building and 
construction tend to be more complicated, because they involve more cost components, 
such as completion or acquisition costs, construction permits, tax, and notaries‟ fees.  
Meanwhile, common costs and administration costs, which cannot be attributed to a 
particular asset, cannot be regarded as acquired costs (PSAP 07, par.32).  The other type 
of fixed asset is an infrastructure asset, which has several features: it is part of a system 
or network; it has a specific characteristic and cannot be converted to another function; 
it cannot be moved to another place, and there are restrictions on disposal of the asset. 
Some examples of infrastructure assets are roads, bridges, sewage systems and 
communication networks (PSAP 07, Par.72). 
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  Before construction of the assets is undertaken, the government is required to 
set a construction contract as a specific agreement for the construction of an asset or 
combination of assets that are closely related to each other with regard to design, 
technology, and the main functions of the asset(s).  The contract is set by the 
government to inform the contractor undertaking the project.  The term contractor can 
be applied both to entities that build an asset and to entities providing construction 
services based on specifications that have been established in the construction contract. 
After the contract has been signed by the contractor, as chosen via the procurement 
process, the project can be started.  Prior to that moment, the government must make a 
down-payment based on the payment terms that were agreed in the construction 
contract.  As the payment has not yet been paid in full, the contractor is still owed 
remaining payments, which will be made when all the conditions determined in the 
contract have been fulfilled; this is known as retention (PSAP 08, Par.5).  However, 
construction contracts should include several categories of work that started with the 
planning of an asset; these are the contract for services of asset construction, such as 
structural design services, the contract for the construction of the asset, the contract for 
the supervision of construction work and evaluation, and the contract for the disposal or 
restoration of the asset and the environment (PSAP 08, par.9). 
 
4.4.  Many Parties affecting the Capital Expenditure  
  A flowchart of capital expenditure is depicted in appendix 10, which describes 
the interrelationships of many government institutions in determining local government 
budgets, including budgets for capital expenditure.  The figure portrays several parties, 
including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, governors, local governments, local 
government agencies and local parliaments. However, other parties might also be 
involved in the implementation stage of the budget, as suggested in appendix 10. 
 
4.4.1. Interrelationship with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) 
  The MoHA, as the main regulator of local governments, plays some very 
important roles, beginning with producing regulations related to issues such as 
decentralisation, fiscal balance, and governance of local governments. The MoHA has 
produced guidelines on the utilisation, supervision, monitoring, and evaluation of fiscal 
balance between central government and local governments (UU 32/2004 art.163). 
Meanwhile, in terms of establishing good governance, particularly relating to the 
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budgeting process portrayed in appendix 10, the MoHA plays different roles: at the first 
stage it sets guidelines for the formulation of local budgets that are used as a reference 
for local governments to compose a draft of general policy for the local budget (KUA / 
Kebijakan Umum Anggaran).  KUA is a document which consists of general policies on 
incomes, expenses, and funding, along with predictions for the fiscal year (Permendagri 
13/2006). The guidelines of KUA contain several points relating to local budgets: the 
first concerns key issues regarding the synchronisation policies of local governments 
with the central government. The second point concerns the principles and policies 
composing the local budget, such as determining the performance measurement of local 
government programmes. The third point relates to technical issues involved in 
composing the local budget, such as forecasting local government income, allocation of 
local government expenditures, sources and uses of funding, along with underlying 
assumptions. The final point relates to the specific issues of a local government 
(Permendagri 13/2006 art. 83-84).   
 
  The second role of the MoHA in determining the local budgets of local 
governments, as depicted in appendix 10, is to authorise drafts of local ordinances 
concerning the implementation of local budgets. Thereafter, drafts of local ordinances 
become actual local ordinances, ready to be implemented.  The local ordinance must 
contain the following main points of the local budget: a summary of the local budget; 
local budget breakdown by agency, programmes, objectives, funding and expenses; the 
number of government officials; local government investments; a forecast of fixed 
assets and other assets; unfinished programmes from prior fiscal budgets; a reserve 
fund; and local government debt (Permendagri 13/2006, art. 107).   
 
4.4.2.  Interrelation with Local Parliament 
  Besides interacting with the MoHA regarding decisions relating to local 
budgets, the local government is required to interact with the local parliament as a 
counterpart of the government in its legislative function, and as the representative of 
local society.  Based on regulations, the local parliament (DPRD / Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Daerah) has an obligation to improve democratisation in the governance and 
welfare of local society.  This obligation reflects democratic participation, which 
facilitate local society to communicate their aspirations and complaints.  Then, these 
inputs need to be followed up by the local parliament (UU 22/1999 art. 22).  Hence, the 
parliament has a right to refuse or accept the accountability reports of the heads of local 
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governments, particularly related to the management and achievement of public 
finances in terms of efficiency and effectiveness in the implementation of 
decentralisation (UU 25/1999 art.24).  The local parliament comprises members of 
different political parties.  The head and vice-head of local government are also 
supported by particular political parties, as are at least 15% of the members of local 
parliament; the process of acceptance or refusal of the accountability report is therefore 
influenced by the political constellations.  
 
  The local parliament is involved in the budgeting process in three ways (see 
appendix 10).  First, the local parliament, together with the head of local government, 
discusses a draft of the general policy for the local budget (KUA / Kebijakan Umum 
Anggaran); as a result of this communication, the draft will be ratified.  Second, the 
local government agency composes a draft of priorities and a temporary budget ceiling 
(PPAS / Prioritas dan Plafon Anggaran Sementara). The PPAS presents the priority of 
programmes and budget ceilings for every local government agency programme, and 
will be used as a reference with which to compose the work plans of those local 
government agencies (RKA-SKPD / Rencana Kerja Anggaran – Satuan Kerja 
Perangkat Daerah) (LKPP, 2012).  A draft of PPAS is based on the following stages: 
(1) determine a priority scale between obligatory and optional functions; (2) determine a 
sequence of the selected programmes; and (3) determine a temporary budget ceiling for 
each programme. Then, the head of local government compiles the PPAS and discusses 
it with the local parliament.  The discussion is led by the budgetary team of the local 
government (TAPD / Tim Anggaran Pemerintah Daerah), as representatives of the head 
of local government, and the budget committee of local parliament.  After the draft of 
the PPAS is approved, it will become the priority and the budget ceiling (PPA / 
Prioritas dan Plafon Anggaran) that will be employed by each local government 
agency. Officially, before it is employed, the ratified KUA and PPA will be signed by 
the head of local government and the head of local parliament in a MoU (Permendagri 
13/2006, art. 87-88). Therefore, the local parliament is also responsible for supervising 
the implementation of the local budget (Kepmendagri 29/2002 art.96), a procedure 
which is known as legislative supervisory (PP 20/2001 art.1).   
 
 Finally, the third form of local parliament involvement is in the process of 
issuing local ordinance about the local budget. The head of local government submits a 
draft of local ordinance about the local budget, by the first week of October at the latest, 
which must be ratified at least a month before the fiscal year begins. If the deadline 
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cannot be met by the local parliament, the local government might apply the same 
budget ceiling as the previous year, particularly for obligatory expenses, such as 
personnel expenses and goods and services expenses, which continuously need to be 
met in order for local government to fulfil its basic public services (Permendagri 
13/2006, art. 104-106).   
 
4.4.3.  Interrelation of the Local Government with other Ministries 
  In addition to the relationship with the MoHA, each local government agency 
is closely related to other technical ministries that supervise the technical agencies; for 
example, the agriculture agency will carry out programmes and will be supervised by 
the Ministry of Agriculture.  The related ministry must compile reports on all projects 
and categorise the reports based on sectors and sub-sectors of capital expenditure, 
organisational units for routine expenditure, and distinguish which projects are managed 
by central government and local government (UU 25/1999 art.31).   
 
 The Ministry of Finance (MoF) also plays important roles, especially relating 
to regulating financial aspects of local government, such as the implementation of local 
government financial information systems (UU 25/1999 art.27).  The MoF issues its 
own decree to regulate local government finance, such as PMK 183/2014, which 
regulates the limits of local budget deficits, PMK 06/2012 concerning the 
implementation and accountability of budget transfer to local governments, and several 
ministerial decrees (PMK 216/2010, PMK 209/2011 and PMK 180/2013) regarding 
specifically allocated funds (DAK / Dana AlokasiKhusus).  In addition, the MoF also 
issued PMK 238/2011 in order to endorse the implementation of government 
accounting standards. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Ministry of State Apparatuses and Bureaucratic Reforms has 
an important role in regulating all aspects of government officials, both in central and 
local government.  For example, the ministerial decree (Permenpan 09/2009) regulates 
implementation, supervision, evaluation and reporting as a follow-up of the functional 
audit that was conducted by the BPK as the external auditor. The APIP (Aparat 
Pengawas Internal Pemerintah / government apparatuses of the internal auditor) 
consists of the BPKP, the inspectorate general for ministries, and the inspectorate of 
provinces, cities and districts.  The APIP has to adhere to the guidelines of audit quality 
control that have been asserted in Permenpan 19/2009.  The head of an agency is 
responsible for the implementation of programmes that will later be assessed to 
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determine the performance of the institution.  Good performance by government 
institutions is also rewarded by increasing the salaries of government officials; thus, the 
ministries decided to give remuneration to all government officials by issuing 
Permenpan 08/2009.  
 
4.4.4.  Interrelation Local Government with Oversight Bodies 
 The main oversight body in the Indonesian government is the BPK (Badan 
Pemeriksa Keuangan), Indonesia‟s supreme auditor which is responsible for auditing 
the management and accountability of public finance (UU 15/2006 art.1).  The scope of 
the audit the BPK covers is broad; it covers financial audit, performance audit, and audit 
for a special purpose, which addresses all government institutions using public finances, 
including central government, local government, and publicly owned companies.  
However, this responsibility can be delegated to public accountants, who are held 
responsible to the BPK and who must submit audit reports in order to be published by 
the BPK (UU 15/2006 art.3). 
 
 In order to do audit assignments, the BPK refers to government regulations and 
guidance that have been disseminated to local government as a starting point (UU 
32/2004 art.221).  Dissemination and tutoring regarding the management of local 
government finance are the responsibility of the MoHA, but the governor at a provincial 
level might also give training to municipalities as long as such an initiative does not 
contradict the MoHA guidance (Kepmendagri 29/2002 art.94-95).  In addition, in 
conducting an audit the BPK also refers to general standards of financial statement, 
standards of auditing, and standards of reporting (UU 15/2004 art.1).  As required in an 
audit, the BPK must perform analysis and assessment of the internal control system of 
local government (UU 15/2004 art.12).  Additional information can be gathered from 
the audit reports of internal auditors, because the internal auditor (BPKP / Badan 
Pengawasan Keuangan dan Pembangunan) is required to submit its report to the BPK.  
Moreover, information can also be obtained from independent institutions, such as the 
KPK (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi / Commission of Corruption Eradication), the 
KPPU (Komisi Pengawasan Persaingan Usaha / Commission of Supervision of 
Business Competition), and the PPATK (Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi 
Keuangan / Centre of Reporting and Analysis of Financial Transactions), as well as 
from professional associations and public complaints.  In an audit assignment, the BPK 
is allowed to employ experts from outside to work on its behalf (UU 15/2004 art.9).  
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The role of the BPK as an auditor is the implementation of functional supervision, as 
suggested in PP20/2001 art.1. 
 
 Regarding audit reports, the BPK must submit the audit report to local 
parliaments and to the heads of local governments (UU 15/2004 art.17; UU 15/2006 
art.6). The BPK also gives opinions on the audit report in the form of professional 
statements about the fairness of information in the financial statements of the local 
government, which refer to four criteria. The first criterion is compliance with 
government accounting standards; second, adequate disclosure; third, conforming to 
government regulations; the last, effectiveness of internal control systems. The BPK 
might give one of the following opinions: an unqualified opinion, a qualified opinion, 
an adverse opinion, or disclaimer of opinion (UU 15/2004 art.16).  
 
 Therefore, the BPK has an important role to play in establishing government 
accounting standards (SAP / Standar Akuntansi Pemerintahan). After obtaining 
feedback from the BPK, the draft is legalised as the government accounting standard 
(PP 24/2005).  The SAP enshrines the principles of government, both central and local, 
as an accounting entity to prepare and present financial statements.  Moreover, in order 
to ensure the reliability of the financial statements, the central government needs to 
establish an internal control system as an integral process involving all organisation 
members. This system is also needed in order to secure government assets, compliance 
with regulations and, finally, to ensure the achievement of organisation objectives 
(Permenkeu 233 PMK.05-2007).  
 
 Apart from the BPK having a role as external auditor, the GoI also has the 
BPKP (Badan Pengawas Keuangan dan Pembangunan / Supervisory Agency of 
Finance and Development) as the internal auditor of the GoI, which was stressed 
specifically by presidential decree (Keppres 31/1983) in the pre-reformation era.  The 
BPKP‟s main responsibilities can be broken down into two categories: (1) supervision 
of acquiring and managing of finance, and (2) supervision of development programmes 
(Keppres 31/1983 art.2). These responsibilities encompass compliance with regulations, 
and assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of the usage of government facilities, 
in an attempt to achieve determined programmes (Keppres 31/1983 art.40).  In order to 
accomplish this, the BPKP must carry out several tasks, both at central and local 
government levels, such as assistance, counselling, and monitoring of all supervisory 
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apparatus; conduct control regarding income and expenses, fixed assets and state-owned 
enterprises; control and evaluation of administration systems (Keppres 31/1983 art.3).   
 
 In the post-reformation era, the position of the BPKP in Keppres 31/1983 has 
been strengthened by presidential decree (Keppres 103/2001), and the latest attempt to 
strengthen the BPKP was Perpres 192/2014.  Perpres 192/2014 places more emphasis 
on the role of the BPKP as the internal auditor than did the previous presidential decree. 
The role and performance of the BPKP are now directly under the supervision of the 
nation‟s president (Perpres 192/2014 art.1).  As under previous presidential decrees, the 
BPKP focused on the accountability of financial management and is related to cross-
sectoral programmes (Perpres 192/2014 art.18-19). In Perpres 192/2014, this 
responsibility is extended to include establishing the government‟s internal control 
system (Perpres 192/2014 art.38). 
 
 In addition to the two existing oversight bodies, the GoI established several 
new oversight bodies during the reformation era.  One of the new overseeing bodies is 
the KPPU (Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha, or Commission of Business 
Competition Supervision), an independent institution free from any interventions from 
the government or any other parties, a status assured by UU 5/1999 and Keppres 
75/1999.  However, the KPPU is funded from the national budget (APBN / Anggaran 
Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara) (UU 5/1999 art.37).  This commission is appointed 
and dismissed by the country‟s president, with approval from parliament; the tenure of 
the commission is five years.  The commission and its members are directly responsible 
to the president (UU 5/1999 art.30-31), and hence the KPPU must provide reports to 
both the president and parliament on a regular basis (UU 5/1999 art.35).  The main 
responsibilities of the KPPU are to assess any practices resulting in or from unfair 
business competition, to identify any monopolies, and to compose guidelines relating to 
the prevention of such practices. The KPPU has the authority to take any necessary 
action to counter these practices and to give input to the government relating to unfair 
business competition and monopolies (UU 5/1999 art.35).  This attempt to establish and 
maintain a level playing field is intended to ensure a business climate conducive to the 
success of small, medium, and large enterprises (UU 5/1999 art.3). 
 
 The KPPU can acquire information about unfair business competition from 
many sources, such as from the public or the business community. Based on such 
information, the KPPU conducts further investigations and produces a report on the 
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practice.  The KPPU has the authority to summon the alleged businessman, along with 
witnesses, and to examine all documents. Finally, the KPPU gives a verdict; if the 
allegation is found to be true, then the KPPU imposes administrative sanctions on the 
businessman who has been judged to have broken the law of business competition (UU 
5/1999 art.36).  The administrative sanctions might be an order to stop the unacceptable 
practice, or could be compensation to the aggrieved party (UU 5/1999 art.47). 
 
 There are several practices that are regarded as unfair business competition: 
oligopoly, oligopsony, boycott, cartel, trust, vertical integration, secret agreement, 
monopoly and monopsony. The first, oligopoly, is assumed when few companies 
dominate production (seller) and acquire 75% of the market share of a product (UU 
5/1999 art.4).  Oligopsony is the same as the oligopoly, but with domination on 
purchasing side (buyer), which cannot be more than 75% of the total market share (UU 
5/1999 art.13).  Monopoly and monopsony are similar to these, but these situations only 
involve a large seller and buyer, respectively, who dominates more than 50% of the total 
market (UU 5/1999 art.17 & 18).  By holding such dominating positions, the companies 
might regulate price in supply or purchase (UU 5/1999 art.1).  A boycott can be created 
when a businessman makes an agreement with his competitor to refuse to buy or sell 
other competitors‟ products (UU 5/1999 art.10).  Similarly, a cartel is initiated with an 
agreement that is intended to regulate prices by controlling the production and 
marketing of products or services (UU 5/1999 art.11).  A mechanism of trust is the 
basically the same as a cartel, but the agreement is realised in a syndication of these 
competing enterprises (UU 5/1999 art.12).  Vertical integration is an attempt to 
dominate a particular market by controlling its production chain (UU 5/1999 art.14). 
However, a monopoly is still allowed if it is related to public needs and managed by a 
state-owned enterprise (UU 5/1999 art.51). 
 
  The other new oversight body created during the reformation era is the PPATK 
(Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan / Centre for Financial Reporting 
and Analysis), which is regulated by UU 15/2002, was revised by UU 25/2003 and then 
revised again by UU 8/2010.  The UU 15/2002 is the legal basis for establishing the 
PPATK as an independent institution intended to deter and eradicate money laundering 
offences (UU 15/2002 art.1). The centre is responsible to the president (UU 15/2002 
art.18), and it is therefore funded by the national budget (UU 8/2010 art.63).  However, 
as an independent body, the work of the PPATK cannot be legally interfered with by 
any parties, including the president.  The PPATK is allowed to cooperate with any 
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parties, both national and international, in attempts to deter and eradicate money 
laundering (UU 15/2002 art.25), such as by providing education and training regarding 
the technicalities and prevention of such an offence (UU 8/2010 art.41).  Meanwhile, 
regarding international cooperation, the PPATK ratifies the international standard of the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on money laundering in order to deter and 
eradicate money laundering and terrorist funding. This initiative is known as the revised 
40 recommendations and 9 special recommendations (Revised 40+9) FATF (UU 
8/2010, explanation). 
 
  The PPATK is tasked with gathering, filing, analysing, and evaluating 
information concerning suspicious financial transactions, and then reporting such 
information to the police and prosecutors if there is any indication of money laundering. 
A suspicious financial transaction is indicated when it falls into one or more of the 
following categories: financial transactions that deviate from a usual pattern; financial 
transactions that evade obligatory reporting of a financial service provider; and financial 
transactions that are allegedly the result of a criminal offence (UU 8/2010 art.1).  In 
addition, the PPATK is responsible for providing recommendations to the government 
on how to combat money laundering, and also for producing accountability reports for 
the president and parliament every semester (UU 15/2002 art.26). The PPATK has the 
authority to undertake these tasks by asking for further information and documents from 
financial service providers.  The PPATK has the right to conduct an audit of the 
financial service providers regarding compliance with guidelines concerning statements 
of financial transactions.  In such a situation, provisions relating to bank secrecy and 
confidentiality of financial transactions do not apply (UU 15/2002 art.27).  If the 
financial institution has been found guilty of breaking regulations, the PPATK has the 
right to impose penal and administrative sanctions (UU 8/2010, explanation). 
 
 The PPATK suggested that money laundering can be undertaken in several 
ways. The first is known as placement, which means that cash from a criminal offence 
is put into the financial system, particularly the banking system. The second is known as 
layering, which means transferring „dirty money‟ that has been put into the banking 
system to credit the accounts of other parties, wherever they are located. The third is 
integration, in which the „dirty money‟ that has been put in the banking system is used 
in legal business (UU 15/2002, explanation).  Apart from the PPATK, there is a body 
which is named the Lembaga Pengawas dan Pengatur (Supervisory and Regulatory 
Agency).  This agency is responsible for ensuring compliance with obligatory reporting 
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by financial services providers; the results of the agency‟s monitoring reports will be 
passed to the PPATK (UU 8/2010 art.31). 
 
 Another new oversight body is intended specifically to deal with corruption, 
collusion, and nepotism (KKN / Kolusi, Kolusi, and Nepotisme). In the early stages of 
the reformation process, the GoI established the Commission of Investigators of 
Government Officials‟ and Ex-Government Officials‟ Wealth (KPKPN / Komisi 
Pemeriksa Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara dan Mantan Penyelenggara Negara) as an 
independent body that has responsibility for preventing KKN practices (UU 28/1999 
art.1).  Thus, government officials were required to disclose and publish details of their 
wealth before and after holding a public office position.  A government official must be 
willing to be audited in the periods before, during and after he or she occupies an 
authoritative / powerful position (UU 28/1999 art.5).  As an independent institution, the 
KPKPN‟s members were appointed by the president with approval from parliament; 
they are therefore responsible directly to the president (UU 28/1999 art.10-13). In 
addition, the investigation reports of the KPKPN must be available to the president, 
parliament, the BPK (as supreme auditor) and the Supreme Court (UU 28/1999 art.18). 
However, in August 1999, the GoI issued UU 31/1999, suggesting the transformation of 
the KPKPN into the Commission of Eradication of Corruption Act (KPTPK / Komisi 
Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi) within two years (UU 31/1999 art.43).  It has 
since been transformed again, from the KPTPK to the Commission of Corruption 
Eradication (KPK / Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi) (UU 30/2002 art.2), but it still 
contains the same substance (UU 30/2002 art.3).  However, the KPK has more 
extensive tasks that include the prevention of corruption acts, investigation, and 
prosecution in the special court of corruption (UU 30/2002 art.6). In terms of 
prevention, the KPK has the authority to disseminate information and education about 
corruption and to give input to the heads of agencies regarding administrative systems 
that are vulnerable to corruption (UU 30/2002 art.13-14). Meanwhile, regarding 
investigation and prosecution, the KPK has the authority to take over from police or 
district attorneys, particularly in a case that has not been followed up or has been 
interfered with by an executive body, the judiciary or legislature (UU 30/2002 art.8-9). 
 
 Corruption attempts are hard to prove when they involve cross-sectoral 
transactions, the use of sophisticated technologies, or government officials (UU 31/1999 
art.27).  In dealing with government officials, the GoI has set tighter regulations in UU 
31/199 art.12, stipulating prohibition of using his/her position for personal benefit:  for 
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example, receiving any gratification from another party in order to use his/her authority 
in favour of that party, in which the gratification will be regarded as a bribe (UU 
20/2001 art.12). Thus, in order to deal with these situations, the KPK has broad 
authority, such as the power to intercept and record any communication, to forbid a 
suspect to leave the country, to obtain information from financial or other institutions 
regarding the financial transactions of a suspect, and to block the suspect‟s accounts.  
The KPK can also ask for assistance from Interpol to search, arrest and seize evidence 
from abroad (UU 30/2002 art.12).  
 
 The next effort to eradicate corruption was the establishment of special courts 
for the sole purpose of trying corruption offences; these are part of the public court and 
located in every province or district or city. The special court deals with cases of 
corruption and money laundering when that money is acquired from corruption or crime 
(UU 46/2009 art.2-5).  The court is also required to disseminate information concerning 
trials of corruption to the general public (UU 46/2009 art.24).  The special court is 
under the supervision of the Supreme Court, which also provides work plans and 
budgets for the special courts (UU 46/2009 art.33).  
 
4.4.5.  Interrelation of Local Governments with Stakeholders 
 Stakeholders of local government might influence the policies of the local 
government in various ways.  The first stakeholder is the adjacent local government.  
Every local government is always bordered with at least one other local government, 
which sometimes raises some concerns regarding developments that might affect the 
other region(s).  Therefore, the central government has produced a regulation in order to 
manage this concern. Regulation 22/1999 art.87 suggested building cooperation 
between local governments by establishing a joint agency as a communication media 
among adjacent regions.  Moreover, this regulation also facilitates cooperation between 
local governments and more institutions than just other local governments.  In 2004, this 
issue was reemphasised in regulation 32/2004 art.196 in order to achieve efficiency of 
public service management across regions. Government regulation (PP / Peraturan 
Pemerintah) 50/2007 gives guidance regarding funding for the joint agency by 
allocating it from the local budget. 
 
 Second, bureaucratic reform has recommended that the central government 
facilitate the involvement of local society in an effort to empower society regarding 
development (UU 22/1999 art.92), which is also known as society control (PP 20/2001 
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art.1).  One method of involving local society is expected to be allowing input into the 
local government policy, as the local government is required to comply with UU 
25/1999 art.27, as well as to disseminate information regarding the condition of the 
local government‟s finances.  Therefore, the information is necessitated to be open data, 
which could be accessed and acquired easily by local society (UU 33/2004 art.103). 
   
 The other engagement by local society is in composing a work plan for the 
local government agency, consisting of policies and programmes that subsequently will 
be implemented by the agency (UU 32/2004 art.151 and art.199).  The work plan of the 
local government agency (RENJA-SKPD) must refer to strategic planning by the 
agency (RENSTRA-SKPD) in accordance with the local government‟s mid-term 
programme (RPJMD) (UU 32/2004 art.151). The MoHA formulated mechanism of 
involving local society through discussion forums about development planning will be 
outlined in the work plans of the local governments (Musrenbang-RKPD / Musyawarah 
Perencanaan Pembangunan – Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daerah) (Kepmendagri 50-
187/Kep/Bangda/2007).  The MoHA decree describes the Musrenbang-RKPD as a 
public event designed to obtain development priority and consensus from stakeholders 
to solve local development issues.  This event is therefore regarded as a tool with which 
to synchronise and reconcile top-down and bottom-up approaches to community needs 
assessment and technical assessment.  The Musrenbang-RKPD can be held in the form 
of public consultation, focus group discussion, or workshops. Stakeholders who are 
invited to this event are all stakeholders affected by development programmes, 
institutions that have an authority or vested interests in discussed issues, and 
representatives of local society. The stakeholders will be determined based on 
involvement in the discussed issues in term of contribution, resources and expertise.  In 
addition, the local parliament is also expected to participate in this event, because 
planning and budgeting must be ratified by the local parliament before being 
implemented. 
 
 Involvement of the public is also expected in national institutions, such as in 
the KPK, the PPATK, and the KPPU.  Active participation by the public is regarded as 
the right and responsibility of society, as part of an effort to realise clean governance.  
Public involvement may include providing information if irregularities occur (UU 
28/1999 art.8-9), and the government will provide rewards to any member(s) of the 
public who assist with the prevention, eradication, or disclosure of corruption (UU 
31/1999 art.42).  Information from the public is also needed in relation to KPPU, as it 
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monitors business competition in order to eliminate monopolies or any other unfair 
business competition (UU 5/1999 art.3) or matters related to money-laundering crime 
(UU 8/2010 art.44).  
 
4.5. The Influential Parties According to the Local Government Officials 
 Appendix 11 shows that the several parties affecting capital expenditure 
decisions can be classified into three major groups: regulators, oversight bodies, and 
stakeholders.  The first element, „regulators‟, refers to ministries that issue regulations 
affecting local governments, especially some aspects of mechanisms of control in the 
capital expenditure of local governments.  The second element is „oversight bodies‟, 
which engage with local government in attempts to ensure the implementation of 
government regulations.  The third element is „stakeholders‟, comprising several parties 
that are identified by respondents; these are state-owned companies, adjacent local 
governments, local society, NGOs, mass media, and suppliers/vendors.  Each of the 
elements is described in the following sections. 
 
4.5.1. Regulators 
 Ministries affect local government agencies in many ways, depending on the 
relationship of each ministry to the agency.  For example, the MoHA (Ministry of 
Home Affairs) has the most important role in regulating local government, especially 
related to local government structure and all aspects of administration, as expressed by 
an interviewee: 
There are ministerial decrees (Permendagri and Permenpan) related to 
management control systems regulating things that are supposed to be done by 
local government and local government agencies in implementation, planning, and 
budgeting. (SFO 2) 
 
As mentioned in the quotation, the MoHA issues ministerial decrees, particularly 
Permendagri 13/2006, that is initial elaborations of government regulation PP 58/2005. 
The ministerial decree is a complete guideline to local government finance, 
encompassing all aspects of it, including structure, composition through to 
implementation, amendment of and accountability reports on the local budget, cash 
management, administration, accounting, mentoring, and supervising. Later, several 
articles of this ministerial decree were revised by Permendagri 59/2007, followed by a 
second amendment in Permendagri 21/2011.   
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 Meanwhile, the Menpan (Ministry of Empowerment of Government Officials 
and Bureaucratic Reform) became involved in the organisational control system by 
issuing Permenpan 20/2010 as a basic road map of bureaucratic reforms from 2010-
2014, encompassing macro, meso, and micro levels.  The ministerial decree emphasises 
the following programmes: revamping organisational structure, management of human 
resources and operational procedures, and strengthening monitoring, performance 
accountability, and quality of public services.  Moreover, the Menpan also issued 
ministerial decree Permenpan 05/2008 regarding audit standards for internal auditors, 
which involved several institutions, such as the BPKP, the inspectorate general for 
ministries, and the inspectorate of provinces and districts/cities. 
 
 In an attempt to strengthen the control system, the MoF (Ministry of Finance) 
has also become involved by issuing ministerial decrees Permenkeu 76/2008 regarding 
accountancy and financial reporting, particularly for the BLU (Badan Layanan Umum / 
Public Service Agency), such as regional public hospitals that can be categorised as 
BLU. Meanwhile, for local government in general, the MoF issued PMK 4/2011 as 
guidelines for the dissemination of information about local government finance. 
Particularly for specific allocation funds (the DAK), every year the MoF issues a 
ministerial decree for the forthcoming fiscal year, such as Permenkeu 201/2012 for the 
fiscal year 2013.   
  
 Apart from the ministries discussed above, related ministries also issue 
ministerial decrees to be implemented in that ministry‟s area. For example, the Ministry 
of Public Works issued ministerial decree 17/2012 in order to regulate performance 
accountability (LAKIP / Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja Instansi Pemerintah / 
Performance accountability reports of government institutions) for all institutions under 
the control of the Ministry of Public Works, such as the local government agency of 
public works.  This situation also occurs in other ministries as part of an effort to 
improve performance in the respective ministries. 
 
 Although these ministerial decrees are intended to enhance the accountability 
of government institutions, these conditions are perceived to be overlapping each other, 
adding a significant burden to government officials, as stated by one senior financial 
official: “The regulations sometimes have the same intention, but these are „packaged‟ 
in different ways.  Consequently, this is troublesome for us” (HOA 3).  This perception 
was also supported by an agency secretary who perceived that those regulations have 
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the same meaning but are expressed in different „language‟ (SOA 13).  However, the 
overlapping, and therefore the redundancy, are not total but only apply to some aspects 
of the regulations (SOA 11). 
 
 However, other local government officials have different perceptions than the 
previous critical views presented.  Some perceived that all regulations are well 
coordinated and complemented each other, as suggested by one senior agency secretary 
(SOA 6).  This perception was also emphasised by an inspectorate official who stated 
there is no overlapping in these regulations (SPO 16). However, there is another 
opinion, from a senior secretary of a local government agency, which pointed out that: 
“in the beginning, regulation is adjusted [to account for recent developments]; 
subsequently, it will always be adjusted again and again”. (SOA 12) 
 
 These varying perspectives confirm that local government officials differ in 
opinion.  The overlapping perceptions can be triggered by two causes from two sides: 
on one side, local government officials are not well informed about the whole picture of 
the policies of central government, along with the regulations following the policies, 
because “central government representatives in a region do not really understand those 
regulations comprehensively” (SPO 16).  On the other side is the fact that ministries are 
not well coordinated when it comes to issuing particular regulations: “those of us who 
work at an „operational level‟ feel that regulations produced by each ministry are 
uncoordinated and those regulations are intended to work in the interests of the 
ministry.” (HOA 3).  It has also been suggested by secondary sources that this can be 
attributed to „ministerial ego‟. Meanwhile, the other perspective, -that is, the 
complementary perspective-, is that government officials perceive all ministerial 
regulations to be efforts to strengthen control mechanisms. 
 
 Any particular ministry may also affect a local government agency by 
implementing a particular software application in the planning process which enables 
each local government agency to propose its needs via the application process.  
However, the proposal must be in line with the available menu in the application.  In 
addition, the related ministry may affect the local government agency by giving a grant 
in the form of equipment or tools to local government, which in some cases raises 
confusion among local government officials, as exemplified as follows. 
The machine [a back-hoe] is extremely big, whereas we mostly need it in areas 
with small roads. So, it cannot travel along them.  (SIA 1) 
 
86 
 
For example, we just received a car, but it is central government [ministry] 
asset… it is not supposed to be maintained from the local budget, because it is not 
recognised as being our asset. However, in this context, we have to maintain it, 
because we need it.  (SOA 6) 
 
Three years ago, the ministry gave us computers for our villages, but currently 
they do not work anymore.  We even have higher spec computers.  (SOA 7) 
 
In this way, the local government agency can be perceived as being used by the ministry 
as a „destination,‟ a way of spending the ministry‟s remaining budget in order to achieve 
its target.    
 
4.5.2. Oversight Bodies 
 Oversight bodies in the Indonesian government consist of many institutions, 
but interviewees in this study have identified four oversight bodies that affect local 
government officials when a decision is being made.  The first oversight body identified 
by most interviewees is the BPK as the external auditor, which is highly respected by 
local government officials because the BPK performs audits regularly (SFO 2).  Its 
audit opinions will affect local governments as a whole. 
The BPK performs an audit every year and we are always selected as an audit 
sample...we are afraid of making any mistakes, because the BPK will produce 
audit reports.  If [they find that] we do not „comply‟ [with laws and regulations], 
we can go to jail. (SFO 8) 
 
Moreover, the BPK staff are perceived to be very strict regarding regulations; many of 
its personnel are still young and very idealistic (SIA 1). The BPK will audit all the 
accountability reports of local government agencies (SOA 6), starting with planning and 
contracts, and will make physical checks if required (SIA 2).  
 
 Meanwhile, the second oversight body identified is the BPKP, an internal 
auditor which is much more engaged in the supervision and monitoring of 
administrative aspects of local government agencies.  Local government agencies are 
regarded as having close relationships with the BPKP because, as a central government 
official, the BPKP representative is placed in a particular local government for several 
years to give assistance to that local government: 
We are well acquainted with the BPKP staff because their rotation is quite slow 
compared to the BPK, which is so fast.  As a result, we have become friends, good 
friends.  They [the BPKP staff members] have different characters to the BPK 
[members]. (SFO 8) 
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The BPKP enhances its assistance by running training and coordination workshops for 
local government agencies, especially related to new regulations (SOA 6). Moreover, 
the assistance tends to be more related to the operational level, rather than the 
theoretical, such as determining indicators for the accountability reports of local 
government agencies (SPO 12).  
 
 The third oversight body identified by interviewees is the KPK (Commission 
of Corruption Eradication).  Although the commission has close relationships, in terms 
of its operation, with the PPATK (Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and 
Analysis Centre) and the KPPU (Commission of Monitoring of Business Competition), 
the focus of local government officials is more on the KPK than the other institutions. 
The reason for this orientation is that the KPK might be investigating any suspicious 
transactions; in the recent past this has resulted in many heads of local governments or 
heads of local government agencies going to jail.  Hence, now local government 
officials are much more careful than previously when making any expenditure 
decisions.  Consequently, budget absorption also tends to be lower than in the previous 
era: 
Recently, the KPK has become very focused [on fighting corruption], we always 
remind all local government agencies every time we hold a meeting to use the 
budget in accordance with regulations.  Any hesitance can be discussed with the 
inspectorate or the BPKP. We always monitor the incorporation of the budget; if it 
is still low, we will remind them [the local government agency]. (HOA 7) 
 
 In addition, one of the central government agencies, indicated by an 
interviewee, is the UKP4 (Unit Kerja Presiden Bidang Pengawasan dan Pengendalian 
Pembangunan / Presidential Work Unit for Development Monitoring and Control), 
which comes directly under the supervision of, and is responsible to, the president: 
Concerning financial control, there are many layers. For example, we have to 
report to Jakarta, to UKP4.  Every month we do reconciliation; every three months 
we will be checked by inspectors. And so we are inspected monthly, quarterly, 
every semester, and yearly. (SPO 7) 
 
Recently, performance reports for the UKP4 have been intensified. The reports will be 
monitored and evaluated regularly by Bappeda (Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan 
Daerah / Regional Body for Planning and Development) (SOA 14). 
 
4.5.3. Stakeholders 
 Interviewees of this study identified several stakeholders that are considered to 
be important when engaging in decisions about capital expenditure.  The first and most 
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identified stakeholder by the interviewee is local society, which will be impacted 
directly by a project.  Local government has two different ways of acquiring input from 
local society: formal and non-formal. The formal method can be accommodated through 
Musrenbang (Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan / Development Planning 
Forum) held by the executive, or a jaring asmara (Penjaringan Aspirasi Masyarakat / 
public aspiration gathering) (SPO 4; SOA 2).  Then, all input will be distinguished 
based on authorities‟ positions in the hierarchy [i.e. central government, provincial, or 
municipal (SPO 9)] and will be considered in the budgeting process based on the 
financial capability of local governments (SFO 7). Although sometimes this process 
does not meet the criteria for being efficient and effective, the input from the public 
might be included in the budget if it is perceived to be really needed by local society 
(SOA 5).  
 
 Apart from the formal approach, every local government agency employs 
different ways to absorb feedback from local society, such as by email, or message 
services at any time (HOA 1; HOA 6).  One of the non-formal approaches is that 
providing direct input to the head of local government when visiting a particular area. 
Another method is by submitting a proposal to the administrative development agency. 
Then, all inputs, both formal and informal, will be listed, verified, and ranked based on 
the priority of a particular area or local government agency, or the local government as a 
whole (SPO 4; SPO 15; SOA 12).  In addition, local society is able to participate 
directly in development processes, either by providing a grant in the form of a building 
(HOA 6), or through other fixed assets (SFO 11).  Then, all grants from the public will 
be recognised as local government assets (SFO 11).  
 
 The input from local society will subsequently be put into the budget and then 
implemented.  Afterwards, the impact of the development as realisation of the budget 
will be assessed for evaluation (SOA 7; SOA 12).  However, as time goes by, the 
impact of a project may well decline; for example, the development of a bus station that 
is rarely used nowadays because the public prefers to use their own vehicles, or the 
closure of many schools due to the success of a nationwide family planning programme 
(it is suggested that each family have a maximum of two children) (HOA 7).  Moreover, 
local society is also able to engage in this formal assessment through the IKM (Indeks 
Kepuasan Masyarakat / Index of public satisfaction) (SPO 3).  However, the IKM has 
been perceived sceptically by some government officials because it is assumed that the 
public will not give a bad assessment to a local government agency. The reason for this 
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is that the public often engages with a local government agency or agencies and they 
therefore have a good relationship, either personally or institutionally, which they will 
not wish to spoil (SPO 9).  
 
 The second stakeholder is an adjacent local government, or governments, 
because a local government might have a border with one or more local governments, 
thus necessitating the sharing of concerns or responsibilities (SOA 9); it needs to be 
determined who will handle what (SPO 14). In order to deal with this issue, the 
provincial government established a joint secretariat as a place for coordination, known 
as „Kartamantul‟, which is an abbreviation of Yogyakarta, Sleman and Bantul (SOA 9). 
The joint secretariat is also expected to reduce any tension among local governments, as 
stated by one local government official: 
We have two or more heads of local government with the same authority, but they 
have different interests. Sometimes, this causes open disagreement; hence, the 
existence of the joint secretariat is required to reduce the impact of these 
differences. (SOA 8) 
 
In addition, the secretariat is very useful as a medium for municipalities to communicate 
when dealing with financing difficulties related to infrastructure that will affect other 
regions (HOA 1). 
 
 The third stakeholder is non-governmental organisations / NGOs, which 
monitor procurement processes (SOA 5) or any other local government expenditure 
(SPO 9).  Hence, local government officials unavoidably engage with them (SFO 10): 
Now, it depends on implementation, precision, and accuracy; so far, there has 
been no spurious claim. [By this] I mean that, all projects are implemented 
[realised], and all goods [the results of the implementation] are in place according 
to specifications.  Here we have specific NGOs, for monitoring or independent 
monitoring system........sometimes, a project supervisor is afraid of it.  Well, as 
long as we comply with regulations this, we don‟t have to be afraid. (HOA 7) 
 
However, not all NGOs really know (or are fully up to date with) particular regulations 
and specific guidelines related to local government expenditures (SPO 5). 
 
 The fourth stakeholder is the mass media, which in several local governments 
involves TV, radio, and newspapers.  Any news published in those media might attract 
the attention of one or other of the oversight bodies, and might be followed up with an 
investigation: 
When the „TRIBUN‟ newspaper published news of a suspicious irregularity 
occurring in the project, the BPK straight away came to investigate the case. That 
is the reason why we are afraid to see any official or unofficial letter regarding a 
90 
 
project. Even any rumour that has been published in a newspaper might put us in 
trouble. (SFO 14) 
 
As well as informing on any irregularities, mass media can be used as a means of 
communication between the heads of local governments and local society; radio is 
particularly useful for this. For example, members of the local community could 
complain about the condition of infrastructure or any public services (HOA 5). 
 
4.6.  Summary 
 This chapter discusses the engagement of many parties outside of elements of 
local government in the control of capital expenditure.  Furthermore, it also depicts the 
interrelationships among these external parties. This study signifies three important 
points: that rivalries among regulators are likely to occur; that local government 
officials tend to focus on oversight bodies that have the authority to impose sanctions, 
including prison; and, finally, that all stakeholders of local government has their own 
agenda, in which they tend to work independently and are not interrelated with the 
identified stakeholders.  The first and second points have a strong connection because 
the oversight bodies play a role in maintaining the compliance of local governments 
towards regulations that have been issued by regulators, such as ministries.  Meanwhile, 
most of the stakeholders, at least officially, do not have a strong relationship with either 
regulators or oversight bodies, although unofficially they can and do interact with both 
government institutions.  For example, if it is indicated that fraud is likely to happen, 
one of the stakeholders might report this possibility to the relevant oversight body or 
ministry, which will duly investigate the report.   
 
 To summarise, this chapter illustrates an attempt at domination in the 
production of regulations by regulators and the cultural response of local government 
officials towards the domination, which tends to be conservative.  Meanwhile, the 
oversight bodies play its roles as „police‟ which emphasis on control and disciplinary of 
local government institutions.  Finally, the roles of stakeholders need to be empowered 
as complementary to the oversight bodies; this is due to the limitations of the resources 
of the oversight bodies compared to the number of overseen subjects.   
 
 The external parties along with their interrelationships are explored in this 
chapter; the following chapter then discusses the interactions of internal elements of 
local government in the capital expenditure process, along with the obstacles they face 
and the way these are dealt with. 
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Chapter 5 
Engagement of the External Actors with Local Government 
Apparatuses in the Capital Expenditure Processes  
 
5.1. Introduction 
 The previous chapter identified external parties that influence capital 
expenditure decision-making. Participants in this study identified several parties that 
were later categorised into three groups: regulators, oversight bodies, and stakeholders.  
The involvement of these actors can be perceived as the interference of international 
institutions in order to establish transparency and accountability in public finance, as 
outlined in several Letters of Intent.  This move has significantly affected many aspects 
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of local government practice, such as decentralisation policies, direct elections of heads 
of local governments, reinstating and empowering of current oversight bodies, 
establishing new oversight bodies, constituting government accounting standards, 
empowering local society, and implementing many best practices adopted from the 
private sector.   
 
 This chapter aims to highlight changes in regulations related to capital 
expenditure processes, along with the engagement of external parties in implementing 
these processes. The implementation of capital expenditure processes encompasses 
planning, implementation of that planning, and monitoring of full processes; external 
parties may engage with any of these stages.  In addition, this chapter also takes into 
account several issues regarding local government characteristics that might affect these 
stages.  Therefore, the sampled local governments were previously classified based on 
the specific characteristics of each region; for example, the breadth and character of the 
area, its poverty level, the minimum education levels of local government officers, and 
the average capital expenditure from 2010-2013. The classification of the local 
governments is intended to emphasise specific problems emerging in specific regions, 
especially in the procurement processes. 
 
 This chapter begins by looking at changes in capital expenditure policy, which 
is followed by a description of the impact of these changes on several aspects of the 
capital expenditure process, such as many parties engaging in capital expenditure 
decision-making, developing planning of capital expenditure, and mechanisms of 
procurement and selection of suppliers.  The next section is a description of the sampled 
local governments, encompassing profiles of the regions, particularly their geographic 
conditions, the distribution of rural and urban areas in each region, leading sectors in the 
regions, and the education levels of the local governments‟ civil servants.  Furthermore, 
this chapter presents the impact of the regulation changes on the sampled local 
governments, particularly in the planning, selection of suppliers, execution and 
monitoring stages.  The final section is the summary of this chapter. 
 
5.2. Changes to Regulations Concerning Procurement 
 Regulations concerning procurement in local government have been 
developing over time. Regulations to establish financial control in Indonesian local 
government were initiated in the “New Order” era, because the “Old Order” era still 
relied on regulations inherited from the Dutch. The evolution of the regulations 
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concerning financial control, especially capital expenditure, which is derived into 
presidential decrees, is set out in appendix 12.  The government of Indonesia has passed 
several presidential decrees regarding procurement processes, including capital 
expenditure.
4
  The several revisions from the initial presidential decree are undertaken 
by considering the dynamics within the context of government organisation, which, 
shifting from centralism to decentralism, are reflected significantly in the procurement 
system.  In the pre-reformation system, which adopted the centralistic model, approval 
of a project depended on the value of the project.  The higher the value of the project, 
the higher the level of approval that was required. For example, this approval could 
come from a particular minister, or from the coordinated ministries of economics, 
finance and development, as reflected in the presidential decree 24/1995.  Meanwhile, 
in the post-reformation era, the procurement system has reflected a decentralisation 
perspective, because approval is not based on the value of a particular project, but rather 
on the overall local government budget, by taking into account its financial capabilities.   
 
 In the post-reformation era, the initial presidential decree is number 18/2000, 
which encompasses many aspects of procurement and lays the foundations for 
undertaking procurement professionally by firmly setting out the mechanisms of 
procurement. These mechanisms are still employed to date; nevertheless, they have 
been improved through the adoption of e-procurement, a modernising development 
underpinned by presidential decree number 54/2010. The information presented in 
appendix 12 indicates that regulations that evolve from time to time tend to become 
stricter, because job assignments that used to be centralised with heads of local 
governments are reduced and distributed to other parties, such as the ULP or a 
procurement committee, along with clear descriptions of the roles and responsibilities of 
each party. This procedure is designed to increase the transparency of procurement 
processes, as authority is not concentrated in one party anymore. In addition, in order to 
enhance transparency, the LKPP was established by presidential decree 54/2010. This 
decree was then followed by the establishment of the ULP, under the supervision of the 
LKPP; these moves are expected to improve procurement practices that used to be 
undertaken manually and which are perceived to be open opportunities for collusion 
between government officials in authority and suppliers. The presidential decree 
                                                          
4
At first, the Government of Indonesia passed presidential decree number 18/2000, which was amended 
by presidential decree number 80/2003, and revised by presidential decree number 54/2010. In 2012, the 
presidential decree was reviewed and then revised again by presidential decree number 70/2012; the latest 
revision is presidential decree number 172/2014. 
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54/2010 accentuated the establishment of the ULP (Unit Layanan Pengadaan / 
Procurement service unit) in local governments, which had to be established by the 
fiscal year 2014 at the latest. This unit is required to support implementation of the e-
procurement that was introduced in the fiscal year 2012, embracing e-tendering and e-
purchasing. 
  
5.3.  Mechanism of Procurement of Capital Expenditure 
5.3.1.  Roles of Local Government Officials in Capital Expenditure 
 Procurement involves many parties, both within a local government agency or 
external to the agency, which is depicted in appendix 13. Those involved within the 
agency include the PA (Pengguna Anggaran / Budget user), which usually refers to the 
head of that local government agency. The PA delegates his/her responsibility, which 
used to be handled by the treasurer of a local government agency, to the KPA (Kuasa 
Pengguna Anggaran / Deputy of the budget user). When the particular local 
government agency requires something, the KPA might delegate authority to the PPK 
(Pejabat Pembuat Komitment / Committing Officer) to determine the requirements of 
the goods/services.  After the PPK has determined the requirements, he/she submits the 
findings to the ULP (Unit Layanan Pengadaan / Procurement Service Unit) or to 
procurement officers. 
 
 The ULP has the main responsibility for handling all procurement documents 
that have been handed over by the PPK (Pejabat Pembuat Komitmen / Committing 
Officer) and is responsible for determining the specification of the procurement based 
on the requirement of the local government agency. The ULP handles the procurement 
of goods/services/construction works worth more than IDR100 million (approximately 
equal to USD7000), a figure that was revised by the presidential decree 70/2012 by 
increasing the baseline to more than IDR200 million (equal to roughly USD14,000); 
and above IDR50 million (approximately equal to USD3500) for consultancy services. 
Consultancies are considered to be a different service because this term is used to 
identify design consultants and supervisory consultants in construction projects. 
 
 Meanwhile, capital expenditures valued at less than IDR200 million for 
construction, and worth less than IDR50 million for consultancy services, are handled 
by procurement officers with a direct appointment or direct procurement mechanism.  In 
order to ensure the procurement is undertaken professionally, the PPK and procurement 
officers must be certified for public procurement by the LKPP (Lembaga Kebijakan 
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Pengadaan Barang/Jasa Pemerintah / Agency for policymakers of government‟s 
procurement of goods/services) as an administrator at the national level. 
 
5.3.2.  Mechanism of Planning of Capital Expenditure 
 The reformation that has been undergone has provided a fundamental change 
in terms of the relationship between central and local government.  In the previous era, 
the central government used to control procurement by local governments, especially 
for high-value projects, but now all procurements are under the control of local 
governments themselves. Moreover, the procurement process also offers more 
opportunities for the involvement of local society in decision-making which affects 
them, as well as controlling the performance of local government officials, as the local 
government now has more power to manage resources in order to provide public 
services for local society (Purba, 2010).   
 
 The mechanism for procurement starts when the local government agency 
identifies its needs through various means, either via internal identification or through 
input from external sources.  The internal needs are identified through internal meetings, 
which must conform to programmes outlined by related ministries. After the internal 
meeting, the identified needs are submitted through e-planning applications to the 
related ministries. Any needs that are not listed in the menu of software applications 
cannot be submitted to the related ministry.  Meanwhile, the external inputs are acquired 
from several sources, such as Musrenbang (Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan / 
Development planning forum with local society), Jaring Asmara (Penjaringan Aspirasi 
Masyarakat / Acquiring aspirations of local society), hearings with the local parliament, 
and direct input from local society to the related agency. Afterwards, based on the 
identification, all of these proposals are ranked and prioritised in the RUP (Rencana 
Umum Pengadaan / Master plan of procurement), when implementation of the selected 
programmes is based on the budgets of related organisational units. Subsequently, the 
relevant organisational unit produces a DED (Detailed Engineering Design) before it is 
submitted to the ULP. 
 
 In this mechanism, another factor that must be taken into consideration is the 
roles of the local parliaments.  Since the reformation, the members of local parliaments 
are elected directly by local society; the members have strategic functions towards local 
government (executive), for example as a partner in governing.  One such function is 
legislation that initiates drafts of local regulations and/or gives approval to drafts of 
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local regulation that have been proposed by the executive. The approved draft of the 
budget will then become the budget implemented by local government.  In most cases, 
the local government will need to amend the budget that has been approved by taking 
into account the recent circumstances of the local government.  The local parliament 
often approves amendments to the local budget in the last quarter of a year, a 
requirement which puts a local government under pressure because it must prepare all 
the processes of capital expenditure within a very limited time. This situation requires 
local government officials to make difficult choices.  On the one hand, they are required 
to meet local government budget targets, but on the other hand, they also have to meet 
public expectation regarding the quality of assets or infrastructure. 
 
 After the budget has been approved, the PA (budget user) composes a master 
plan of procurement (RUP); then the PA delegates the authority for the implementation 
of the RUP to the KPA and the PPK, who carry out the programmes. The PPK must 
specify the goods/services based on their requirements. After the procedure has been 
completed, it is handed over to the ULP in order to be put into e-procurement for the 
procurement of goods/services totalling more than IDR200 million or IDR50 million for 
consultancy services.  Meanwhile, any procurement below those limits is handled by the 
procurement officials of a local government agency. 
 
5.3.3.  Procurement and Evaluation Methods of Suppliers’ Proposals 
 Procurement can be undertaken through two methods: self-managed and 
selection of suppliers of goods/services. The self-managed method involves planning, 
implementing and supervising the procurement, which is being undertaken by an 
agency. In terms of construction work, this method only encompasses rehabilitation, 
renovation, and simple construction.  Complicated construction is undertaken by a 
particular agency and, when it has been completed, it is handed over to the local 
community/society as a user. In order to ensure the implementation of the project in 
terms of effective utilisation of the budget, the involvement of the APIP, which is 
responsible for internal audit, is required. The second method is procurement involving 
a third party, as a supplier of goods/services. 
 
 Selection of the third parties is undertaken in several ways, particularly in the 
selection of suppliers involved in construction works: for example, by general auction, 
limited auction, direct selection, direct appointment, or direct procurement. First, the 
most common method is a general auction with several requirements. Second, the 
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simple selection is specified for procurement with limited suppliers involving 
complicated work. Third, for simple construction worth up to IDR200 million 
(approximately USD14,000) a supplier can be selected straight away if the supplier 
meets the qualification. Fourth, direct appointment can be applied in specific 
circumstances, such as in a state of emergency.  Finally, direct procurement is specified 
for procurement up to IDR100 million, or about USD7000, and involving small and 
medium enterprises as a supplier.     
 
 Proposals that have been submitted by suppliers are selected by the ULP based 
on a single-elimination system, a value system, and economic life cycle cost.  The first 
system is the single-elimination system, which is the most common system employed in 
procurement; exemption is given for projects with high complexity, costing above 
IDR100 billion or USD7 million, which require the application of a value system or 
valuation cost of economic life as the evaluation method.  The single-elimination 
system is based on the assessment of suppliers‟ proposals through verification and 
comparison between the proposal and requirements that have been set. Any suppliers 
that cannot meet the requirements are eliminated. The second method is a value system 
that is measured by assigning point values for each element that has been set, based on 
specified criteria and weighting. Then the total values are compared with the suppliers 
in order to decide which one has the highest value. The last method is economic life 
cycle cost, which assesses suppliers‟ proposals by employing point values for technical 
elements and price, referring to economic life based on particular criteria and values that 
have been established. This method is applied to highly complex projects, as it also 
considers operating costs, maintenance costs, and the residual value of the assets.   
 
 Meanwhile, for consultation services, the ULP uses four methods for selecting 
consultants: an assessment based on quality; quality and cost; budget ceiling; and the 
lowest cost.  The first method is an assessment based on the quality of technical 
proficiency, which is initially verified and then continued with negotiations involving 
technical matters and fees.  The second method is based on an assessment of quality and 
cost, in order to select the best combination of both components (i.e. the quality of the 
technical service being offered and its price).  The third approach, which is an 
evaluation based on the budget ceiling, is when proposals are compared with the budget 
ceiling; selection is normally based on the value of the proposals, with the one offering 
the lowest price selected.  Finally, an evaluation based on the lowest value is also used 
to select a consultant with higher technical standards than are required. 
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 Each of these methods can be applied to a particular project; for example, 
assessment based on quality is applied to the selection of consultants for a macro 
perspective, or planning and supervising projects of high complexity, such as the 
construction of a power plant, an underwater tunnel, or an international airport. 
Assessment based on quality and cost can be applied to projects that are less complex 
than the previous mega-examples; for example, a primary irrigation system, road, 
feasibility study, project consultant, or a construction which does not involve building. 
The next method of assessment, based on the concept of the budget ceiling, can be 
applied to construction projects, both for planning and supervising the construction of a 
building.  The final method, based on the lowest cost, is employed in simple projects, 
such as the design and supervision of simple buildings.   
 
 After passing through stages of assessment, the ULP then decides the winner of 
the auction. However, the ULP still gives the other suppliers an opportunity to appeal 
regarding this decision. The supplier who appeals against this decision must give a 
deposit worth 5% of the contract value, or HPS (Harga Perkiraan Sendiri / Self-
estimated price), or a maximum of IDR50 million (equal to USD3500); this provision 
was revised by presidential decree 70/2012 to be worth 1% of HPS.  Otherwise, the 
ULP offers the contract to the winner of tender. When the supplier signs the contract, 
they must also give a security deposit worth 5% of the contract‟s value or of the HPS.  
 
 
5.4. Issues with the Procedures of Procurement in Particular Local 
Governments 
5.4.1.  Brief Profile of the Sampled Regions: Geographic and Demographic 
Conditions 
 The Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY) province is located in the centre of 
Java Island and consists of five local governments; these are the districts of 
Gunungkidul, Bantul, Kulon Progo, Sleman, and City of Yogyakarta. The percentage of 
the total geographical area of each local government relative to the Yogyakarta Province 
is as follows: Gunungkidul 46.63%, Kulon Progo 18.40%, Sleman 18.04%, Bantul 
15.91%, and Yogyakarta 1.02%, as presented in Figure 5.1.  Approximately 65.65% of 
the area is situated at a height of between 100m and 499m, 28.84% at a height of less 
than 100m, 5.04% at 500m–999m, and 0.47% at a height of 1000m or 
more(D.I.Yogyakarta, 2014). 
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Figure 5.1. Percentages of total geographical area by districts or city in the D.I. 
Yogyakarta province 
  
 
Source:Badan Pusat Statistik D.I.Yogyakarta (Central Agency on Statistics of the 
Special Region of Yogyakarta), 2014, p.7 
 
 Figure 5.1 shows that the Gunungkidul district is the largest area in the 
province of Yogyakarta, while Kulon Progo and Sleman are approximately the same 
size.  These are followed by Bantul and, finally, the smallest region, which is the city of 
Yogyakarta itself. Most parts of the districts of Gunungkidul and Sleman are located at 
an altitude of between 145m and 185m because these regions contain hilly areas, and 
there is a volcano in the Sleman region in which situated at an altitude of more than 
500m. Meanwhile, the districts of Bantul, KulonProgo, and Yogyakarta are mostly 
situated at altitudes of between 45m and 75m. 
 
 Each of the five regions administers sub-districts and villages, made up as 
follows: Kulon Progo consists of 13 urban areas and 75 rural areas; Bantul 47 urban 
areas and 28 rural areas; Gunungkidul 5 urban areas and 139 rural areas; Sleman 59 
urban areas and 27 rural areas; Yogyakarta city 45 urban areas. Based on this 
distribution, the district of Gunungkidul has the largest area, and most of this area is 
rural (95%). This district is the farthest from the centre of the province of 
D.I.Yogyakarta. The district of KulonProgo is the second largest in terms of area, and 
the second furthest in terms of distance from the centre of the province. Therefore, both 
of these regions can be regarded as outer areas in this study. Meanwhile, the district of 
Bantul is the third farthest from the centre of the province. Finally, Sleman is the closest 
district to the centre of the province, and is situated adjacent to the city of Yogyakarta 
(D.I.Yogyakarta, 2014).   
 
 In addition, as presented in appendix 14, in the districts of Gunungkidul and 
Kulon Progo, 54.41% and 50.24% of the population, respectively, rely on the 
46.63%
18.40%
15.91%
18.04%
1.02%
Gunungkidul
Kulon Progo
Bantul
Sleman
Yogyakarta
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agriculture sector.  Hence, in these regions, there are many rural rather than urban areas. 
Meanwhile, the district of Bantul is about to shift from being an agricultural sector 
(16.98%) into manufacturing (21.78%), as well as being involved in trading and tourism 
(26.55%), the latter involving the development of hotels and restaurants in the region. 
The development of financial services involves about 20.95% of the total population of 
Bantul.  Finally, the district of Sleman relies on trading, hotels, and restaurants as 
leading sources of income and employment (28.54%). The city of Yogyakarta itself 
depends on trade, hotels and restaurants (47.57%) and services (26.28%) 
(D.I.Yogyakarta, 2014).  
 
 All of the above conditions are set out in appendix 14, which emphasises the 
shifting orientation of the local societies of these regions from the agrarian sector to 
industrial and trading sectors. The data give insights into the conditions of the local 
societies, where the agricultural sector is representative of traditional society, while the 
industrial and trading sectors indicate modernised society (Charlton and Andras, 2003). 
According to these criteria, the Gunungkidul and Kulon Progo regions can be classified 
as traditional societies when compared with the other regions. On the other hand, Bantul 
and Sleman are shifting from traditional into modern societies, while the city of 
Yogyakarta can be classified as representing an already modernised society. The 
different types of society might react or behave differently towards specific conditions, 
particularly in terms of social boundaries in these two societies.  A traditional society is 
depicted as a pyramid of top-down authority, while a modern society is exemplified as a 
mosaic that is put together with mutual interdependence (Charlton and Andras, 2003). 
 
 Moreover, demographic conditions regarding civil servants in each region 
reveal evidence that a few officers in the local governments still have only the minimum 
level of education, as summarised in appendix 15.  Civil servants at the provincial level, 
who have minimum level of education, make up 42.46% of the total; in the KulonProgo 
that figure is 31.56%; in the city of Yogyakarta it is 28.98%; in Gunungkidul it is 
28.29%; Sleman is 26.39%; and the lowest figure comes from the district of Bantul, 
with 26.22% (D.I.Yogyakarta, 2014).  The officers‟ education levels are an important 
factor; they are perceived to affect the way local governments apprehend and resolve 
the problems they encounter (Pakpahan et al., 2014).  Moreover, Charlton and Andras 
(2003) suggest that the process of modernising society can be accelerated through 
education. At the organisational level, an employee‟s standard of education affects the 
job satisfaction of that individual, which will in turn influence the level of employee 
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turnover (Lambert et al., 2001). It has been suggested that this happens because a 
person‟s education has other functions apart from technical requirements, for example 
as a socialisation medium and for transmitting occupational values (Gusfield, 1957). 
 
 The figure in appendix 16 shows the distribution of civil servants based on 
their levels of education, and indicates that most civil servants are educated to degree 
level. Approximately 40% of civil servants in the five local governments are first-
degree holders, apart from in the Kulon Progo district, where the figure is 36%. The 
high number of degree-holders in this figure can be accounted for by the fact it is the 
minimum requirement for civil servants in order to be placed in middle management 
(Indonesia, 2013). The middle management is responsible for the operation of capital 
expenditure processes, from the start up to the handing over of the procured assets. 
Hence, this chapter considers the relation between the demographic conditions affecting 
socio-culture in specific regions and the role of education levels in local government 
cultures in order to determine how this contributes to the creation of an atmosphere 
conducive to work.  
 
5.4.2.  Economic Conditions and Capital Expenditures of the Regions 
 All municipalities of Yogyakarta province still depend financially on funds 
from the central government, both from the DAU (Dana Alokasi Umum / Generally 
allocated fund) and the DAK (Dana Alokasi Khusus / Specifically allocated fund); this 
constitutes, on average, around 64% of total revenue. Regional revenue that can be 
generated by the municipalities totals about 14%, and the rest comes from other sources 
of revenue, such as grants, emergency funds, and provincial funds. Of the total 
expenditure, most (approximately 57%) is assigned to pay civil servants‟ salaries, 
except in the province of D.I.Yogyakarta, which allocates only 20% of its funds to 
personnel expenditure. About 12% of total outgoings is allocated for capital 
expenditure, as presented in appendix 17, which includes the capital expenditure of all 
sampled regions since 2010 - 2013 (D.I.Yogyakarta, 2014). 
 
 Capital expenditure in every region in the Province of Yogyakarta is presented 
in appendices 17 and 18.  From 2010-2013, all regions experienced increasing capital 
expenditure, except the two largest districts: GunungKidul and Kulon Progo slightly 
decreased their expenditure in 2013 from that in 2012. As the largest districts, both 
regions would be expected to spend more on capital expenditure in order to accelerate 
development in these districts (Adi, 2006; Harianto and Adi, 2007).  Meanwhile, the 
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city of Yogyakarta, which only has a small area of around 1% of the total area of 
Yogyakarta province, in 2013 allocated IDR121,557 million (about USD8.7 million) for 
capital expenditure, an increase of 42% from 2012.  The district of Sleman and the 
province of Yogyakarta increased their capital expenditure substantially in 2013 
compared to 2012.   
 
  All of the conditions of the sampled local governments are summarised 
according to their areas, along with the conditions of poverty, education levels, and  
capital expenditure in each region, in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1. Classification of the regions along with the socio-demographic 
conditions 
Area Rural Semi-urban Urban 
Region Gunungkidul KulonProgo Bantul Sleman City of 
Yogyakarta 
Percentage area of 
district or city 
46.63% 18.40% 15.91% 18.04% 1.02% 
Percentage of rural 
areas 
96.52% 85.22% 37% 31% 0% 
Poverty 21.70% 21.39% 16.48% 9.68% 8.82% 
Minimum education 
level 
5.01% 3.99% 3.23% 2.73% 5.73% 
Average capital 
expenditure 2010-2013  
154,229 94,087 108,094 127,115 84,083 
(in IDR million) 
 
The table above indicates that the district of Gunungkidul, which has the largest area, 
also received the largest allocation of capital expenditure.  However, the „total area‟ 
does not necessarily receive a proportional allocation of capital expenditure; the district 
of Kulon Progo has the second largest area, but receives a relatively small allocation for 
capital expenditure.  Meanwhile, the other regions receive a proportional allocation for 
capital expenditure.  
 
5.4.3. Internal Dynamics of the Sampled Local Governments 
 Managing the vast amounts of money allocated for capital expenditure requires 
managerial skills from the heads of local governments or the heads of local government 
agencies, particularly in order to formulate procurement plans that benefit local 
communities. The role of leadership is considered to be an important aspect, as 
indicated by one official: “If the head of an organisational unit does not understand a 
new system, he/she will give unclear and biased instructions to their subordinates” 
(SOA 13). Although the role of leadership is perceived to be crucial, in cases of 
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promotion to head of an organisational unit, far more value is currently placed on 
seniority than meritocracy: “Seniority is the main consideration for a job promotion, 
without considering the competency and job experiences of the candidates” (SPO 12). 
The competency and capabilities in the head of the organisational unit are really needed 
in order to foster a dynamic organisation: “We have an organisational unit head, who 
has good „processor‟ and „storage‟ [abilities]; hence, we help her by supplying her with 
data recording applications” (SOA 12). Moreover, leadership is required in order to 
build an organisational culture, as it is noted that organisational culture must be 
established firmly and started by the superior officer.  This is typified by a senior 
financial officer scrutinising the decision of central government to increase the limit of 
procurement, which might increase opportunities for misconduct: 
This system is much better because user and vendor do not contact each other 
directly. As a result, the procurement committee is not afraid of being contacted 
by vendors. However, a problem arises because the threshold of e-procurement is 
IDR200 million, which means that procurement below IDR200 million can be 
arranged directly, giving the organisational unit a wide-ranging opportunity to 
„play‟ [i.e. try to get money for their own]. At the national level, IDR200 million 
is a relatively small amount, but for local governments, it is quite large. Therefore, 
many local government agencies try to set procurement below IDR200 million in 
order to avoid e-procurement, allowing the organisational unit will be able to 
choose which supplier they wanted. (SFO 5) 
  
The officer indicates a practice that might occur in a local government agency. He has 
points out how an agency might use the regulation for their own benefit, as direct 
procurement requires the supplier to provide commission for unscrupulous persons in an 
organisational unit in order to secure the project. Furthermore, he suggests that this 
practice is quite common in organisational units and that the occurrence of the practice 
strongly requires that the head of agency deal with it: “if the head of agency intends to 
„play‟ [in the procurement], then the subordinates will follow and to „play along‟ as 
well” (SFO 5).  This example therefore affirms the importance of the roles of heads of 
agencies in building an organisational culture within their agency. 
 
 The larger area, which consists of rural areas such as Gunungkidul and Kulon 
Progo, offers other challenges for the head of an agency, because the staffs rely heavily 
on the head to create an effective local government agency, as stated by one senior 
planning officer: 
The head of an agency will give directions to their subordinates through the civil 
servants‟ ceremony and by making a personal approach, person to person....and 
sometimes even, structural boundaries are omitted. The relationship will rely on 
friendship and brotherhood, ties that we can remind each other about. 
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Coordination is maintained whenever we go to take any action; all coordinators 
will gather to discuss a plan of action...However, the effectiveness of this 
approach is not as expected (SPO 5). 
 
Furthermore, semi-urban regions, such as in the districts of Sleman and Bantul, start to 
become more independent and professional.  However, the roles of heads of agencies 
are still to dominate in order to control their subordinates: “He comes to our offices 
every week and asks us: how is your work?...And we hold a meeting: Monday for the 
finance division and Tuesday for other divisions” (SPO 1).  Meanwhile, in the urban 
region, comprising the city of Yogya and province of Yogyakarta, the staffs tend to be 
more independent at work. Although all decisions are made by the heads of agencies, 
staff can provide suggestions based on their expertise, and even dare to argue with their 
superior, as exemplified by an interviewee who creates an indicator of output 
measurement: 
It must be clear what the improvement is, what the initial condition was, what 
should be measured, what are the parameters. I formulate this and apply it to the 
Renstra [Strategic planning]; then it is adopted by the Bappeda [Local government 
planning agency], and all agencies are required to adopt this method. (SPO 12) 
 
This example shows that initiative is encouraged and appreciated in this case, because 
what the officer created was later adopted by the planning agency (Bappeda) and 
prescribed for use by all other agencies. In another case, one of the interviewees 
describes how he argued with his superior regarding the implementation of a software 
application: 
We had spent a lot of money to develop this system [SIPKD], but they [the 
supplier] wanted us to switch to their system and they came to the provincial 
secretary, but the secretary asked me about it. I argued with them to show me the 
weaknesses of our system. If they were vital, I did not mind changing [the 
system]; if they were not vital, I asked why I had to change it....that was a glimpse 
of a software application that would affect our internal control (SFO 14). 
 
Both examples demonstrate critical thinking by the staff, which tends to be more 
developed in urban areas than in rural or semi-urban areas, and an egalitarian 
atmosphere is more noticeable in the urban context. For example, when group 
interviews were conducted involving heads of divisions and secretaries of agencies, they 
argued with each other regarding some topics, without restraint, even though their 
superior was also in the same room. This is an atmosphere that was not found in other 
peer interviews in rural or semi-urban agencies.  
 
5.5.  Compliance of Mechanisms of Procurement to the Regulations 
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5.5.1. Formulation of Capital Expenditure Planning in Local Governments 
 Regarding the implementation of planning mechanisms, every agency might 
have different ones because they are under different ministries. Each local government 
agency is under the supervision of related ministries and each agency undertakes 
programmes handed down from the ministries. In order to control capital expenditure, 
the ministries apply different methods; for example, a local hospital that is under the 
Ministry of Health employs e-planning, whereas the transportation agency that is under 
the control of the Ministry of Transportation implements different software applications. 
Hence, every agency must comply with the regulations of at least three ministries, i.e. 
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Home Affairs for all agencies, and related 
ministries for specific agencies.  This somewhat complex arrangement sometimes raises 
problems, as indicated by several sources. The various ministries have their own 
programmes that must be implemented right down to district and regional level; 
however, among those ministries, there appears to be a lack of coordination. 
 
 In general, “at the beginning of a fiscal year, we submit a proposal to the 
relevant ministry [Ministry of Transportation]” (SPO 6).  The proposal must refer to 
Renstra (Rencana strategis / Strategic planning) as long-term planning: “So, core and 
master plan have been set; hence, any replacement of the head of local government will 
not affect the policy because all developments must refer to the master plan, which is 
specified within the yearly programmes afterwards” (SOA 7).  In addition, the master 
plan becomes a reference for the priority of programmes (SPO 6): 
For capital expenditure, such as that funded by the DAK [Specifically allocated 
fund], technical guidelines will usually accompany it, along with menus for its 
application. Each agency is only able to propose in conformity with this menu. So, 
we are constrained by this menu; even if we need something, we cannot propose it 
because it is not available on the menu. (SPO 3) 
 
Then “the internal meeting is needed to prioritise the needs” (JPO 1). After the technical 
guidelines have been examined, the meeting will be held, chaired by the head of an 
agency, in order to determine which one should be prioritised (SFO 2). Afterwards, 
“when the master plan of procurement (the RUP) has been accomplished, and the DED 
has been acquired, the following next year will then involve suppliers being selected 
through an auction in the ULP” (SOA 7). This mechanism has been implemented 
widely in local government agencies. Although they have implemented the procedures 
as required by regulations, in the same way, the intensity is different due to the different 
circumstances encountered by each particular agency.  For instance, three interviewees 
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were from agencies under the supervision of the same ministry, but they came from 
different local governments, representing the three regional categories (rural, semi-
urban, and urban). Although they came from agencies under the same ministry, because 
they came from different regions, they posed different challenges. Issues arising in the 
rural area, with regard to the planning stage, were mostly related to human resources: 
This is related to a presidential decree, and we have provided guidelines. The 
certified staffs are supposed to understand the presidential decree, but in one 
particular case, they cannot understand how to handle it. For example, 
procurement in 2012 was delayed because there was no solution; we could not 
take any action without any legal basis. (SPO 6) 
 
This situation indicates the importance of continuous improvement for and of human 
resources, especially for certified staff who handle procurement processes. Such 
personnel must always be updating their knowledge regarding new regulations issued 
by the government. 
 
 Meanwhile, the semi-urban regions face a different problem, as described: 
“For the planning system, in every section, we have a planner...and he synchronised the 
district programmes with our agency, and every division has a technical planner” (SOA 
7). However, this model is not always as successful as expected, particularly when it 
does not take into account the dynamics of society, as confirmed by the other 
interviewee from the same region: 
There is a public transport terminal; we do not know the future, it was built before 
[the time when] motorcycles and cars can be purchased easily through leasing. 
Therefore, people prefer to ride a motorbike because they consider it cheaper than 
public transport. Hence, the terminal cannot be utilised optimally. (HOA 7)    
 
This particular example indicates that planning, specifically long-term strategic 
planning, might not fit with the dynamics of society. Therefore, the aspirations of local 
society must be noted seriously, not only in order to meet the regulation that must be 
adhered to. The involvement of local society / communities in planning is also needed 
in order to overcome issues that are encountered in the urban region, because conditions 
in the urban region are more dynamic than in the rural or semi-urban regions. Hence, 
the agency is both required and obliged to adjust with the dynamic: “Planning changes 
are very dynamic and very fast, but they must be accommodated in the Renja [Rencana 
Kerja / Yearly planning]....if there is a change, we have to consider our capacity to 
accomplish it by the end of the fiscal year” (SPO 10). Through the involvement of the 
local community, the expenditure can be expected to be utilised optimally by society. 
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 It is a regulatory requirement to involve local society in order to gain input that 
subsequently will be considered in composing the local government‟s budget, although 
the government agencies‟ work is based on strategic planning (Renstra) within a 5-year 
time frame, which is then narrowed down into yearly planning (Renja): 
Basically, the five-yearly vision and mission is elaborated upon within yearly 
programmes, and in the yearly programmes, we hold onto something that can 
provide aspirations for society, i.e. Musrenbangdes, Musrenbang kecamatan, 
Musrenbang kabupaten, then the provinces, and then finally at the national level. 
Therefore, we have a database of society‟s needs...Then, we prioritise by 
considering: what is the most important thing for society, whether the location is 
strategic or not, and whether it stimulates the surrounding areas or not. (SOA 7) 
 
Hence, any input from local society must conform to the Renstra; otherwise, it will be 
omitted.  This reflects the fact that public involvement in capital expenditure decision-
making is limited, although the central government has been providing media for the 
public to channel their aspirations regarding capital expenditure through 
MUSRENBANG (Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan / Public participation in 
development planning) as a public consultation forum. However, the outcomes of the 
MUSRENBANG are not satisfactory, as the public is not well informed about the 
availability of resources, which has created a cynical perception of this event:“It makes 
the participants dream. They are encouraged to say whatever they want, and finally, in 
the end, I will make the decisions about what can be done, based on how much money I 
have” (Purba, 2010).  This means that MUSRENBANG can be perceived as a mere 
formality, and is regarded as an instrument of legitimacy. 
 
 In addition, it should be pointed out that the availability of an up-to-date 
database is also perceived to be an important issue: “the technical database of 
government infrastructure is required as the basis for budgeting and planning 
programmes, but we do not have accurate and updated data” (SPO 4). A planning 
officer suggested that “data in central and local government are not valid at all” (SPO 
9). This situation is very confusing: on one side is a substantial technical database, but 
on the other side the validity of this database is seriously questioned. Data regarding one 
subject can differ from department to department, as exemplified in the following 
comment: “data for healthy housing, from the public health office, are different from the 
public works department; data regarding irrigation of agricultural areas from this 
organisation unit differ from data supplied by the agricultural organisational unit” (SPO 
9). In addition, the officer suggested that this dissonance might occur because of the 
application of different methods or due to a different understanding of the same subject. 
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5.5.2. Selecting a Contractor or Supplier of Capital Expenditure 
 After the general planning of procurement (RUP) is composed by the head of 
an agency, it is delegated to the PPK in order to be implemented, either through direct 
procurement or by submission to the ULP (Unit Layanan Pengadaan / Procurement 
services unit) for procurement by tender. Some agencies prefer all their procurement to 
be put through the ULP, for reasons such as a lack of certified procurement staff or in 
order to reduce psychological pressures, as the suppliers tend to approach the staff who 
handle the procurement process.  However, other agencies prefer to handle their own 
procurement decisions. One reason for this is that there is a limited time frame for 
putting a procurement tender through the ULP, while the agency is required to meet its 
budget absorption target.   
 
 Improvements in software applications have stimulated development in the 
capital expenditures mechanisms of local governments, through the employment of e-
procurement. However, levels of implementation of the e-procurement model vary 
among local governments, who come to depend on the ULP as organiser of the e-
procurement, because of confusion regarding regulations that must be complied with, as 
indicated by a senior financial officer: “City [of Yogyakarta], [District of] KulonProgo, 
Sleman have established the ULP; we [Province of Yogyakarta] are still in the process 
[of establishing it]” (SFO 14). Local governments view the ULP as part of various local 
government agencies: “The ULP cannot be attached arbitrarily to any agency, the 
DPPKA or Bappeda [BadanPerencanaan Pembangunan Daerah / Local government 
development planning agency]” (SOA 10). Therefore, establishing of the ULP must 
refer to a specific ministerial decree: 
Referring to the Ministerial Decree of Kemenpan (Ministry of apparatus 
empowerment and bureaucratic reform) regarding its main duties and functions, 
the LPSE (Layanan Pengadaan Secara Elektronik / E-procurement services that 
organised by the ULP) is supposed to be coordinated by Bappeda in the 
controlling division.  However, when the ministry issues an official letter that is 
because the LPSE is related to the [software] application; therefore, it must be put 
under the coordination of the transportation, communication and information 
agency [Dinas Perhubungan dan Kominfo]. In other provinces, it is placed in the 
supplies bureau, but we do not have such a bureau. (SPO 17) 
  
 In addition, the ULP as the organiser of the LPSE (Layanan Pengadaan 
Secara Elektronik / E-procurement services) requires personnel who hold certification 
for the procurement of goods and services. However, certification has also become a 
problem for several local government agencies because only a very limited number of 
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persons meet the requirement for certification: “[the number of] procurement staff is 
very limited” (SPO 3). This point is also supported by an agency head: “even though it 
is not obliged by regulation [because procurement is below IDR200 million]; I prefer to 
give [the project] to the ULP because we only have two certified [procurement] staff” 
(HOA 5).  An issue that has arisen within many local government organisational units, 
which do not have sufficient personnel with appropriate qualifications, is also stressed 
by a local official: “for the technical team, we rely on personnel from other 
organisational units. We have proposed four persons, but only approved one” (SIA 1). 
This deficit condition has occurred in many organisational units in many local 
governments; workloads of certified officials are therefore quite high. 
 
 After the procurement is announced to the public, procurement staff select 
suppliers that have submitted their proposal by considering many aspects, such as 
technical requirements, price, and the reputation of the supplier. Blacklisted suppliers 
are not allowed to participate in procurement tender, or to be appointed as suppliers. 
However, the availability of an up-to-date comprehensive database regarding this issue 
is very limited; suppliers have ways of overriding the current system, which is why 
many blacklisted suppliers are still able to participate in the tendering process or 
manage to be appointed as vendors. Moreover, support and oversight from professional 
associations are inadequate; hence, the blacklisted suppliers are still able to operate: 
“each municipality has its own blacklisted suppliers; blacklisted suppliers from one 
region might win a tender in another region” (SFO 4). This negative situation indicates 
that the database was built for a specific local government and has not been integrated 
throughout even a province. This situation is highly favourable for „bad‟ suppliers. On 
the other hand, professional organisations, which purport to regulate a specific 
profession, appear not to play any role in enforcing the appropriate code of ethics: 
“professional organisations are required to do so; they should have control of the 
members of the organisation. We have suggested it, but it seems they do not bother 
about it” (SFO 14).   
 
 Ideally, increasing levels of decentralisation should result in increasingly 
effective control systems, which improve the performance of particular local 
governments through the implementation of suggested changes. It is essential that 
decentralised decisions must be supported by the availability of valid information as 
feedback for the decision maker (Miah and Mia, 1996; Glynn and McCrae, 1986). 
Distorted information leads to misallocation of resources, and thereafter results in the 
110 
 
diversion of management attention away from the economy, efficiency and effective 
accomplishment (Smith, 1989). Thus, the availability of an integrated database is 
necessary in order to meet the challenge in the public sector, where compliance with 
regulations, public accountability and public expectation is perceived to be more 
important than in the private sector. 
 
5.5.3. Implementation of Procurement of Assets 
 After a vendor or supplier has been chosen through the selection process, they 
become responsible for the execution of the project. The project executors can be 
distinguished into three types: planning consultant, contractor, and supervising 
consultant. At the first stage, a local government agency determines the technical 
specification, administrative requirements, and qualifications of tender participants 
(SPO 11). Then, in the technical planning stage, a local government agency is involved 
in supervising and reviewing, especially with regard to specifications and site 
conditions (SPO 4), because sometimes the planning might be implemented in a remote 
area or even on a mountain (HOA 4). 
 
 The next stage in the implementation of a project is the construction stage. If 
there is any input from local society as users, it can be accommodated by considering 
technical and financial conditions (SFO 4). In the construction stage, the supervising 
consultant plays an important role in ensuring the quality and specification of the 
construction. Hence, the involvement of local government officials is required in order 
to reduce the possibility of collusion between the contractor and the supervising 
consultant (HOA 6). If a local government official finds a discrepancy between the 
planned specifications and the real conditions, the situation will be discussed together 
with the planning consultant, the contractor and the supervising consultant (HOA 6). 
Meanwhile, any delays in the completion of a project will have different consequences, 
the worst being the unilateral termination of the contract (SPO 4). 
 
5.5.4. Monitoring the Implementation of Planning by Many Parties 
 The procurement processes attract the attention of many parties in order to 
ensure the process is run fairly: “we try to solve any problem with the ombudsman and 
with non-government organisations as well” (SPO 1); this is basically to ensure that the 
lowest bidder is chosen as the winner of the auction. However, one senior financial 
officer offers a different opinion: 
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The procurement committee members are afraid if they do not choose the lowest 
bidder because the BPK will question it. Choosing anyone but the lowest bidder 
will be regarded as a waste of public funds. Therefore, the regulation does not 
support the committee choosing supplier who offers better quality. (SFO 14) 
This statement indicates that the officials see themselves as being „in the middle‟. On 
one side, they are pressed by the public and other stakeholders to provide a good quality 
service; on the other, they are required to spend at the lowest level by regulations 
imposed by the BPK (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan / Indonesian Supreme Audit), which 
acts as external auditor for government institutions. 
 
 The inspectorate, as one local government institution that has responsibility for 
internal audit, also plays an important role in supporting improvement control in local 
governments.  However, the inspectorate‟s involvement varies.  In one region, it is 
perceived to be insufficient by an organisational unit: “we coordinate with the 
inspectorate for evaluation, but the inspectorate cannot coordinate regularly” (SFO 3).  
Meanwhile, in another region, the involvement of the inspectorate is quite intense: 
“staffs of the inspectorate are more focused on building link with organisation units. 
This helps us to be more organised in terms of administration and compliance with 
regulations” (SOA 9). 
 
 Therefore, procurement through the ULP is perceived in a positive way as it 
reduces psychological risk: “procurement risk is related to psychological risk as well. 
Many persons come to my office asking about the procurement process; that places 
great pressure on us” (SOA 2).  Even an officer in an organisational unit tends to 
forward any procurement decisions to the ULP (Unit Layanan Pengadaan / 
Procurement services unit) in order to reduce this risk: “if all procurements were able to 
be put to auction through the ULP, we would be happy to do that, as we get pressure 
from many parties, such as the BPK, the BPKP, the district attorney, the police, and the 
mass media” (HOA 5).  This suggests that some officials want to shift their „burden‟ to 
the ULP, as the pressure from many sources has tended to increase recently.  They do 
not want to be put „in the middle‟ between public expectation and regulatory 
requirements, especially when the local budget needs to be amended: “the amendment 
of the local budget is usually in September or October; while for capital expenditures 
need to be put on auction. Time is limited [and so an agency does not dare spend it], so 
no wonder budget surpluses are high” (SFO 10).  This notion explains the involvement 
of local parliament as a representation of political parties, the members of which pursue 
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their somewhat selfish agendas with considerably more energy than is seen in their 
commitment to their constituents (Choi, 2004).  Since the public sector is closely 
related to a country‟s political context; hence, the relationship might trigger a conflict of 
interests (Mayston, 1992). This is consistent with that of Abdullah and Asmara (2006), 
who noted the occurrence of opportunistic behaviour by local parliamentarians in order 
to satisfy their needs.  Therefore, if an agency urges that the budget be spent, the agency 
must face the consequences: “time restrictions make expenditure higher, as expenditure 
must be prepared in only three months” (SPO 10). However, in order to deal with this 
problem, an officer may try a risky way to manage the budget through estimation and 
planning, including regarding the procurement processes being undertaken in advance. 
Yet the expenditure must only be carried out after receiving approval from the local 
parliament, as expressed in the following statement: “I will spend more than budgeted, 
which includes the budget surplus in this spending, but implementation of the spending 
of the budget surplus must be suspended until approval from the local parliament” 
(SOA 3).    
 
5.6. Summary 
 This chapter presents descriptions of a range of planning processes 
implemented by local government agencies. It also considers geographic, demographic 
and socio-cultural conditions, which vary in every region and which also affect planning 
processes. Therefore, this chapter emphasises how the planning processes are affected 
by socio-cultural variables and values inherited from the previous era; behaviour and 
values that have been institutionalised in local government officials. In addition, 
demographic conditions must be considered in this study, as demographic factors also 
have an effect on socio-cultural change. Therefore, the sampled regions in this study are 
categorised as rural, semi-urban and urban areas.  
 
  The findings of this study indicate the importance of the head of an agency as 
the leader in its organisation. However, public servants in rural areas tend to rely 
heavily on the head of the agency, a role whose importance decreases in urban areas, 
where the officials tend to work independently in an environment that also tends to be 
more egalitarian. This study also found that every sampled agency implemented the 
same approach to instructing subordinates; an action that is performed through apel or 
formal ceremony. This regular practice was designed to establish the loyalty of 
government officials, and emphasises the hierarchical relationship between superior and 
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subordinates rather than the managerial skill or leadership of the head of a local 
government agency. Such a notion will become an obstacle to the creation of an 
egalitarian atmosphere in Indonesia‟s government offices, which is apparent in the rural 
areas that are less egalitarian than the urban regions. 
 
  Regarding the mechanism of procurement planning, each region also 
encounters different problems. In the rural regions, the most apparent issue is a lack of 
certified procurement staff to handle procurement processes. Meanwhile, in the semi-
urban and urban regions, civil servants are trying to deal with the dynamics of a society 
that is changing at a rapid pace. However, all the regions encountered a common issue: 
the involvement of local society/communities in designing procurement planning, via 
MUSRENBANG, as required by regulations.  Local input is „taken on board‟ in order to 
meet the requirement of regulations, rather than actually obtaining real input from local 
society. Moreover, the unavailability of the integrated database that is needed for 
technical planning and blacklisted vendors also raises another troublesome issue for 
local governments. 
 
  Dealing with procurement makes the local government agency the centre point 
of pressure from many parties, such as the civil society organisation, the ombudsman, 
the district attorney, the police, the BPK (Indonesian supreme auditor), and the local 
parliament; this encourages the local government agency to give up all selection 
processes to the ULP. This arrangement is expected to reduce the unwanted 
psychological pressure and stress being experienced by the agency officials. Regarding 
relationships with the local parliament, on one side the local government officials are 
required to meet the budget; on the other side, they must deal with amendments to the 
budget that are approved in the last quarter of each fiscal year by the local parliament, 
which gives them only a very limited time in which to complete the capital expenditure 
project.  
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Chapter 6 
Summary Discussion of Key Findings 
 
 This study has identified the most influential parties, and how those parties 
affect capital expenditure control at the local government level, based on the perception 
of local government officials.  Respectively, this study has specified many parties 
involved in stages of capital expenditure decision-making, both formal institutions and 
non-formal bodies, along with various interests as outlined in Chapter 4.  Then, this 
study demonstrated that every party tends to use its power to achieve its own ends, and 
explored how local government officials deal with those intentions, as discussed in 
Chapter 5.  The empirical results demonstrate that various intentions from various 
parties tend to either strengthen or weaken the control mechanisms in many ways, 
which is summarised in this chapter. 
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 Bureaucratic reforms initiated in 1999 affect many aspects of government, both 
at national and sub-national level.  One reform initiative was related to decentralisation, 
which gives more independence to local government to control and authorise their own 
expenditure.  It means that currently local government has broader decentralisation and 
manages much more funding than in the previous era. In the previous era (the “New 
Order” regime) ministers were highly reliant on decisions made by the president.  
Structurally, the ministries were based on a military model, because the president and 
most of the ministers had a military background, while governors and heads of 
municipalities also tended to have a military background. Furthermore, the influence of 
the president on parliament was enormous, which made the position of the president 
very strong.  In this condition, based on hierarchical military order, the president was 
able to coordinate national and sub-national levels.  Rivalry among ministries was 
unlikely because it could be eliminated by intervention from the president.  Hence, 
military hierarchical order was an important aspect of control and coordination in the 
“New Order” regime.   
 
 After the reformation, direct elections were introduced for the appointment of 
the president, vice president and heads of local governments, at both provincial and 
municipal levels.  Consequently, the president, vice president and heads of local 
government come from diverse backgrounds.  Ministers could be chosen based on 
merit, with the result that many professionals were chosen to be ministers. The military 
hierarchical order that had been established by the “New Order” regime could not be 
implemented in the post-reformation era.  Moreover, the intervention of political parties 
at the ministerial level has made interrelationships among ministries more complex than 
in the previous era, which was dominated by a single party.  Hence, new mechanisms of 
control and coordination are urgently required in this era to supersede the military 
hierarchical control. 
 
 This study has shown that many local government officials of sampled regions 
perceived competition among regulators as an attempt by ministries to dominate local 
government in an expression of the „power‟ of central government.  One of the attempts 
at domination is represented by the issue of ministerial decrees in relation to local 
government expenditure: the main ministries, which hold responsibility for local 
government, tend to establish their domination by decree, although in several aspects 
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the ministerial decree might contradict decrees from other ministries, as indicated by 
several government officials.   
 
 The other attempt at domination, especially by a ministry relating to a 
particular local government agency, comes in the form of giving a grant to the related 
agency, which use to be in form of fixed assets.  The local government agencies deal 
with receiving equipment from related ministries as the programme of a particular 
ministry is implemented.  The allocation of equipment in some cases poses another 
problem for local government agencies; for example, the equipment may not fit with 
local government needs because they were not tailored to the geographical conditions of 
the local government.  Hence, the equipment is abandoned without use.  Equally, the 
specification of the assets may be inappropriate for the local government‟s current 
requirements and in some cases may not have been needed by the agency.  This 
situation occurs because a related ministry is required to meet its budget targets; the 
ministry must spend its budget, therefore they must issue a related local government 
agency with a grant in the form of fixed assets.  This can create situations that are quite 
problematic for the specific local government agency, as depicted by the interviewees in 
the Chapter 4. 
 
 In another case, there was a problem regarding recognition of the fixed assets 
in a local government‟s financial statement.  The fixed assets in a form of equipment 
coming from a ministry were delivered directly to local users without the related local 
government agency being notified.  Consequently, the equipment was recognised as an 
asset by the user in its financial statement, but not by the local government agency that 
oversees the recipient institution.  In a similar instance, equipment from related 
ministries were not officially handed over to a specific local government agency; the 
equipment therefore cannot be recognised as assets of that local government agency and 
cannot be maintained from that agency‟s local budget.  
 
 Two oversight bodies had been established during the “New Order” era, 
namely BPK (the Indonesia supreme auditor who act as the external auditor of central 
government) and BPKP (the internal auditor of central government).  Meanwhile, other 
oversight bodies were established during the reformation era.  During the “New Order” 
era, the roles of BPKP and BPK tended to overlap.  The BPKP, which was supposed to 
focus on internal controls and build financial systems, emphasised the audit function 
and thereby encroached on the BPK‟s area of authority.  All strategic sectors were 
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audited by the BPKP, such as oil and gas, the central bank, and state-owned enterprises.  
In this era, the role of the internal controller was concerned not only with financial 
control, institutional performance and corruption eradication attempts, but also the 
political or ideology orientation of government officials (Nasution, 2009).  Following 
the reformation agenda, the traditional roles of the BPK were reinstated and it assumed 
the position it is supposed to occupy.   
 
 Moreover, the GoI established several oversight bodies in light of the 
recommendation of the international institutions that has been imposed in the letter of 
intent (LoI).  For example, the LoI of 10
th
 April 1998 Par.15 endorses the 
implementation of a law relating to business competition as an attempt to enhance 
market efficiency by placing emphasis on fairness in business practices and the 
suppression of anticompetitive behaviour.  Later, this suggestion was realised and 
reinforced by the LoI of 16
th 
March 1999 Par.45, which prompted the GoI to establish 
the KPPU (Commission of Monitoring of Business Competition) in order to eliminate 
monopolistic practices and unhealthy competition.  Thus, the law placed more emphasis 
on the actual behaviour of businesses than on market structure, which is imposed by a 
judicial process along with penalties. 
 
 Another suggestion that was outlined in the LoI of 16
th 
March 1999 Par.40 was 
the introduction of the KPK (Commission of Anti-corruption), which was expected to 
be operational by early April 1999.  The KPK has responsibility for combating 
corruption in the public sector and reporting it to parliament, the Supreme Court and the 
president.  It was later endorsed by the LoI on 14
th 
May 1999 Par.31, which suggested 
that the law should be issued by 28
th 
May 1999 and become effective within six months, 
with the interim period to be used to strengthen the institutional infrastructure of the 
commission.  Another oversight body that was established during the reformation era 
was the PPATK (Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre) by 
referring to the LoI of 14
th 
May 1999 Par.41, with responsibility for preventing money 
laundering along with authorisation to obtain information about foreign exchange 
transactions, capital inflow and outflow to and from any financial institutions in 
Indonesia. 
 
 This study shows that all of these institutions have clearer roles during the 
reformation era than during the previous era, and that they complement each other.  
However, of the identified oversight bodies above, most local government officials pay 
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more attention to the BPK and the KPK than to the other oversight bodies.  None of the 
local government officials were aware of involvement of the KPPU and the PPATK in 
the control mechanisms.  Meanwhile, the BPKP is regarded as a working partner of 
local government officials, with whom they can discuss and seek consultation on any 
problems related to the implementation of rules and regulations.  However, local 
government officials tend to be very careful when engaging with either the BPK or the 
KPK, because these oversight bodies are perceived to have legal implications, as well as 
authority, if there are any suspicions of financial irregularities. 
 
 In addition, regarding stakeholder involvement, in the previous era the 
stakeholders did not have a significant role in any local government decision-making. 
Local society, NGOs and mass media did not have the opportunity to speak up about 
their needs or participate to control local government‟s spending.  Meanwhile, the 
vendor or contractor selected for a project was often closely related to a very important 
person in either local or central government.  None of the stakeholders criticised these 
practices.  However, empirical findings indicate that the current roles of stakeholders 
have become clearer following the reformation movement.  For example, roles of local 
society have been elevated, although in some cases it is still regarded as ceremonial in 
order to fulfil a regulatory requirement.  NGOs have also been endorsed, and 
consequently many new NGOs have been established in this era.  In addition, mass 
media is also guaranteed by freedom of the press to disseminate information to the 
public, and contractors are assured of fair competition when obtaining a project, because 
the KPPU has been established to support this practice, and stakeholders are actively 
involved in monitoring the procurement process. 
 
 This study shows that engagement of local government with the parties 
discussed above is conducted in various degrees of intensity in every stage of capital 
expenditure decision-making.  For example, in the stage of capital expenditure 
planning, implementation of new regulations relies heavily on the heads of local 
government agencies, a phenomenon that is more obvious in rural regions, where 
society still upholds traditional values.  Meanwhile, in semi-urban and urban regions, 
society is more egalitarian and therefore more willing to accommodate more dynamic 
relationships between superiors and subordinates. 
 
 On the other side, implementation of new regulations must be supported by 
competent and qualified staff, such as local government officers.  In order to realise this 
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target, the LKPP requires all staff who handle the procurement process to be certified as 
procurement officials.  However, conditions in many local governments, particularly in 
rural areas, make it quite difficult to satisfy the certification requirements, because of a 
lack of qualified personnel.  This problematic situation cannot be resolved immediately, 
as all local governments, except for the provincial government, are affected by a 
recruitment moratorium policy. The moratorium imposes the requirement that personnel 
expenditure should not constitute more than 50% of that government‟s total budget.  
From the sampled regions, only provincial government passed the threshold, i.e. the 
personnel expenditure was below 50% of local government‟s total budget, whereas 
municipal governments did not pass the threshold, thus hindering them from recruiting 
new government officials.  Therefore, the moratorium has inhibited the municipal 
governments‟ ability to meet the required number of officials that are needed for each 
local government agency based on job analysis results.  In consequence, the municipal 
governments are only able to allocate 75% - 80% of the job analysis results.    
 
 In addition to the implementation of new regulations, the central government, 
through its ministries, employs technologies in planning procurements, such as e-
planning.  Implementation of e-planning has advantages and disadvantages for local 
governments.  According to local government officials, the advantage of implementing 
e-planning is that it makes the planning process a lot easier, because the system has 
features to accommodate the complexities of the process.  Hence, the planning process 
can be undertaken faster than before, because the proposed procurements are directed to 
the relevant ministry as soon as the data have been entered into the system.  However, e-
planning also has disadvantages; for example, a local government agency must stick to 
the procurement allocation that has been determined under a particular ministry and put 
it into the system in a form acceptable to the available menu.  Any procurement 
proposal that deviates from the prescribed menu cannot be accommodated.  Another 
problem has been identified by local government officials, and particularly concerns 
those local government agencies under the watch of several different ministries; the 
implementation of different e-planning for different ministries is accompanied by a 
variety of different requirements. 
 
 Another challenge, particularly for the planning process in the semi-urban and 
urban regions, is that it must deal with the rapid development of local society, a change 
that needs to be accommodated in strategic planning (Renstra).  Inability to 
accommodate this development has resulted in the abandonment of either infrastructure 
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or equipment.  This problem was exemplified by an interviewee regarding the 
development of a bus station, which was used for less than five years after its 
completion because of the shifting preference of the local community from buses to 
private vehicles; the bus station was ultimately abandoned.  This case can be accounted 
for in two possible ways: one possibility is that the development was really needed but 
that a feasibility study conducted by the relevant agency did not consider the dynamic 
nature of local society; another possibility is that the development was not really 
necessary, but was merely undertaken in order to meet an expenditure target. 
 
 Involvement of local parliament is therefore needed to act as a counterpart to 
local government, particularly for giving input on the setting of budgets.  In the 
previous era there was only one ruler, justifying an authoritarian approach; however, 
through the reformation movement, the position and authority of parliament at national 
or sub-national levels have been reinforced.  The reformation has enabled the 
implementation of a multi-party policy, in which all members of local parliament are 
elected directly by local society.  Many people want to become members of parliament, 
spending considerable sums of money in order to be nominated by a political party. 
Consequently, where local parliaments were initially expected to meet the expectations 
of their constituents as an expression of the democratic model, in reality, the 
opportunistic behaviour of members of parliament is more likely to occur (Abdullah and 
Asmara, 2006).  This behaviour is particularly apparent in the approval process of the 
amendments of capital expenditure budget.  Since, the local parliament used to approve 
the local budget in the final quarter of a fiscal year, which places greater pressure on 
local government agencies.  This condition is common in the sampled regions, and it 
complicates the procurement processes, as the remaining time to undergo the 
procurement is only three months before the end of the fiscal year.  
 
 In Indonesia‟s reformation era, not only have the roles of local parliament been 
reinstated, but involvement of the local communities has also been encouraged; 
however, currently it is still at a superficial level, because a local government must stick 
to long-term planning instead of accommodating the aspirations of local society.  Thus, 
the engagement of local community members in many arrangements can be regarded as 
an attempt to comply with regulations merely in order to legitimise the local 
government‟s planning; that is, long-term planning with little consideration of feedback 
from local society.   
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  In this context, planning officials need to know what infrastructure has been 
constructed in order to be able to plan a more integrated development.  However, the 
database of the local government‟s infrastructure is not available at the moment, which 
complicates planning and inhibits the development of subsequent infrastructure or 
maintenance planning for that infrastructure.  In addition, the database is required 
because each local government adjoins other regions, and it is necessary to determine 
what belongs to whom.  Thus, a local government will be able to make an allocation 
from its local budget for subsequent development, if required, or for the regular 
maintenance of that government‟s infrastructure.  A further example concerns the 
maintenance of a road connecting two local governments, with the two sides of the road 
each maintained by a different government. 
 
 Regarding infrastructure in relation to other local governments, pressure tends 
to escalate when infrastructure affects another local government‟s income.  This is 
exemplified by interviewees in this study who pointed out that the existence of a bus 
station in one area affected another local government‟s income, as the bus station is a 
source of income for the local government thanks to a levy on buses that pass through 
the station.  The bus station was built right in the border, preventing others regions from 
building another bus station within a certain range.  All the issues that might arise 
between the sampled local governments are resolved by the provincial government that 
oversees and administers these municipal governments.   The provincial government 
established a joint secretariat to settle any issues that might arise among the overseen 
local governments.   However, difficulties tend to become more complicated when those 
issues involve local governments from other provinces, because there is no specific 
institution to accommodate a conflict of this nature.  It has to be resolved by involving 
the MoHA (the Ministry of Home Affairs). 
 
 Subsequently, the second stage of capital expenditure is the selection of a 
supplier or contractor. This can be undertaken in two different ways; by a procurement 
official in each local government agency, or procurement by a specific organisational 
unit of local government, such as the ULP.  In the first method, procurement is handled 
by an official of a local government agency, and this is applicable when the value of 
procurement is less than IDR200 million.  This value is regarded as considerable, 
especially for rural areas or regions covering a small area.  Consequently, a lot of the 
procurement of assets is still handled by local government agencies.  However, a 
differing perspective from a government official suggests that the threshold of 
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procurement might incite misbehaviour regarding the procurement process.  A local 
government agency can split a „big‟ project into several „small‟ projects in order to 
enable collusion with suppliers/contractors.   
 
 In the second method, procurement is carried out by the ULP that is established 
in every local government and which applies different approaches to accomplishing the 
task of procurement.  The level and quality of implementation of the ULP in each local 
government therefore varies. The ULP in each local government is overseen by the 
LKPP. The establishment of this body was intended to suppress collusion between local 
government and private sector officials, which used to occur frequently and was 
regarded as common practice.   In addition, some officials of local government agencies 
perceive the procurement unit to be necessary in order to reduce the psychological 
pressure caused by the procurement process, as all such processes are now handled by 
the ULP.  However, this effort is still in its early stages and needs to be improved in 
terms of the applied system and the personnel behind the system.      
 
 For the selection of suppliers, one of the supporting systems needed by 
procurement officials, both in the ULP and in local government agencies, is an 
integrated database of blacklisted suppliers.  Currently, this kind of database is not 
available and the „black‟ supplier might therefore be able to operate across local 
governments under different corporations, sometimes by „hiding‟ behind another 
person‟s name as the manager or administrator of the corporation.  By employing this 
modus operandi the supplier cannot be detected by the current system, and regulations 
cannot resolve this issue as it is not regarded as breaking the regulations. An official of 
a local government agency gave the following example: a corporation won an auction, 
but it was suspected that the corporation was operated by one of blacklisted supplier; 
the auction result was therefore annulled.  As a result, the corporation appealed against 
the local government‟s decision on the basis that the business was administered under a 
different name than that of the „blacklisted‟ supplier.  However, the local government 
were able to prove their suspicion and upheld the decision.  Meanwhile, the 
involvement of professional bodies, such as the Indonesia Contractors Association, in 
regulating its members is still very low.  Actually, officials of local governments expect 
more engagement from professional bodies in providing input regarding this ethical 
issue and in imposing professional sanctions on any member who breaks their 
professional code of ethics or regulations.  
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 The third stage of the process occurs after a supplier or contractor has been 
appointed: the supplier must sign a work contract before proceeding with their work.  
There are three external contractors involved in a project: a planning consultant, a 
construction contractor and a supervising consultant.  The contractors also must provide 
a financial deposit, which varies depending on the value of the contract, as a 
precautionary measure in case the contractor fails to fulfil their obligations.  The 
procurement official sets the terms of completion for every project; if the contractor 
cannot meet the terms of completion, then that contractor will be fined.  The planning 
contractor is responsible for providing detailed technical drawings of a project, which 
will be realised by the construction contractor.  In several cases, particularly in relation 
to the construction contractor, one of the main explanations for an inability to meet the 
terms of completion of construction was that the prices of building materials increased 
far more rapidly than expected, and the contractor was therefore unable to continue their 
work.  Consequently, the contractor had to pay a fine and the project was listed again 
for auction.  During the course of construction, every stage is supervised by the 
supervising contractor, who is responsible for providing procurement officials with 
reports on the progress of the project. In addition, construction can be unofficially 
monitored by users of the building, by members of local society who are affected by the 
project, or by NGOs.  Any input or feedback from those parties can be accommodated, 
provided it meets with local government‟s technical and financial conditions. 
Otherwise, the project will be constructed based on the initial plan.  Any discrepancies 
that might arise between technical planning and real conditions will be resolved by a 
meeting between the planning consultant, contractor and supervising consultant.  This 
meeting will determine who will be held responsible for the discrepancies.  
 
 Besides the technical supervision, administrative supervision is conducted by 
an inspectorate, which is a local government agency that is responsible for being the 
internal auditor of local government.  This agency is responsible for providing input on 
procurement processes by referring to current regulations; the inspectorate is 
approachable by any local government agency that needs to consult it regarding 
particular regulations.  However, several officials of local government agencies perceive 
the inspectorate to be failing to employ a proactive approach.  One reason for the 
inspectorate‟s difficulties is the insufficient number of personnel to cover all local 
government agencies.  The role of the inspectorate as a local government‟s internal 
auditor is also supported by the BPKP, as the internal auditor of Indonesia‟s central 
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government. The BPKP has established a good relationship with local government 
agencies, according to many local officials.  The BPKP works hand in hand with the 
inspectorate to supervise administrative tasks performed by local government agencies 
in terms of compliance with regulations. Furthermore, the auditing of all aspects of 
procurement, including planning, implementation and constructed assets, is the 
responsibility of the BPK as Indonesia‟s supreme auditor, acting as an external auditor 
in this sense.  This institution audits the „fairness‟ of all procurement processes, as well 
as assessing the „fairness‟ of the relationship between the value of the contract and the 
constructed asset.  In this audit, the value of the constructed asset will be checked 
physically.  However, not all projects are audited by the BPK, as the number of BPK 
auditors is very limited compared to the vast numbers of local government agencies 
throughout Indonesia.  Hence, the BPK mostly focuses on high value projects in 
particular local government areas.  Being audited by the BPK is regarded as a key 
concern for officials of local government agencies, particularly for officials of finance 
departments, as any serious mistake will affect the auditor‟s opinion and could be 
followed up on by the KPK if the BPK found any indications of corruption in a project.  
Any such suspicion might therefore negatively affect the career of the local government 
agency official in the future.  
 
 Currently, informal bodies also play an important role in safeguarding 
procurement processes. One of the informal interested parties is the NGOs.  
Engagement of NGOs has become more active after the reformation era; NGOs are now 
able to monitor local government budgets and the implementation of those budgets. In 
particular, capital expenditure draws the attention of the NGOs, as it involves a vast 
amount of money.  NGOs in several cases have approached a particular local 
government agency to „discuss‟ the local government‟s implementation process, which 
puts more pressure on local government agencies to behave correctly.  Therefore, 
officials of local governments need to be able to settle the NGO-initiated issue 
persuasively.  Another source of informal monitoring is the mass media, which has also 
been affected by the reformation movement and now has more freedom to convey 
information to the public.  An officer from a local government agency offered an 
example of when the mass media exposed a „suspect project‟ based on a reporter‟s 
suspicion.  It attracted attention not only from local society but from many other parties, 
such as the BPK, the district attorney and the police; thus, the project was probed.  
Currently, these two informal bodies (NGOs and mass media) are considered to be very 
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influential in shaping perceptions of asset procurement within local society.  
Meanwhile, the involvement of the district attorney and the police may be less than 
transparent, as suggested by an officer who implied that the involvement of the two 
authorities was motivated by a desire to get „money‟, in order to ensure that the case 
would not be further investigated.  Hence, in these conditions, a local government must 
be able to deal with many parties‟ interests, both legitimate and otherwise.   
 
 To sum up, this chapter has discussed the external parties affecting local 
governments‟ decisions in capital expenditure, including regulators, oversight bodies 
and stakeholders. In relation to the regulators, many local government officials 
perceived uncoordinated interaction among them, suggesting that they tended to 
compete with each other.  Consequently, some regulations tend to overlap each other 
and raise confusion for the local government officials. This situation has been triggered 
by attempts at administrative domination by each ministry, because the ministries are 
headed by ministers with varying backgrounds and political loyalties. Regarding 
oversight bodies, most of the local government officials perceive that their work is more 
organised and that the separation of responsibilities tends to be distinctive.  From the 
five oversight bodies identified by the local government officials, two oversight bodies 
are perceived to have a great impact on the way local government officers undertake 
their work.  These oversight bodies are the BPK and the KPK.  The third party is the 
stakeholders, who have their own agendas, which they try their utmost to pursue.  
 
 These external parties affect the internal elements of local government in many 
ways, particularly in the procurement stages, including planning, selection of 
contractors, acquiring assets, and monitoring of the procurement stages. In the planning 
stage, several issues have been highlighted, which are detailed as follows:  
 the dominant roles of heads of local government agencies,  
 the implementation of new regulations alongside software application issued by 
each ministry,  
 receiving assets from related ministries,  
 the importance of competent and qualified staff to deal with the procurement 
process,  
 engagement with local society and local parliament, and  
 availability of an infrastructure database.   
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 After the planning has been approved by the local parliament, the local 
government selects suppliers or contractors in a variety of ways, depending on the value 
of assets.  The selection process will be handled either by the ULP or by an official 
from a local government agency.  However, the selection of suppliers or contractors 
poses problems, specifically in terms of the availability of a database of blacklisted 
suppliers and a detrimental lack of involvement by professional bodies in dealing with 
this issue.  Finally, after a supplier or contractor has been selected, the project is 
executed.  The procurement of infrastructure in construction is a more complicated 
process than the procurement of equipment, because planning consultants, contractors 
and supervising consultants are involved.  Therefore, this type of procurement becomes 
the main focus of attention for both formal and informal bodies, i.e. the inspectorate, the 
BPKP, the BPK, NGOs, local society, mass media, the district attorney and police 
officers with various (not always legal) interests as well. 
 
 In the next chapter, patterns of the interaction of external parties with elements 
of local government are depicted with reference to the historical development of local 
government administration, which is framed from a Foucauldian perspective.     
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
Connecting Theory, Values and Practices 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 This study has been conducted within the context of bureaucratic reforms that 
delegate more authority to the local government level, and the intention of the central 
government to establish mechanisms of financial control, particularly on capital 
expenditure.  The findings of this study indicate the involvement of many parties 
affecting the control mechanisms of capital expenditure at various levels, which 
influence the dynamics of local government organisation.  Indonesia‟s local 
governments intend to provide infrastructure in order to stimulate economic 
improvement within the local government. Therefore, this proportion of the capital 
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expenditure has been increased and become the second largest allocation after the 
routine spending. As capital expenditure involves vast sums of money, it attracts many 
parties to get involved in the capital expenditure processes alongside their various 
interests. Every party tries to exercise their power in the processes, which puts more 
pressures on local government officials.   
 
 Within this study, mechanisms of capital expenditure control have been 
investigated, not only as a discourse, but as real practices alongside the real impact they 
have, particularly on the involvement of many parties and the power relations among 
those parties.  This study employs a Foucauldian perspective as the method of 
investigation, as this perspective focuses on approaches to the governance of self and 
others.  In addition, this study is related to a government institution that is very sensitive 
to laws and regulations; this study therefore applies updated regulations and laws as 
references.  An extensive study on laws and regulations in this study is conducted and 
considered as secondary data to support the primary data. 
 
 This chapter contextualises current practices of mechanisms of capital 
expenditure control in sampled local government areas, which is reflected in the data 
produced, along with interpretations of the findings based on a Foucauldian perspective 
and historical views on the practices.  
 
 
 
7.2. Impact of Each Party on Capital Expenditure Control 
 Power relationships within organisations are regarded as very complex in 
nature and there are no specific tools for studying them.  However, Foucault suggested 
that there are two models of power: legal or legitimate power, and the institutional 
model.  Furthermore, regarding the analytical work of the power relation, Foucault 
suggested considering conceptualisation of particular objectification.  The 
conceptualisation encompasses critical thought and constant review of phenomena of 
objectification based on historical conditions and current reality.  Hence, 
conceptualisation becomes the main basis of analytical work (Foucault, 1994, p.327).  
Another alternative approach to investigating power relationships is suggested by 
Foucault, and is regarded to be a more empirical method, more reflective of current 
conditions; it uses analysis of the form of resistance as a starting point.  The resistance 
is used to identify the position of a particular party and the methods being used 
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(Foucault, 1994, p.329).  Therefore, the following figure depicts the interrelationship 
among parties and the power exercised among those parties, together with the impact of 
those aspects on functions of capital expenditure control of local government. 
Moreover, historical conditions are also considered in order to give insight into the 
current conditions. 
Figure 7.1. Interrelationships of the many aspects affecting the capital expenditure 
control 
Political Factor
(Local Parliament)
Function of organisation in capital 
expenditure decision-making:
         - Planning
         - Execution
         - Monitoring
Ensuring objectives of control system by 
oversight bodies:
   - Safeguarding financial resources
   - Compliances with laws and regulations
Formal:
- Structure of organisation
- Human resources policies
Informal:
- Beliefs
- Values
- Norms
- Culture
External Parties
(Stakeholders)
Factors affecting internal aspects of 
local government
Source: Original 
This figure illustrates the roles of several parties in capital expenditure control of local 
government, including the oversight bodies that both directly and indirectly affect the 
process by influencing internal aspects of local government.  Likewise, the stakeholders 
and political factors also exert direct and indirect influence.  Meanwhile, the internal 
factors of local government, which are shaped formally by the laws and regulations 
imposed by central government bodies and informally by pressure from local 
stakeholders and political factors, affect the implementation of capital expenditure 
decisions. The internal factors comprise formal aspects, including the structure of an 
organisation and the human resources policies in place within that organisation. Also 
involved in the decision-making process are informal factors, such as beliefs, values, 
norms and culture.  Further elaboration of the interrelationships of all these components, 
as presented in the figure above, is contained in the following sections.   
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7.3. Achieving the Objectives of the Control Systems 
 Establishing control systems in Indonesian local government is started by 
issuing laws and regulations, some of which need to be further elaborated on by 
presidential or ministerial decree.  These control systems involve three main parties: (i) 
ministries, as the representation of central government; (ii) the BPK, in its role as 
external auditor of the central government; and (iii) the BPKP acting as the internal 
auditor of central government.  The laws and regulations are implemented in local 
government areas, and the local governments need to adhere to these in an attempt to 
safeguard financial resources and to control and prevent corruption.  Thereafter, the 
laws and regulations become points of reference from which the auditors undertake their 
assignments, and they must be regularly reviewed and revised in accordance with the 
dynamics of government organisation.  Thus, the imposition of moral values, stricter 
methods of surveillance and more efficient techniques for gathering information are also 
developed in order to eliminate corruption and fraud.  As modus operandi of illegal 
practices will develop continually and involving more complex mechanism (Foucault, 
1977); hence, the methods and techniques need to be reviewed and developed 
continually as well.   
 
 Engagement of those parties in the capital expenditure of local government 
impacts the local government, both in formal ways, such as organisational structure and 
human resources policies, and informal ways, linked to the beliefs, values, norms and 
culture within the local government organisation. One of the formal aspects affected is 
organisational structure, which is exemplified by the establishment of a special unit to 
provide procurement services in accordance with Presidential Decree 106/2007; 
however, the level and quality of implementation of the decree varies across the 
sampled regions. The establishment of the ULP has been endorsed in order to improve 
the transparency of procurement processes, as the ULP involves cross-functional 
officers from local government agencies.  This approach can be perceived as an attempt 
by central government to adjust mechanisms of power through adaptation and 
refinement of the local government body, which is initially fully responsible for the 
procurement of fixed assets, by establishing a special unit.  The special unit is placed 
under surveillance so that everyday behaviour, identity, activity, and policy can be 
monitored by the head of local government at the local government level, and by the 
LKPP in central government level (Foucault, 1977). This idea places emphasis on 
hierarchical surveillance, as in a military camp in which the layout, number of tents and 
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direction of tents are all precisely mapped, enabling superiors to exercise their power 
(Macintosh, 2002).  
 
 The Indonesian local government has adopted the idea of hierarchical 
authority, especially in the establishment of the ULP as a special unit for procurement, 
which is intended to be the sole method of procurement and to enable local 
governments to optimise their procurement processes, particularly for high-value 
procurement.  Thus, the head of local government and heads of local government 
agencies can monitor the processes of capital expenditure through this unit.  Several 
heads of local government agencies chose to hand over their agency procurements to the 
ULP rather than be audited by the BPK.  The BPK is regarded as a highly influential 
and powerful institution that could, under certain circumstances, endanger an official‟s 
future career.  It is therefore better to avoid it than to confront it.  In addition, the 
involvement of cross-functional officers from many local government agencies is 
expected to strengthen the ULP, as each section is occupied by the highest quality 
officer from each local government agency.  The highest quality of officials for the ULP 
is necessary, as this unit encounters many pressures from many parties.  However, 
although the establishment of the ULP has been endorsed since 2007, the 
implementation of this unit is still in the early stages because of a lack of qualified 
officers to handle procurement processes. 
 
 The second formal aspect of local government decision-making is the issue of 
human resources policies.  Of particular relevance are the moratorium on local 
government officials, the complexity of and difficulties related to the dismissal of 
government officials, and the long-established emphasis on seniority instead of 
meritocracy.  These examples pose diverse problems for local governments.  In order to 
deal with these human resources policy issues, it is suggested that an institution 
employing a supervisory hierarchy should adopt normalising sanctions, such as those 
that are or were employed in schools, military establishments, prisons, hospitals, 
factories, and other state bureaucracies (Macintosh, 1994, p.226).  Furthermore, 
Macintosh (1994) suggested that sanctions are designed to motivate officers in order to 
achieve higher levels of competence and to reduce the gap between norms and actual 
behaviour.  Regarding human resources policies, the central government needs to give 
more attention to sanctions and penalties that can be used to normalise the behaviour of 
local government agencies.  For example, current policies are insufficient when it comes 
to the issue of dismissing a government official.  It is very difficult to dismiss a 
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government official unless he/she has been convicted, with severe punishment, in a 
court of law. Any violation of rules will only be punished leniently by local government 
agencies, each of which will apply different policies on sanctions based on the 
discretion of the head of the local government agency or the head of local government.  
This leniency of punishment is highly influenced by local culture, which tends to avoid 
confrontation, especially with senior officers. 
 
 The most common approach to establishing a relationship and exercising 
power by superiors over subordinates is through formal ceremonial behaviour, known 
as apel, which is used to convey any messages or instructions from a superior to his or 
her subordinates.  This practice originated in the 19
th
 century, when it was used by 
government officers (called priyayi) and was known as seba. This practice was intended 
to show the devotion of government officials to the monarch.  It signified the 
availability of the priyayi to serve and receive any instructions from the monarch or a 
superior.  Moreover, it also had the political dimension of showing submission towards 
authority and the rule of superiors, thus emphasising the formal relationship between 
subordinate and superior (Moertono, 2009).        
 
 To date, the seba practice is still preserved in government offices, which can be 
perceived as helping to maintain and affirm the importance of formal relationships.  It is 
reasonable to conclude that Indonesia still has a significant power imbalance between 
superiors and subordinates (Hofstede, 1994).  This relationship puts the leader at the 
centre of an organisation, as confirmed by many interviewees; thus, development in an 
organisation depends heavily on the position of the leader.  This situation sees the 
leader, or superiors in general, as immune from criticism from subordinates, as 
expressed in a common joke: „Rule number 1, superior never makes a mistake; rule 
number 2, if superior made a mistake, please refer to rule number 1‟.  This joke 
cynically renders anyone in a lower position subject to, and subjected to, the „perfect 
and faultless‟ individual in the higher position. 
 
 Apart from formal and observable impacts, imposing laws and regulations also 
impacts a local government‟s beliefs, values, norms and culture.  An example of this is 
the drive to improve transparency and disclosure of information to the public, as 
required in law 14/2008.  This law requires government officials to deal with many 
stakeholders who are interested in particular pieces of information; a practice that has 
never been done before.   Hence, in order to understand an institution from a 
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Foucauldian perspective, one must not only relate to its legal formal character, but also 
become involved in its composition of government officials and the patterns of 
behaviours associated with it (Bevir, 1999).  The institution can be understood by the 
ideas or concepts that characterise it.   Furthermore, Bevir (1999) exemplifies this 
notion using the character of a state, which can be understood from its ideas of 
sovereignty, discipline and pastorship.  Likewise, the concept of pastorship can be 
grasped from values, ideas and practices developed within the Christian church (Bevir, 
1999, p.352).   
 
 Referring to the findings of this study from the perspective of pastorship, local 
government officials, as governed individuals, can be regarded as members of a flock 
who need to be led along, with certain rights attached to them (Burchell, 1991).  
Furthermore, he described this as “children to be corrected and educated, as part of a 
natural resource to be exploited, or as living beings who are part of a biological 
population to be managed” (Burchell, 1991, p.120). In this concept, the local 
government official, as an individual, is required to internalise various values and norms 
that are contained in the laws and regulations of various oversight bodies as external 
entities.  In this case, the central government bodies must be able to impose and 
internalise new values concerning transparency that make it much more prudent for 
local government officials to execute procurement decisions in order to comply with all 
laws and regulations; otherwise, the local government official will face sanctions for 
deviation from those laws and regulations.  Since the local government officials are 
concerned with their own wellbeing, they strive to regulate themselves in accordance 
with the dictates of that external body by scrutinising their own behaviour for signs of 
„sin‟ or abnormality, as defined by the powers that be (Bevir, 1999, pp.349-350).  This 
condition shows that, because they holding the power, the central government bodies 
see the local governments as „subjects‟, which can be defined in two ways:(i) as being 
subject to another party through control and dependency; and (ii) as being subject 
because of consciousness of identity or self-knowledge. The subjectification can be 
studied based on mechanisms of exploitation and domination among related parties 
(Foucault, 1994, pp.331-332). 
 
 The subjectification of local government is settled when the central 
government issues regulation regarding fiscal balance (UU 33/2004), which emphasises 
the implementation of fiscal balance mechanisms through DBH (Dana Bagi Hasil / 
Revenue sharing), DAU (Dana Alokasi Umum / Generally allocated fund), and DAK 
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(DanaAlokasi Khusus / Specifically allocated fund).  Through these mechanisms, local 
government has a fairly strong dependence on central government.  Particularly, since 
capital expenditure is mostly funded by the DAK; hence, engagement with central 
government via related ministries for decisions of capital expenditure is immense.  Any 
decisions regarding capital expenditure must be in line with the priorities of the related 
ministry. 
 
 From Foucault‟s perspective, the role of oversight bodies can be identified as 
being that of „police‟.  Historical definitions of police are different from a current or 
contemporary definition (Foucault, 2007).  In the sixteenth century, „police‟ was 
defined as an agency that serves the splendour of the entire state and the happiness of all 
its citizens.  The agency used a set of laws and regulations to establish and strengthen 
the power of the state (Foucault 2007, p.314).  In Indonesia today, the „police‟ concept 
relates to the roles of two oversight bodies: the BPK, acting as the government‟s 
external auditor, and the BPKP, acting as the government‟s internal auditor.  In 
addition, the KPK comes onto the scene as a new and powerful institution designed to 
deal with, control and eradicate collusion and corruption.  In its role as internal auditor, 
the BPKP engages intensively with local government officials to give input regarding 
compliance with laws and regulations.  Although they build good trusting relationships 
with local government officials, the BPKP officials are rotated regularly in order to 
avoid the possibility of collusion with those local government officials.  Similarly, the 
BPK officers, as external auditors, are rotated even more often than the BPKP officers. 
The BPK is responsible for auditing the implementation of capital expenditure and 
recording all transactions according to government accounting standards.  From their 
records the BPK later produce audit opinions regarding the validity and fairness of the 
financial statements of local governments.  As well as a standard financial audit, if 
necessary the BPK might also conduct a forensic audit.  In addition, if the BPK audit 
finds any irregularities in a project‟s procurement, the BPK can hand the details over to 
the KPK, the anti-corruption committee.  The KPK will then investigate further and 
formally undertake prosecution in the anti- corruption court. 
 
 Moreover, attempts to control the behaviour of local government officials are 
also undertaken by related ministries in the form of implementing the application of 
planning software when dealing with capital expenditure.  From a Foucauldian point of 
view, such attempts can be regarded as applications of disciplinary power based on a 
panopticon model, which is described as a constant surveillance system (Foucault, 
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1977).  The main intent behind this method is to define, control and regulate individuals 
who are subjects of regimes of power (Bevir, 1999, p.352).  The implementation of 
mechanisms of control of capital expenditure, through the employment of a particular 
software application as a device of a related overseeing ministry, can be perceived as an 
imposition of disciplinary power.  The assets that are to be procured have been pre-
determined by the relevant ministry along with all requirements related to supporting 
documentation without consideration on the local government agency‟s needs. 
 
 Macintosh (2002) divide the concept of disciplinary power into three aspects: 
disciplinary space, disciplinary time, and disciplinary body.  The first aspect of 
disciplinary power is „disciplinary space‟, which the software application provides by 
determining allocations and ensuring that any proposals other than those specified will 
not be accommodated.  The specific allocation will enable the ministry to manage 
capital expenditure.  Hence, it allows identifying the total budget, which is aimed to 
meet specified targets for budget spending.  Meanwhile, from the local government 
agency side, this practice will ensure a source of funding for a particular area of capital 
expenditure. The second aspect of disciplinary power is „disciplinary time‟, which 
requires each local government agency to set out a time frame of implementation of 
capital expenditure, enabling each concerned ministry to monitor the progress of local 
government agencies.  On the other side, a local government agency is induced to 
adhere to a time target, which compels the local government officials to act effectively 
and efficiently.   The third aspect of disciplinary power is „disciplinary bodies‟, which 
enable the monitoring, sanctioning and examination of a particular local government 
agency by a related ministry or ministries.  Implementation of capital expenditure is 
monitored by the related ministry, which can impose sanctions if it finds any 
irregularities.  If the related ministry suspects a potential irregularity, the ministry will 
send a team to scrutinise the issue before involving any other bodies, such as the BPKP 
and the BPK.  All of these aspects of disciplinary power reflect Bentham‟s panopticon 
mechanism: the tower in the centre of Bentham‟s prison building enabled a warden to 
monitor all cells around the tower.  In this analogy, the tower is the software application 
implemented by a ministry that enables the monitoring of every cell; that is, the 
monitoring of local government agencies from the capital city. By employing this 
practice, local government agencies can be constantly monitored by their related 
ministry or ministries.  
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7.4. Influence of Stakeholders and Political Power on Capital Expenditure 
7.4.1. Influence of Stakeholders 
 The social forces or stakeholders, represented by the engagement of local 
society, non-government organisations (NGOs) and professional bodies, affect practices 
in local government in two ways: the implementation of the capital expenditure process 
and influencing the internal dynamics of local government.  The idea of the 
empowerment of stakeholders in this era can be justified from the viewpoint that a 
person or an institution will not be able to encompass all aspects and that many areas 
will be neglected (Foucault, 1994, p.74).  This notion suggests that the human resources 
of the oversight bodies are very limited when compared to the number of local 
governments to be overseen and the numbers of regions in which they are located, 
scattered over many islands.  Therefore, empowering stakeholders is an alternative 
means of strengthening control over local governments. The formal forces are expected 
to give information to oversight bodies that can be followed up by further investigation 
if any suspicion of irregularities in procurement processes is found. 
 
 However, the influence of local society as the main stakeholder is still low, and 
any involvement is regarded by local government officers as an attempt to comply with 
regulations regarding the involvement of local society in the planning stage of local 
budget setting.  The local government bodies have the power to impose their plans on 
the local community, giving little consideration to the needs of local society.  This 
practice is in line with what was suggested by Foucault (1994): that discursive practices 
are not only related to producing a discourse, but also to imposing and maintaining that 
discourse in a form of technical ensembles, institutions, behavioural schemes, types of 
transmission and dissemination (Foucault 1994, p.12).  Referring to this notion, 
discourse about the requirement of involvement of local society in planning stage is 
facilitated by local government through a formal gathering, i.e. Musrenbang 
(Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan / Development planning meeting) or Jaring 
Asmara (Penjaringan Aspirasi Masyarakat / Collecting public aspirations/opinions).  In 
this case, a local government used the involvement of local society in the planning 
process as a discourse, which was followed by a technical ensemble in the form of 
Musrenbang or Jaring Asmara involving local society, political parties and other 
interested elements.  In this event, the local government communicated both their short- 
and long-term plans to local society instead of gathering and meeting local society‟s 
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needs.  By holding this event, the local government will be able to claim that local 
society was involved in the planning process, as required by regulation.  
 
 Actually this practice can be traced back to the seventeenth century, when 
Javanese society was divided into three classes.  The upper class comprised the king and 
noblemen; the middle class was abdi dalem (the king‟s servants as the lower middle 
class) and priyayi (the king‟s officials as the upper middle class); and the lowest class 
was the common people (Moedjanto, 1990; Moertono, 2009).  These classes are still 
preserved, especially in the relationships between government officials, previously 
represented by the priyayi class, with the public as the „common people‟.  Traditional 
perspectives suggest an absence of reciprocal obligation between superior and 
subordinate: “Any such system would have had to admit a formal reciprocity in political 
relationships, fundamentally alien to Javanese thinking” (Anderson, 1990).  Therefore, 
the higher class (priyayi or government official) might impose obligations on the 
common people. 
 
 The other stakeholder is NGOs, organisations that flourished after the 
reformation era.  The NGOs affect capital expenditure processes, particularly in the 
setting of local budgets, together with other local societies.  Moreover, the NGOs also 
become involved in monitoring particular projects that indirectly exert another source of 
pressure on local government officials.  This pressure can be seen as highly constructive 
if it convinces the official to adopt a new set of values in order to become more 
accountable and transparent. In this context, the local government encounters different 
elements of society, and therefore applies different approaches.  Foucault (1994) 
suggested that the transformation of discursive practices is affected in three ways: 
outside the discourse, reflected in the form of relationships with social and political 
institutions; within the discourse, such as techniques applied in order to determine 
object, refinement and adjustment of concepts; and alongside the discourse, by 
producing other discursive practices (Foucault 1994, p.12).  Since Indonesia‟s 
reformation era, there has been a discourse raised regarding strengthening the roles of 
local society through involvement in government decision-making.  The NGOs in 
particular are an important element of society.  Engagement of local governments with 
NGOs is quite intense, requiring local government officials to find good ways of 
dealing with them, as each NGO has a different agenda.  Some NGOs truly engage with 
local governments in the interests of local society and communities; but a few NGOs 
have agendas in place for their own good.  This pressure situation is exemplified the 
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case of a NGO intimidating a local government by threatening to expose an alleged 
irregularity in a project if the particular local government agency did not provide some 
money to the NGO.  This is powerful leverage, because if a case is exposed via mass 
media and gains public attention the local government agency has to make itself 
accessible to many concerned parties, including the BPK and the local attorney.   
Dealing with NGOs tends to be more complex than engaging with local society, as the 
NGOs have more knowledge related to public expenditure and government procedures 
than local society.  Hence, different approaches are necessary when dealing with these 
two groups. 
 
 Another stakeholder is professional bodies that are required to regulate their 
members in accordance with laws, regulations, customs and codes of ethics.  However, 
the roles of professional bodies are still low in terms of importance and effectiveness, 
and they do not meet the expectations of local government officials in terms of 
regulating their members.  This situation can occur as the result of lacking a system of 
communication as a means of exercising power; power that is supposed to be held by 
the professional bodies therefore cannot be exercised over its members (Foucault 1994, 
p.17).  When local government officials are dealing with the issue of an unreliable 
contractor, they perceive that the professional body does not have any power to control 
their member.  After a case occurred in one area, the unreliable contractor is still free to 
participate in procurement in other regions.  An integrated database is not available at a 
provincial level, but rather communication is conducted personally among local 
government officials.  Thus, attempts to restrict the movement of the unreliable 
contractor are still limited in their effectiveness.  
 
 Involvement of social elements, which are represented by local society, NGOs 
and professional bodies, not only affects the social values of local government, but also 
impacts the structural organisation of local governments and their human resources 
policies.  Consequently, the structure of the organisation in each local government is not 
the same.  This variation exists in order to accommodate the dynamics within each local 
government, which are very different, especially between rural and urban regions.  For 
example, the city of Yogyakarta established an agency, the DGBAD (Dinas Gedung, 
Bangunan, dan Aset Daerah), that is responsible for managing the fixed assets of the 
local government.  This agency was established initially as a response to input from 
local society regarding many assets of the local government that had not been identified 
and recognised in its financial statements.  This type of agency cannot be found in any 
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other local government in Indonesia.  The influence of local society on human resources 
policies is reflected in the initiatives of local governments to gather input from local 
society regarding any service provided by a particular local government official or an 
agency.  The local government provides forms, both online and via paper, to allow local 
society to assess the services that have been received.  In some cases the assessment of 
local society may affect the performance evaluation of an official, but there is no 
sanction imposed relating to that feedback.     
 
7.4.2. Influence of Political Power 
 Another issue relates to the role of political power, represented by the local 
parliament, in which the members are from various parties and are elected directly by 
local society.  In this context, basic decisions of the members of parliament are affected 
by several things, such as (i) by their party, for each party has its own agenda that must 
be enforced by its members. In addition, (ii) local society, as constituents of the MPs, 
should be accommodated in order to get their support. Finally, (iii) the members‟ 
interests dictate that each member of parliament has a duty of reciprocity to his/her 
political party in terms of financial support for that party.  Referring to these conditions, 
the members of parliament will have a tendency to exert his/her authority on local 
governments in order to achieve his/her interests.  Particularly in local budget setting, 
local government officials feel more pressure, and those officials need to be able to 
manage and deal with the many interests of the local parliament‟s members.  In 
particular, the setting of the local budget on capital expenditure is more complicated 
than other allocations in local budgets. As such, execution of capital expenditure needs 
more time than any other allocation, beginning with the selection of suppliers or 
vendors, execution of the procurement, and handing over the asset or assets to a 
particular local government agency. 
 
 Interaction with the local parliament does not structurally affect a local 
government organisation, but it influences the behaviour of local government officials.  
Particularly in budget setting, it leads to various reactions, especially when a local 
government is dealing with capital expenditures that are allocated from amendments to 
the local budget.  Those reactions are exemplified by certain officers, such as a 
government official finding a risky method, which does not comply with the legislated 
procedure, in order to meet the local government agency‟s budget spending target.  
Meanwhile, other local government officials avoid executing the procurement of any 
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assets, as time is regarded as being very limited, making the situation too risky to 
violate the regulations.  In consequence, these local government agencies could not 
meet their set budget spending targets.   
 
 The “New Order” regime has been ruling for more than 30 years over all areas 
of Indonesia, and it has undermined the position of parliament at both a national and 
sub-national level.  Under this regime, the position of parliament, either at a local or 
sub-national level, can be regarded as merely an ornament of democracy, powerless 
compared to the executive body.  The momentum of reformation has reinstated these 
parliaments, along with their power as legislative institutions.  Now the local parliament 
is able to exercise its power as a legislative body over a local government agency as an 
executive body.  On the other side, local government officials reacted to the 
objectification attempts in various ways, as described above, even if that meant taking 
risks.  From a Foucauldian perspective, this phenomenon can be understood by referring 
to two ways of logical thinking about power, one based on a legal model and one on an 
institutional model.  The local parliament in this case has a power base informed by 
both models.  The legal model posits that the members‟ positions have been legally 
recognised as legislative bodies referring to laws, while the institutional model 
recognises that they get formal support from local society in direct elections.  Therefore, 
the position of the local parliament is considered to be very strong and becomes a 
counterpart to the head of local government, who is also appointed through direct 
election.  However, as the positions of the local parliament and the head of local 
government are equal, the local parliament therefore cannot dismiss the head of local 
government.   
 
 The tendency to exercise power over lower level officers can be traced back to 
practices in the early 19
th
 century, which were observed by Raffles (2015).  If the 
Javanese was a person of rank, he tended to be very proud and slavish towards his 
superiors.    Meanwhile, toward his inferiors he would be mean, arrogant and despotic 
(Raffles, 2015, p.276).  Foucault suggested three modes of objectification that transform 
human beings into subjects.  The first mode is that people try to give themselves a 
particular status; the second mode is called “dividing practices”, in which the subject is 
either divided within himself or divided from others; and the final mode is that he turns 
himself into a subject (Foucault, 1994, p.326-327).  Referring to Raffles‟ observation 
and modes of objectification, the local parliament applies the second mode, dividing 
practices between “superior” and “subordinate”, although structurally there is no direct 
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link of responsibility between the local parliament and local government agencies.  
Raffles observed that Javanese people tended to be sensitive to praise or shame, and 
were ambitious in pursuing power and distinction.  Furthermore, in Javanese culture it 
was necessary for individuals to distinguish themselves as members of the privileged 
classes of society, and as therefore “different” from the common people.  Suffering 
from long oppression has injured the bright character of the common people, while the 
privileged class tend to constantly exercise an absolute dominion that is sometimes 
expressed in violence, deceit and gross sensuality.  Thus, in Javanese society, power can 
be clearly felt and seen; rank, wealth and authority can be identified easily, and different 
classes are noticeable (Raffles, 2015, p.287-288).  Today, the observations of Raffles 
are still relevant in understanding the inclination of the local parliament to exercise its 
power over local government agencies. 
 
7.5. Impact of Improvement of Internal Factors on Capital Expenditure 
Practices 
 There are two main aspects to the impact of the interrelationships of various 
parties on internal factors: the formal aspect that concerns organisational structure and 
human resources policies, and the informal aspect that focus on beliefs, values, norms 
and culture.  In this section, the discussion emphasises the informal aspect, as the formal 
aspect was discussed in the previous section in relation to formal bodies of central 
government.  The influence of central government bodies is reflected in engagement of 
ministries and oversight bodies with local government.  In addition, the local society‟s 
power over local government is signified by political forces that are reflected in local 
parliament, while social power is embodied by stakeholders consisting of local society, 
NGOs and professional bodies.  The influence of those factors on organisational beliefs, 
values, norms and culture can be identified by determining the differences between 
initial values and the current values applied by the local government officials. 
 
 Raffles (2015), in his book The History of Java, depicts the conditions and 
character of local society, particularly Javanese society.  In his observations, Raffles 
characterises the Javanese as having a despotic government, upholding feudalistic 
principles and being a patriarchal society.  The government based on feudalistic 
principles tends to disregard the common people, and some local aristocrats even 
considered the common people living in their areas as their slaves (Raffles, 2015).  
Currently, this over 200 year old phenomenon is being eroded by involving local 
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society in the process of local budget setting, although the engagement is still 
superficial.  Regarding Java‟s patriarchal society, Javanese tend to relies on the ruler 
(Pigeaud, 1967) “in Javanese culture rulers and noblemen occupied an important place 
in the centre of human society, and so their behaviour was a model for all” (Pigeaud, 
1967, p.72).  This characteristic of society is still preserved in local government 
practices, in which local government agencies rely heavily on the roles of heads of 
agencies.  However, this characteristic tends to diminish in urban regions, where local 
government officers work more independently than officers in rural areas.   
 
7.6. Summary 
 This study focuses on control of capital expenditure in Indonesian local 
government.  It is an interesting subject of study, as it involves a vast amount of money 
attracting many parties to participate in the decision-making process of capital 
expenditure.  This study has identified the parties involved, and also how those parties 
affect local government, either formally or informally.  Furthermore, this study has also 
identified the discourses instigated by each party that affect the control of capital 
expenditure.  Thus, in order to understand those discourses, this study applies 
Foucauldian perspectives to the interactions among parties in terms of how those 
discourses affect control systems, formal structure, procedures and organisational 
values. 
 
 The main issue found in this study is that the capital expenditure control of 
local government still needs to be addressed.  The involvement of oversight bodies 
imposing laws and regulations has affected local government directly and indirectly.  
The direct effect is on the phases of capital expenditure, while the indirect effect is 
influence through the internal aspects of local government that encompass 
organisational structure, procedures and values, which later affect capital expenditure 
processes.  The oversight bodies structurally related and have power to impose its 
power to local government.  Local government officials must follow all instructions 
from those bodies in order to adhere to regulations, although there have been some 
cases of resistance towards the imposed power. 
 
 In addition, this study also indicates the importance of stakeholders and 
political power in the form of the local parliament.  Likewise, these parties also affect 
the capital expenditure process in local government, both directly and indirectly.  The 
local parliament, as representation of political power, is legally able to exert its power 
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over local government, although structurally the local parliament has no relation to the 
local government.  However, the local parliament is a legislative body and a counterpart 
of local government, that acts as an executive body. Therefore, the local government 
must comply with the local ordinances that are ratified by local parliament. Another 
party is the stakeholders, which encompasses several parties; specifically local society, 
NGOs and professional bodies. Although involvement of this party institutionally has 
been accommodated by regulations, the local government tends to disregard its role. 
The local government‟s treatment of the stakeholders can be understood culturally, 
which engagement of the common people used to be neglected. 
 
 Referring to those indications, the local government tends to adhere to power 
based on a legal model rather than an institutional model.  The power based on a legal 
model is held by central government institutions, such as ministries and oversight 
bodies, and local institutions, such as the local parliament.  Meanwhile, the institutional 
model is signified by the involvement of stakeholders.  Thus, the implementation of an 
capital expenditure control mechanisms tends to be more of an administrative matters, 
such as compliance to the requirements set out by the formal bodies, and neglecting the 
roles of the non-formal bodies to strengthen the mechanisms of capital expenditure 
control.  The overall conclusion of this study is presented in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 8 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 Indonesia experienced a severe financial crisis when the value of its currency 
plummeted as a result of the Asian financial crash in late1997.  Consequently, many 
companies collapsed and the country‟s financial sector was paralysed.  In order to 
eliminate the negative effects of this crisis, the GoI invited international institutions, 
represented by the IMF, to intervene in order to restore the nation to something like pre-
crash conditions.  However, as a condition of the involvement of the IMF, the GoI had 
to sign several LoIs that must be implemented by the GoI.  The LoIs embraced 
reformation in many aspects, but their key purpose was to encourage enhancing 
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transparency and accountability in the GoI, as previously Indonesia had been ruled with 
an authoritarian style of leadership, which was opaque and unaccountable.   
 
 One of the LoI‟s programmes was decentralisation, which required the central 
government to devolve its authority to local governments.  As a result, nowadays local 
governments manage more power and resources than ever before; even capital 
expenditure decisions are now authorised and managed by the local government itself.  
In order to accommodate this situation, and to eliminate the possibility of financial 
irregularities, the GoI set control mechanisms by issuing regulations and empowering 
other parties to strengthen the controls.  
 
 The objectives of this study are therefore as follows: first, to describe the 
setting of control mechanisms of capital expenditure, and the influence of the new 
mechanisms on practices at local government level; second, to identify the engagement 
of any other parties and the impact of that engagement on established control 
mechanisms; and finally, to explore local government officials‟ perceptions of the 
involvement of such parties.  This study applies a Foucauldian perspective to analysing 
those changes and the interaction of these parties in attempts to strengthen control 
mechanisms of capital expenditure. 
 
 Referring to those objectives, this study encompasses several aspects of the 
implementation of new financial control mechanisms in Indonesia‟s local governments.  
The discussion begins at a time of intervention by international institutions, following 
the 1997 financial crisis, in an attempt to establish good governance.  The intervention 
of international institutions not only involved funding, but also introduced new systems 
that had to be implemented by the GoI.  The findings of this study indicate that 
introducing a new system into an organisation can trigger resistance from organisation 
members, including members of local governments.  Particularly in Indonesia, where 
the culture of government offices and officers is influenced by traditional and long-
standing aristocratic values, those government officials are perceived to be of higher 
status than ordinary people.  The government tends to be a closed organisation which is 
not transparent to members of the public, who are regarded as commoners.  Hence, 
introducing a new system that emphasises a culture of transparency and accountability 
has created high levels of resistance from civil servants, because the new system 
contradicts the old aristocratic culture that had been in place for decades. 
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 In an attempt to deal with this problem, the central government intends to 
involve professionals from the private sector who are perceived as being familiar with a 
transparent and accountable culture at ministerial level.  However, this move cannot be 
implemented within the lower levels of personnel, because the government‟s staffing 
system relies on seniority and prohibits hiring professionals (i.e. outsiders) for key 
positions, such as for heads of local government agencies.  Consequently, many 
programmes that have been designed cannot be implemented as intended.  All 
procedures are applied only as formalities in order to meet the pre-determined 
requirements; for example, the implementation of standard operating procedures (SOP) 
in every local government agency is applied based on the discretion of the head of that 
particular local government agency.    
 
 The main ministries have set up many programmes by issuing regulations in 
order to strengthen control mechanisms, although sometimes such actions raise 
confusion for local government officials because of overlapping, contradictions and 
redundancies contained in the issued regulations.  The confusion tends to increase in 
particular for local government agencies that are placed under several ministries in 
charge of a particular field or area.  Another issue related to ministries emerge when a 
particular ministry allocates equipment or other fixed assets to a local government 
agency even though the agency sometimes does not actually need that asset.  Just as 
problematic is when the allocation is not accompanied by an official letter handing over 
the equipment to the local agency; the equipment cannot therefore be recognised as an 
asset of the local agency and thus procedurally it cannot be maintained from the local 
government‟s budget.  Meanwhile, the equipment requires maintenance, but the related 
ministry does not provide funds for this.  The outcome of this is that the equipment will 
not be used, is used until it breaks, or is maintained using other sources of funding, 
meaning that the agency will mark up another account in order to be able to maintain 
the asset from the local budget. 
 
 Local government acquires assets is not solely rely on the grant from related 
ministry, but the local government can procure its own asset.  Regarding the 
procurement, the GoI has recently implemented a system of e-procurement in order to 
eliminate the occurrence of irregularities in procurement processes.   E-procurement 
requires the establishment of a new organisational unit, known as the procurement 
services unit or ULP.  All procurements above IDR 200 million will go through this unit 
and will no longer be handled by local government agencies.  However, this method has 
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not worked as well as expected for several reasons.  First, members of the ULP must be 
certified as procurers, and local governments, particularly in rural areas, are still lacking 
qualified human resources.  Second, the ULP can still be subjected to intervention by 
the head of a local agency in favour of one the tender participants, for example.  Third, 
there is a lack of an integrated database of suppliers, which enables blacklisted suppliers 
from one region to participate in tendering in other regions.  Finally, local government 
agencies have a tendency to break down a procurement that is initially worth more than 
IDR200 million into several smaller procurements, thus allowing the process to be 
managed by the local agency.  
 
 Apart from the internal aspects of government, the involvement of other 
elements is required to strengthen the control mechanisms that have been established by 
central government ministries.  The first element is oversight bodies, which are regarded 
as important for controlling capital expenditure.  However, local government officials 
tend to give more attention to those bodies that threaten severe punishments if they find 
financial irregularities, i.e. the BPK and KPK.  Second, the stakeholders in local 
governments have not been involved as required, although the condition of their 
involvement is underscored in the LoI from the IMF.  This can be seen in the 
involvement of local society in Musrenbang as a way to legalise a predetermined work 
plan.  On the other side, all of the identified stakeholders have own agendas and try to 
realise it.   Overall, the control mechanisms of capital expenditure in local governments 
can be perceived as being still vulnerable to irregularities committed by local 
government officials.    
 
 A Foucauldian perspective has been employed as an analytical lens in this 
study in order to create a framework for identifying the positions of interrelated parties 
and how power in each party is exercised over the others during decision-making 
regarding capital expenditure at the local government level.  The Foucauldian 
perspective is fitting for this study, as its offers historical and cultural reference points 
when portraying the current situation.  Hence, these approaches have been implemented 
in this study in order to obtain a basic idea of the current practices existing in Indonesia 
in both central and local government offices. 
 
 A culture of transparency and accountability that is endorsed by international 
institutions in governance reforms has changed the organisational structure 
substantially, which has affected the structure of power at both the central and local 
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governments level.  Thus, employing a Foucauldian perspective in Indonesian local 
governments can be expected to reveal who holds power, how that power is exercised, 
and how to deal with the exercised power.  Although Foucault derived his ideas from 
historical and cultural approaches to Western society, this study shows that this 
approach can also be usefully employed as an analytical lens for considering 
organisational issues in other global regions outside Europe.  This approach can be 
applied in other parts of the world by considering the history and culture of any 
particular region. 
 
 This study illustrates three main points related to the dynamics of organisation, 
particularly local government the organisation; these are the involvement of many 
parties with different interests, the influences of those parties, and the response of the 
local government officials towards those influences.  Thus, this study gives an 
understanding of the interrelationship between influential parties and the discourses that 
arise surrounding the capital expenditures of local government.  However, this study 
only focuses solely on the perspectives of local government officials, which opens up an 
opportunity for future study to explore the perspectives of other parties that have been 
identified in this study.  Interview with members of regulators, oversight bodies and 
stakeholders is suggested.  Hence, a holistic view can be acquired by involving all of 
those parties.   
 
 This study can be useful as an initial reference point for future studies, as this 
study also encompasses various aspects of capital expenditure, both technical and 
cultural, which have not been explored in previous studies.  Previous studies on local 
government‟s capital expenditure focus on factors affecting capital expenditure 
decision-making, such as the composition of local government finance.  However, none 
of these explores the deeper aspects of capital expenditure decision-making and how 
local government officials deal with the many issues related to it, particularly regarding 
the control mechanisms of capital expenditure.  Thus, this study fills the gap by 
providing insight into the interrelationships between local government officials and the 
related parties in control of capital expenditure, starting with planning, decision-making, 
execution and recognition as an asset of local government.  However, the sample 
population of this study is entirely located on Java Island, near the country‟s capital 
city, where qualified personnel are relatively easy to contact compared to other regions 
in the outer islands.  Therefore, further study should be undertaken for the outer islands, 
with an emphasis on considering how local government officials are dealing with the 
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new procedures, particularly concerning capital expenditure, along with any cultural 
aspects inhibiting the implementation of these procedures.  The same approach and 
theoretical basis might be applied to the outer islands and hence the findings of a study 
in Java Island can be compared with findings from the outer islands. 
 
 This study also considers the influence of cultural aspects on the 
implementation of capital expenditure, and has found that the influence of 
organisational culture and the implementation of control mechanisms are highly related, 
as evident in rural areas where the role of the head of a local government agency is still 
dominant.   His/her staff tends to be more passive and compliant compared to staff in 
regions surrounding or adjacent to provincial centres.  Currently, the central 
government, through related ministries, is focusing on “hard control” by issuing and 
revising regulations and introducing new systems in order to establish rigorous 
procedures.  However, the importance of “soft control”, which is needed to complement 
the hard control that has already been established, is still neglected.  At the moment, 
“hard control” is more advanced than “soft control”, and the less attention given to “soft 
control” inevitably inhibits the implementation of hard control.  Thus, this study 
prescribes importance to the balance between the implementation of soft and hard 
control systems in a government organisation. 
 
 In addition, this study contributes to current practice by sending an important 
message to Indonesian decision makers: that organisational culture, as well as 
procedural control in government offices, needs to be substantially reformed.  For 
example, lack coordination among regulators that consequently affect the performance 
of local government officials because the officials have to prepare many administrative 
works to meet requirements of the regulators.  Although the administrative works are 
intended to strengthen the control mechanism, it needs to be simplified without 
lowering quality of control.  Hence, engagement of the oversight bodies also needs to be 
intensified that are not only emphasised on administrative works.  Consequently, it 
requires more auditors as currently the number of auditors is not proportional to the 
number of local government as auditees.  Regarding stakeholders, it still needs to be 
empowered and regulated, which their involvement is not only as an ornament to meet 
regulations but as components of control to support formal control undertaken by 
oversight bodies.  Meanwhile, the internal condition of local government is necessary to 
get serious attention and needs to be reformed fundamentally, mainly upgrading the 
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quality of the local government officials and build egalitarian environment instead of 
stick on the patriarchal system.   
 
 In summary, the capital expenditure controls of Indonesian local government 
have been improving; however, in implementation the level of control varies depending 
on the conditions and organisational culture of a particular local government.   
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 
Ratio of Capital Expenditures to Total Expenditures of Municipal Governments 
(in thousand IDR5) 
YEARS 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Indirect Expenditure 
     
87,405,357,099  
  108,548,513,241   134,527,570,742   156,617,007,328   188,589,276,241 
Direct Expenditure 
     
99,652,408,963 
  133,045,900,061   143,692,431,250   146,926,567,973   143,888,335,960  
                                                          
5 Exchange rate on 2006 – 2010, USD1 were  between IDR9,020 – IDR8,991 
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TOTAL 
EXPENDITURES 
  187,057,766,062    241,594,413,302   278,220,001,992    303,543,575,301   332,477,612,201 
Capital Expenditure 60,409,354,360 74,499,348,112 78,973,206,315 78,441,736,968 70,614,542,366 
Ratio of Capital 
Expenditure to Total 
Expenditure 
32.29% 30.84% 28.39% 25.84% 21.24% 
Note: The table is produced based on data from Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) / Centre 
Bureau of Statistic (www.bps.go.id).   
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Ratio of Capital Expenditures to Total Expenditures of Provincial Governments 
(in thousand IDR) 
YEARS 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Indirect Expenditure  24,218,934,530  30,302,209,927  36,214,961,163  45,398,365,063     48,855,323,889     55,626,315,588 
Direct Expenditure  24,980,872,207  34,483,611,934  39,726,141,320  43,212,462,677     53,029,301,998 
58.446.922.847  
 
TOTAL 
EXPENDITURES 
 49,199,806,737  64,785,821,861  75,941,102,483  88,610,827,740   101,884,625,887   114.073.238.435 
Capital Expenditure  12,203,423,086  18,163,225,121  19,565,920,017  18,896,876,045     24,246,695,616     26,722,956,306 
Ratio of Capital 
Expenditure to Total 
Expenditure 
24.80% 28.04% 25.76% 21,33% 23.80% 23.02% 
Note: The table is produced based on data from Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) / Centre 
Bureau of Statistic (www.bps.go.id). 
 
 
 
Appendix 3 
Ratio of Capital Expenditures to Total Expenditures of Central Government 
(in thousand IDR) 
YEARS 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
TOTAL 
EXPENDITURES 
  504,623,000,000   693,356,000,000   628,812,000,000   697,406,000,000   908,243,000,000 
Capital Expenditure 
     
64,289,000,000 
    72,773,000,000     75,871,000,000     80,287,000,000   140,952,000,000 
Ratio of Capital 
12.74% 10.50% 12.07% 11.51% 15.52% 
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Expenditure to Total 
Expenditures 
 
Note: The table is produced based on data from Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) / Centre 
Bureau of Statistic (www.bps.go.id).   
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  YEAR SOCIO-POLITICAL 
CONDITIONS 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS CONTROL FUNCTION 
IN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT  
FINANCIAL 
SYSTEMS 
ACCOUNTING 
SYSTEM 
1945 – 1948 Revolution still occurred, yet 
the Dutch did not recognise 
independence of Indonesia 
that adopted unitary state 
system. 
The Indonesia central committee held an 
important position and became a legislative 
body in every region.  Subsequently, the 
committee nominated governors for established 
provinces assisted by the „Badan Executive‟ 
(Executive Body) 
 
Head of local government led 
the legislative and executive 
body. 
Bookkeeping referred to 
the Dutch regulations. 
Cash basis and 
single entry 
1948 – 1949 The local government had been divided into 
three levels in a hierarchical model.    The 
government established local parliaments as 
legislative bodies along with local government 
councils as executive bodies at every level. 
 
The head of local 
government held the position 
as head of the executive 
body, and as representative 
of the central government. 
 
1949 – 1950 As a part of formal 
recognition of independence, 
Indonesia must adopt a 
federal state system. 
 
The Indonesian Republic became one of sixteen 
provinces/states, yet did not establish 
governmental system for a federal state. 
 
 
1950 – 1957 Indonesia already had formal 
recognition as an 
independent country.  
However, there were still 
many uprisings in many 
regions. 
Indonesia re-established local governments at 
three levels in a hierarchical model. One 
improvement from the previous laws, that the 
head of local government was elected directly 
by the local parliament. 
 
The central government took 
control over the local 
governments and abolished 
the role of the head of local 
government as the central 
government representative. 
 
The government passed 
the law in 1955 
concerning application of 
the cash basis in financial 
reporting. 
1957 – 1965 President „Sukarno‟ declared 
„guided democracy‟ which 
underplayed the role of  
parliament. 
 
The government still divided regions into three 
levels in a hierarchical model.  The local 
government consisted of local government 
councils and daily government agency.  The 
role of local parliament was downplayed. 
The heads of local 
governments gained position 
again as representatives of 
the central government, and 
the local parliament could 
Appendix 4 
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 not demote the head of local 
government. 
 
1966 – 1998 The „Sukarno‟ regime 
collapsed and was replaced 
by „Suharto‟ regime.   
 
The regions were divided into two levels of 
local government in hierarchical order.  The 
local government consisted of local parliament 
as a legislative body, and the head of local 
government as an executive body.  The head of 
local government was proposed by the local 
parliament, but the President had a prerogative 
to choose the head of local government that 
might be different with the proposal of the local 
government. 
 
The head of local 
government again holds the 
position as government 
representative and must be 
responsible to the President.  
In addition, they also need to 
provide accountability 
reports to the local 
parliament. 
In this era, government 
still applied the cash 
basis.  The central 
government took control 
over financing of the 
local government budget. 
1999 – 2011 The „Suharto‟ regime 
collapsed and the parliament 
adopted a democratic 
system, both for central and 
local government.  The 
system also requires more 
transparent and accountable 
governmental finance.  
 
The central government still applied the same 
zoning system; even more the government gave 
wide decentralised authority to the local 
governments to manage their revenues and 
expenditures.  The local parliaments had 
broader authority than in the previous era.  The 
local parliament could demote the head of local 
government.  In this era, the government started 
to apply the direct election model, with people 
in particular areas voting for the head of their 
local government. 
 
The heads of local 
government in districts and 
cities do not have 
hierarchical relation with the 
upper level (governor).  
However, they need to 
provide accountability 
reports to the local 
parliament.  
 
In this era, the local 
governments have 
broader authority to 
manage their revenues 
and expenditures.  
However, they still relied 
on subsidies from the 
central government. 
Applied cash 
towards accrual 
and double-
entry system 
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Appendix 5 
The Proportions of Fund Allocation from Central Government on 2012 to 2014 
 
National Allocation 2012 2013 2014 
Dana Alokasi Umum (DAU)  
(General Allocated Fund) 
57.8% 59.8% 58.9% 
Dana Alokasi Khusus (DAK) 
(Specific Allocated Fund) 
5.5% 6.1% 5.7% 
Dana Bagi Hasil (DBH) 
(Shared Revenue Fund) 
21.8% 17.8% 18.5% 
Dana Penyesuaian 
(Adjustment Fund) 
12.3% 13.7% 14.1% 
Dana Otonomi Khusus 
(Special Autonomy Fund) 
2.5% 2.6% 2.8% 
         Source: http://www.kemenkeu.go.id/Page/diagram-informasi-transfer-ke-daerah#node-
4064 
 
 
 
Appendix 6 
Previous Studies about Indonesian Local Government 
Title Studied by Result 
A case study of governmental 
accounting and budgeting reform at 
local authority in Indonesia: an 
institutionalist perspective 
 
Djamhuri, A 
(2009) 
Result of this study indicated that 
introducing of new budgeting and 
accounting system will cause 
decoupling due to the insufficient 
quantity and quality of staff in 
accounting and the rigidity of 
bureaucratic culture. 
 
Analisis faktor-faktor yang 
berpengaruh terhadap keterandalan 
dan ketepatwaktuan pelaporan 
keuangan pada SKPD pemerintah 
daerah kota Kendari 
(Analysis of factors affecting 
reliability and timeliness of financial 
reporting in local authority of 
Kendari) 
 
Mustafa, et al. 
(2011) 
Internal control and application of 
information technology affect 
reliability of financial statements, 
while capacity of personnel did 
not affect the reliability because 
these personnel still have low 
abilities and education regarding 
governmental accounting. 
  
Pengembangan sistem anggaran dan 
akuntansi Badan Layanan Umum 
Universitas Brawijaya: Sebuah studi 
interpretative 
(Development of budgeting and 
accounting system of Brawijaya 
University as a state owned 
company: an interpretative study) 
 
Amirya, et al. 
(2011) 
This study indicated that adoption 
of budgeting and accounting 
systems is required to gain 
legitimacy. 
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Perilaku opportunistik legislatif 
dalam penganggaran daerah: Bukti 
empiris atas aplikasi agency theory 
di sektor publik 
(Opportunistic behaviour of  the 
legislative in local government 
budgeting: Empirical evidence on 
application of agency theory in the 
public sector) 
 
Abdullah, S. & 
Asmara, J.A. 
(2006) 
This study indicated that 
legislative members behave 
opportunistically towards 
budgeting processes, which were 
affected by Pendapatan Asli 
Daerah (local government 
income); and Anggaran 
Pendapatan Daerah (local 
government budget) as a medium 
for corruption. 
 
The influence of internal control 
systems on the reliability of local 
government financial statements 
(Case study at East Java Province) 
 
Nugraha, D.S. 
(2010) 
This study indicated the 
importance of the internal control 
system affecting reliability of 
financial statements.  Especially 
two components of five 
components of internal control, 
i.e. the control environment, and 
information and communications 
affected the reliability of financial 
statements significantly.  
 
Pengaruh tekanan eksternal, 
ketidakpastian lingkungan, dan 
komitmen manajemen terhadap 
penerapan transparansi pelaporan 
keuangan 
(Influence of external pressures, 
uncertainty, and management 
commitment towards implementation 
of financial reporting) 
 
Ridha, M.A. & 
Basuki H. 
(2011) 
This study indicated that 
implementation of financial 
transparency was affected by 
external pressures, which were 
imposed through laws and 
regulation from the central 
government; and by management 
commitment. 
 
Akuntabilitas dan transparansi 
dalam pertanggungjawaban 
pemerintah daerah untuk 
mewujudkan pemerintahan yang baik 
di daerah (Studi di Kabupaten 
Kebumen) 
(Accountability and transparency as 
local government‟s responsibility to 
realise good corporate governance 
(Study in Kebumen district) 
 
Rahmanurrasjid, 
A. (2008) 
Involvement of the local 
parliament tends to be political 
and local society also has 
propensity to be apathetic toward 
accountability reporting  
Studi evaluasi dampak pemekaran 
daerah 2001 - 2007 
(Evaluation study of impact of local 
government enlargement) 
 
Badan 
Perencanaan 
Pembangunan 
Nasional / 
Bappenas 
(2008) 
 
This study suggested several 
points, i.e. low quality of local 
government officers; 
underemployed of the officers; 
and qualifications of the available 
officers do not fit with 
requirements. 
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Governance and poverty reduction: 
Evidence from newly decentralised 
Indonesia 
 
Sumarto, S., et 
al. (2004) 
Bad governance affects poverty 
reduction significantly; local 
governments with better 
governance experience faster 
poverty reduction. 
  
Do attitudes towards corruption 
differ across cultures? Experimental 
evidence from Australia, India, 
Indonesia, and Singapore 
Cameron et al. 
(2005) 
Results of this study in Indonesia 
indicated that recent 
democratisation and press 
freedom strengthen efforts against 
corruption. 
 
Voice lessons: Local government 
organisations, social organisations, 
and the quality of local government 
Alatas et al. 
(2002) 
0This study indicated roles of 
social organisations to enhance 
performance of government 
institution in Indonesia. 
 
Obstacles to public sector accounting 
reform in Indonesia  
Harun (2007) Improvement in accountability 
will thread overall income level of 
politicians and bureaucrats.  In 
human resources aspects, this 
study indicated lack of accounting 
skills. 
 
 
 
Appendix 7 
List of Interviewees as Primary Sources 
No. District Local 
Government 
Agency 
Date of 
Interview 
Number of 
Interviewee 
Position of 
Interviewee 
Code 
1. Bantul Dinas Perhubungan 19 September 
2013 
2 Head of agency, 
and Finance 
department 
HOA 1 
SFO 1 
2. Bantul Dinas Pendidikan 
Dasar 
13 September 
2013 
1 Planning 
Department 
SPO 1 
3. Bantul  Dinas Pendidikan 
Menengah dan 
Non-Formal 
12 September 
2013 
3 Planning, and 
Finance 
Department 
SPO 2 
JPO 1 
SFO 2 
4. Bantul Dinas Kelautan dan 
Perikanan 
11 September 
2013 
3 Planning, and 
Finance 
Department 
SPO 3 
JPO 2 
SFO 3 
5. Bantul Dinas Pekerjaan 
Umum 
10 September 
2013 
3 Planning, Finance 
Department, and 
Secretary of 
agency 
SPO 4 
SFO 4 
SOA 1 
6. Bantul Inspektorat 01 October 2013 1 Head of agency HOA 2 
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7. Gunung 
Kidul 
DPPKAD 23 August 2013 2 Head of the 
agency, and 
finance 
department 
HOA 3 
SFO 5 
8. Gunung 
Kidul 
Dinas Peternakan 23 August 2013 3 Planning, and 
Finance 
Department 
SPO 5 
JPO 3 
SFO 6 
9. Gunung 
Kidul 
Dinas Pendidikan, 
Pemuda, dan 
Olahraga 
20 August 2013 2 Secretary of the 
agency, and 
Finance 
department 
SOA 2 
SFO 7 
10. Gunung 
Kidul 
Dinas 
Perhubungan, 
Komunikasi dan 
Informatika 
21 August 2013 1 Planning 
department 
SPO 6 
11. Gunung 
Kidul 
Inspektorat 21 August 2013 2 Internal Auditor SIA 1 
SIA 2 
12. Gunung 
Kidul 
RSUD Wonosari 21 August 2013 2 Planning, and 
Finance 
department 
SPO 7 
SFO 8 
13. Kulon 
Progo 
RSUD Wates 19 September 
2013 
1 Secretary of 
agency 
SOA 3 
14. Kulon 
Progo 
Inspektorat 09 September 
2013 
1 Secretary of 
agency 
SOA 4 
15. Kulon 
Progo 
Dinas Kesehatan 03 September 
2013 
1 Head of agency HOA 4 
16. Kulon 
Progo 
Dinas Kebudayaan, 
Pariwisata, Pemuda 
dan Olahraga 
06 September 
2013 
2 Head of agency 
and planning 
department 
HOA 5 
SPO 8 
17. Kulon 
Progo 
Dinas Pendidikan 03 September 
2013 
2 Secretary of 
agency, and 
Finance 
department 
SOA 5 
SFO 9 
18. Kulon 
Progo 
Dinas Kelautan, 
Peternakan, dan 
Perikanan 
04 September 
2013 
1 Secretary of 
agency 
SOA 6 
19. Kulon 
Progo 
Dinas Pekerjaan 
Umum 
04 September 
2013 
1 Head of the 
agency 
HOA 6 
20. Sleman Dinas SDAEM 18 September 
2013 
1 Planning 
department 
SPO 9 
21. Sleman Dinas Dikpora 23 September 
2013 
3 Finance, Planning, 
and Asset 
management 
SFO 10  
SFO 11 
SPO 10 
22. Sleman Inspektorat 03 October 2013 1 Head of agency HOA 7 
23. Sleman Dinas Perhubungan 03 October 2013 2 Secretary of 
agency, and 
Finance 
department 
SOA 7 
SFO 12 
24. Sleman Dinas Pertanian 02 October 2013 1 Planning 
department  
SPO 10 
25. City of 
Yogyakarta 
Dinas Gedung, 
Bangunan, dan 
Aset Daerah 
26 September 
2013 
3 Secretary of the 
agency, Planning, 
and Finance 
department  
SOA 8 
SPO 11 
SFO  13 
26. City of Dinas Lingkungan 26 September 1 Planning SPO 12 
170 
 
Yogyakarta Hidup 2013 department 
27. City of 
Yogyakarta 
Dinas Kesehatan 25 September 
2013 
1 Planning 
department 
SPO 13 
28. City of 
Yogyakarta  
Dinas Perhubungan 25 September 
2013 
1 Planning 
department 
SPO 14 
29. City of 
Yogyakarta 
Dinas Pemukiman, 
Prasarana Wilayah 
25 September 
2013 
2 Secretary of the 
agency, and 
Planning 
department 
SOA 9 
SPO 15 
30. Province of 
Yogyakarta 
Inspektorat 29 August 2013 1 Planning 
department 
SPO 16 
31. Province of 
Yogyakarta 
DPPKAD 23 August 2013 4 Secretary of the 
agency, Finance, 
and Planning 
department 
SOA 10 
SFO 14 
SPO 17 
SPO 18 
32. Province of 
Yogyakarta 
Dinas Pendidikan 
dan Pelatihan 
15 August 2013 3 Secretary of the 
agency, Finance, 
and Planning 
department 
SOA 11 
SFO 15 
SPO 19 
33. Province of 
Yogyakarta 
Dinas PUP dan 
ESDM 
15 August 2013 1 Secretary of the 
agency 
SOA 12 
34. Province of 
Yogyakarta 
Dinas Kelautan dan 
Perikanan 
16 August 2013 1 Secretary of the 
agency 
SOA 13 
35. Province of 
Yogyakarta 
Badan 
Perpustakaan dan 
Arsip Daerah 
14 August 2013 2 Head and 
secretary of the 
agency 
HOA 8 
SOA 14 
36. Province of 
Yogyakarta 
Badan 
Penanggulangan 
Bencana Daerah 
13 August 2013 2 Secretary of the 
agency, and 
planning 
department 
SOA 15 
SPO 20 
37. Province of 
Yogyakarta 
RSUD Grahasia 19 August 2013 1 Secretary of the 
agency 
SOA 16 
TOTAL 37 Local Government Agencies 64 Local Government Officers  
 
Abbreviation: 
JFO:  Junior Finance Officer 
JPO:  Junior Planning Officer 
HOA:  Head of Local Government Agency 
SFO:  Senior Finance Officer 
SIA:  Senior Internal Auditor 
SOA:  Secretary of Local Government Agency 
SPO:  Senior Planning Officer 
 
 
171 
 
Appendix 8 
List of Questions / Daftar Pertanyaan 
1. Would you please tell me about capital expenditures in this province/city/district?  
Tolong anda ceritakan mengenai beberapa belanja modal di 
provinsi/kodya/kabupaten?  
 
2 Would you please tell me how does funding flow from central government to the 
specific project? 
Bisakah anda jelaskan bagaimana mengenai pendanaan mulai dari pemerintah 
pusat sampai ke belanja modal tersebut? 
 
3 Why does the province/city/district approve the particular expenditures and reject 
the other proposal of expenditures? 
Mengapa provinsi/kodya/kabupaten menyetujui suatu belanja modal tertentu dan 
menolak pengajuan belanja modal yang lain? 
 
4 Would you please tell me about your perception with regard financial systems and 
procedures?  
Bagaimana menurut persepsi anda mengenai sistem keuangan dan prosedur 
pengendalian yang sudah ada saat ini? 
 
5 What are difficulties in implementation of the capital expenditures in relation with 
other unit/other section/third parties, and with systems and procedures? 
Apakah kesulitan yang dihadapi waktu implementasi belanja modal dalam 
kaitannya dengan unit lain/bagian lain/pihak ketiga, dan kepatuhan kepada sistem 
dan prosedur? 
 
6 How do you deal with the difficulties? 
Bagaimana cara mengatasi kesulitan-kesulitan tersebut? 
 
7 What would you like to see done differently, if you have authorisation for it? 
Apakah perbedaan yang ingin anda lakukan jika anda memiliki kewenangan untuk 
itu?  
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Appendix 9 
List of Secondary Sources 
No. Name of Interviewee Position of the Interviewee Date of Interview 
1. Emil Salim An economic advisor to the late President 
Suharto, Vice-chairman of the National 
Planning Board, and  
held various cabinet-level positions for the 
improvement of state apparatus, 
communications, development supervision, 
the environment. 
 
6 July 2009 
2. Erry Firmansyah Former president of the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange (Indonesia Stock Exchange). 
 
10 July 2009 
3. Erry Hardjapamekas First appointed commissioner on the KPK 
(Komisi Perberantasan Korupsi, 
Corruption Eradication Commission). 
 
22 February 2012 
4. Erwin Ariadharma A Senior Public Sector Management 
Specialist at the World Bank. 
 
9 July 2009 
5. Hadi Soesastro The executive director of the CSIS (Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies). 
 
7 July 2009 
6. Juwono Sudarsono The minister has been Minister for State, 
for the Environment, Minister for 
Education and Culture, the first civilian 
Minister of Defense in Indonesia's history, 
ambassador to the UK under then President 
(Megawati) Sukarnoputri and currently 
Minister of Defense since 2004. 
 
7 July 2009 
7. Muhammad A.S. Hikam A researcher at the Indonesian Institute of 
Sciences, a government-owned research 
institution, in Center for Economic and 
Development Studies (PEP-LIPI) from 
1983 until 2001. Appointed as a cabinet 
minister in 1999. 
 
14 July 2009 
8. Rizal Ramli Headed the nation's State Logistics Agency 
and most notably was Coordinating 
Minister for Economic Affairs under the 
administration of President Abdurrahman 
Wahid, and also Minister of Finance. 
 
15 July 2009 
9. Robert Pakpahan The Director of Business Processes 
Transformation at the DG (Directorate 
General) Tax in the Ministry of Finance in 
Indonesia, which is basically in charge of 
improving or developing current processes, 
mostly administrative aspect of these 
organizations. 
16 July 2009 
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10. Sarwono Kusumaatmadja Had a longstanding involvement with 
Indonesian politics, most notably as 
secretary-general of the Golkar Party, state 
minister for Administrative Reform, and 
minister for the Environment under 
President Suharto, minister of Maritime 
Affairs. 
 
9 July 2009 
11. Siti Nurbaya Had an important role in implementing 
Indonesia's decentralization policy as the 
secretary general of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs from February 2001 to May 2005. 
 
7 June 2010 
12. Sri Mulyani Indrawati The Minister of Finance (former). 
 
14 July 2009 
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Appendix 10 
Flowchart of Planning Process of Local Government Agencies along with the Timeline 
 
Local 
Parliament
Local Government 
Agencies
Local Government
Ministry of Home 
Affair / Governor
Guideline to formulate local budget 
(Anggaran Pembangunan Belanja 
Daerah / APBD)
(Rencana 
Pembangunan 
Jangka Menengah 
Daerah / RPJMD)
Work plan of local 
government 
(Rencana Kerja 
Pemerintah Daerah / 
RKPD)
January - May
Medium-term 
development plan 
(Rencana 
Pembangunan Jangka 
Menengah Daerah / 
RPJMD)
Strategic plan of local 
government agencies
(Rencana Stategis 
Satuan Kerja 
Pemerintah Daerah / 
Renstra SKPD)
Work plan of local 
government agencies
(Rencana Kerja 
Satuan Kerja 
Pemerintah Daerah / 
Renja SKPD)
June - July
Draft of general policy of local budget / 
APBD
Head of local government with 
local parliament are 
discussing about the draft of 
general policy of local budget
Draft of the general policy of 
local budget is ratified into 
general policy of local budget
Draft of priority and temporary 
budget ceiling
MOU between head of local 
government and local 
parliament
Guideline of formulation of 
work plan and budget of local 
government agency
(Rencana Kerja dan Anggaran 
– Satuan Kerja Perangkat 
Daerah / RKA-SKPD)
Formulating work plan and 
budget of local government 
agency
(Rencana Kerja dan Anggaran 
– Satuan Kerja Perangkat 
Daerah / RKA-SKPD)
August - September October - December
Authorisation of draft of local regulation for local 
budget by Ministry of Home Affair for local 
government (province/district/city)
Formulating draft of 
local regulation for 
local budget
Local regulation for 
local budget
Secretary of local 
government socialise to 
local society regarding 
draft of local regulation for 
local budget before it will 
be discussing with local 
parliament 
Discussing draft of local 
regulation for local budget
 
 
 
Source: Rancangan Pedoman Umum Perencanaan Pengadaan Barang/Jasa Pemerintah di Lingkungan Kementerian/Lembaga/Satuan Kerja 
Perangkat Daerah/Institusi Lainnya, LKPP (Lembaga Kebijakan Pengadaaan Barang/Jasa Pemerintah, Appendix 2.3 
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Appendix 11 
Research Finding 
 
 
 
REGULATIONS
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
STAKEHOLDERS
FORMAL BODIESLOCAL GOVERNMENT
Suppliers / Vendors
NGOs Society
Local Parliament
Adjacent Local 
Government
Mass Media
State owned 
company
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Home 
Affairs
Ministry of 
Empowerment of 
State Apparatus and 
Bureaucratic Reform
Inspectorate
Code Ethics
Sekretariat Bersama
(Joint secretariat for adjacent 
local government
BPKP (Badan Pengawasan 
Keuangan dan 
Pembangunan) / Internal 
auditor of central government
KPK (Komisi 
Pemberantasan 
Korupsi) / Comission of 
corruption eradication
BPK (Badan Pengawas 
Keuangan) / Indonesian 
supreme audit
Leadership
Technology
Human resources 
aspects
Cultural and regional 
aspects
UKP4 (Unit Kerja Presiden 
bidang Pengawasan dan 
Pengendalian Pembangunan / 
Unit for development monitoring 
and oversight that responsible 
directly to president)
Related ministry
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Appendix 12 
Evolving Regulations Concerning Capital Expenditure 
 
Regulations in Pre-reform Era Regulations in Post-reform Era 
Government Regulation 
36 / 1972 
Presidential Decree 
16 / 1994 
Presidential Decree 
24 / 1995 
Presidential Decree 
18 / 2000 
Presidential Decree 
80 / 2003 
Presidential Decree 
54 / 2010 
Presidential Decree 
70 / 2012 
 
This regulation 
distinguished two types of 
local budget, i.e. Routine 
budget and development 
budget.  The latter budget 
was specified based on 
field, sector/sub-sector, 
programme, and 
project/sub-project. 
 
Regarding local 
government expenditures, 
the head of local 
government has authority 
to spend funds as long as it 
was outlined in the local 
budget that has been 
approved by the local 
parliament.   
 
All spending must be 
accompanied by SKO 
(Surat Keputusan 
Otorisasi / Official letter 
of authorisation) issued by 
the head of local 
government. 
 
Any invoice from a 
supplier must be 
accompanied with 
 
This presidential decree 
had indicated four ways 
that goods or services 
may be procured. 
- Public Tender, 
- Limited Tender, 
- Direct selection, 
- Direct Appointment. 
 
Public tender was open 
to all qualified bidders. 
 
Limited tender relates to 
procurement in which a 
minimum of five 
potentials suppliers who 
are listed in government 
database to participate. 
 
Direct selection was 
procurement without 
tender.  It involves 
comparing technical 
specifications and prices 
from at least three 
potential suppliers. 
 
Direct appointment was 
procurement without 
tender or selection, 
because it was directed 
 
This presidential decree 
was intended to revise 
several articles of 
Presidential Decree 
16/1994. 
  
Direct appointment was 
directed to small 
enterprises.  Hence, it did 
not need public or limited 
tender or direct selection. 
 
Meanwhile, the direct 
selection can be performed 
for projects between 
IDR15 million to IDR50 
million. 
 
At the province level, 
direct selection of supplier 
can be undertaken for 
projects between IDR50 
million to IDR1 billion.   
 
Projects between IDR1 
billion to IDR5 billion 
must be approved by the 
Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. Above IDR5 
billion  must be approved 
by Coordinator Ministries 
 
This presidential 
decree has emphasised 
roles of heads of local 
government agencies 
as both budget user 
and procurement 
committee. 
 
Officers  authorised   
to determine suppliers 
of goods or services 
were: 
- Head of local 
government 
agency  
responsible for 
direct selection or 
direct 
appointment for 
procurement up to 
IDR50 billion, 
 
- Head of local 
government for 
procurement 
above IDR50 
billion, or 
Governor if the 
procurement was 
funded by the 
province. 
 
In this decree, the 
procurement officers 
started to have roles to 
handle procurement up 
to IDR50 million. 
 
Meanwhile, 
procurement above 
IDR50 million will be 
handled by the 
procurement 
committee.   
 
Selection of suppliers 
through four method, 
i.e. public tender; 
limited tender for 
complex work; direct 
selection from at least 
three supplier for 
procurement up to 
IDR100 million; and 
direct appointment of 
a supplier in specific 
circumstances or 
maximum worth 
IDR50 million. 
 
Cash paid in advance 
for small enterprise 
supplier was set up to 
 
This presidential decree 
initiated the 
establishment of LKPP 
(Lembaga Kebijakan 
Pengadaan Barang/Jasa 
Pemerintah / Agency 
formulating policies of 
government 
procurement), and 
determined each actor in 
procurement, along with 
their roles. 
 
Procurement was 
undertaken in several 
ways: 
- Public tender for all 
qualified suppliers 
to participate; 
- Limited tender for 
complex works;  
- Simple tender for 
procurement worth 
up to IDR200 
million; 
- Direct selection for 
construction work 
that has a maximum 
value of IDR200 
million; 
- Direct appointment 
 
This presidential decree 
revised the previous 
decree.   
 
The involvement of the 
ULP is revised from 
IDR100 million to 
IRDR200 million up to 
IDR100 billion for 
construction work; and 
consultancy services limits 
remain the same IDR50 
million up to IDR10 
billion.  
 
Any work worth below 
IDR200 million or 
consultancy services below 
IDR50 million can be 
undertaken by a 
procurement officer 
 
Complex work is defined 
as work worth at least 
IDR100 billion. 
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supporting documents that 
was stipulated by the head 
of local government. 
 
The amount of cash in 
advance that will be paid 
to a supplier was 
determined by the head of 
local government and local 
parliament. 
 
Any project with value 
exceeding that which had 
been determined, must be 
undertaken through 
general procurement or 
limited procurement. 
 
Cash paid in advance may 
not exceed 20% of the 
value of the total project 
after the supplier submitted 
a bank guarantee. 
 
Head of local government 
undertook public or limited 
tenders, and appoints the 
most favourable bidder. 
 
Local government officers 
are not allowed to 
participate in any project 
from local government 
directly or indirectly. 
 
 
 
 
for small enterprises. 
 
Implementation of 
procurement was 
regulated as follows: 
- Up to IDR5 million 
limit for the direct 
appointment of 
small enterprises, 
 
- From IDR5 million 
to IDR15 million for 
direct appointment 
referring to list of 
head of local 
government, 
 
- FromIDR15 million 
to IDR50 million 
was direct selection 
from at least three 
potential suppliers, 
 
- Above IDR50 
million was 
undertaken through 
public or limited 
tender. 
of Economic, Finance, and 
development. 
 
In the municipal level (city 
or district), direct selection 
can be performed for 
projects between IDR50 
million and IDR500 
million.   
 
Projects between IDR500 
million to IDR1 billion can 
be performed if acquired 
approval from the 
governor. Projects from 
IDR1 billion to IDR5 
billion must get approval 
from the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs.  Finally,  
projects above IDR5 
billion must have approval 
from Coordinator 
Ministries of Economic, 
Finance, and 
Development. 
 
 
Evaluation of bidder 
of tender will be 
undertaking through 
three method, i.e. 
- Single-elimination 
system 
- Value system 
- Live cycle cost. 
 
Cash in advance can 
be paid based on the 
contract. 
30% of value of 
contract; meanwhile 
for other enterprises 
was up to 20% of the 
value of the contract. 
 
A „small enterprise‟ 
was defined as a 
company that has 
maximum net assets of 
IDR200 million and 
maximum net sales of 
IDR1 billion per 
annum.  In addition, 
the company is not a 
subsidiary of a 
medium or large 
company. 
 
A foreign company 
was allowed to 
participate in 
procurement with 
requirements as 
follows: 
- Construction  
with value above 
IDR50 billion, 
- Other 
goods/services for 
value above 
IDR10 billion, 
- Consultancy 
services worth 
IDR5 billion 
in which one 
supplier is 
appointed; 
- Direct 
appointment/procure
ment. 
This decree became the 
foundation for the 
establishment the ULP 
(Unit Layanan 
Pengadaan / 
Procurement service 
unit). Any procurement 
or construction work 
above IDR100 million 
up to IDR100 billion, 
and consultancy services 
worth above IDR50 
million up to IDR10 
billion must be procured 
by the ULP. 
 
Meanwhile, procurement 
for goods/services worth 
below IDR100 million, 
or IDR50 million for 
consultancy services can 
be undertaken by either 
the ULP or a 
procurement officer. 
 
Procurement below 
IDR200 million can be 
undertaken by simple 
tender or direct selection. 
Assumption: at that time US$1 was equal approximately IDR2,000; currently USD$1 is equal IDR14,000 
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Appendix 13 
Mechanism of Selection of Suppliers 
Source: Rancangan Pedoman Umum Perencanaan Pengadaan Barang/Jasa Pemerintah di 
Lingkungan Kementerian/Lembaga/Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah/Institusi Lainnya, LKPP 
(Lembaga Kebijakan Pengadaaan Barang/Jasa Pemerintah, P.52 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 14 
Leading sectors in Each Region of D.I. Yogyakarta Province 
 
Main Industry 
Region 
Kulon 
Progo 
Gunungkidul Bantul Sleman 
City of 
Yogyakarta 
Agriculture 50.24% 54.41% 16.98% 18.86% 0.25% 
Manufacturing Industry 11.61% 8.56% 21.78% 11.83% 9.78% 
Wholesale, Retail Trade, and Restaurant 17.80% 15.70% 26.62% 28.54% 47.57% 
Services 12.17% 12.31% 20.95% 25.66% 26.28% 
Others 8.18% 9.02% 13.67% 15.12% 16.12% 
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik D.I.Yogyakarta (Central Agency on Statistics of the 
Special Region of Yogyakarta), 2014, p.95 
 
 
 
 
 
Master plan of procurement of 
goods/services (RUP) 
submitted to committing officer 
(Pejabat Pembuat Komitment / 
PPK) and Procurement 
service unit (Unit Layanan 
Pengadaan / ULP or 
Procurement officer (Pejabat 
Pengadaan / PP)
PPK and ULP/PP set plan for 
selection of supplier goods/
services by referring to RUP. 
Any amendment  of 
procurement package, PPK 
and ULP/PP must be written 
into an official report of 
amendment and must be 
approved by budget user 
(Pengguna Anggaran / PA or 
Kuasa Pengguna Anggaran / 
KPA)
ULP / PP specify selection of 
procurement system encompassing:
- Method of selection;
- Method of submission of tender;
- Method of evaluation of tender;
- Types of contract
PPK determine planning of procurement encompassing:
- Technical specification;
- Detail of self estimated price (Harga Perkiraan Sendiri / HPS)
- Draft of contract
ULP / PP is drafting and determining documents of 
procurement of goods/services, include:
- Document of assessment of qualification;
- Document of selection of supplier of goods/services
ULP / PP determine schedule of selection of supplier 
of goods/services
Documents of procurement goods/services 
encompassing:
- Document of assessment of qualification;
- Document of selection of supplier of goods/services;
- Schedule of selection of suppliers
Dissemination / invitation for 
pre-qualification / selection by 
ULP / PP
Registration and collection of 
pre-qualification document / 
document selection of 
suppliers of goods/services
November December
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Appendix 15 
Distribution of Civil Servants Based on Their Levels of Education 
 
Level of Education 
Region 
Kulon  
Progo 
Bantul Gunungkidul Sleman 
Yogyakarta 
City 
DIY 
Province 
High school 31.56% 26.22% 28.29% 26.39% 28.98% 42.46% 
Vocational 29.65% 28.80% 26.57% 29.19% 22.75% 12.19% 
Degree 36.83% 41.93% 42.41% 41.34% 45.32% 39.88% 
Specialist or Master Degree 1.95% 3.05% 2.72% 3.06% 2.95% 5.45% 
Doctoral  0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.00% 0.03% 
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik D.I.Yogyakarta (Central Agency on Statistics of the 
Special Region of Yogyakarta), 2014, p.77 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 16 
Distribution of Civil Servants Based on Their Levels Education 
 
 
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik D.I.Yogyakarta (Central Agency on Statistics of the 
Special Region of Yogyakarta), 2014, p.77 
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Appendix 17 
Capital Expenditure in Regions of the Province of D.I. Yogyakarta 
 
 
Province of D.I. 
Yogyakarta 
Region of 
Bantul 
Region of 
Gunungkidul 
Region of 
Kulon Progo 
Region of 
Sleman 
City of 
Yogyakarta 
2013 292,505 146,797 179,342 118,397 201,672 121,557 
2012 217,959 127,094 190,308 138,686 130,674 85,153 
2011 150,174 90,932 143,141 77,093 110,782 71,352 
2010 131,691 67,552 104,126 42,170 65,333 58,270 
(in IDR millions, exchange rate $1=IDR14,000) 
Source: http://www.kemenkeu.go.id/Page/data-keuangan-daerah  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 18 
Capital Expenditure in Regions of the Province of D.I.Yogyakarta 
 
 
(in IDR millions, exchange rate $1=IDR14,000) 
Source: http://www.kemenkeu.go.id/Page/data-keuangan-daerah  
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